In the forest we die. The border between Poland and Belarus: a human retaliation.

In general, societies all over the world recognize rights to living beings and to human beings in the first place. The type of rights recognized varies according to the cultures, traditions, political and ideological systems of each society, but, according to the so-called naturalists, it is commonly accepted that there are some fundamental rights that are independent from the legal system to which they belong. These rights are defined as “rights of nature”. So the question arises: are there “environmental rights” among the rights of nature? The answer is controversial and not at all obvious. In recent years, progress has been made and the issue of the environment is no longer an elitist discourse that only scientists and activists talk about. Environmental protection movements have spread globally, the international political agenda has set as a top priority that of reducing climate change and facing the consequent environmental disasters. It is clearly recognizable that this issue has really taken hold in the political debate at all levels, but this does not always translate into a true recognition of environmental rights. There is still no univocal opinion that confirms and outlines if and what they are, or at least, it is often discussed and finds controversy arising from very varied needs and contexts. There are those who focus more on the effects that environmental damage causes on humans, those on animals and those more generally on the Planet, thus complicating the attribution of these rights to specific subjects. In general, rights are always included in the binomial rights-duties that can fall on the same subject or not. In the field of environmental rights, the identification of both positions is complex and remains an unsolvable problem in many cases. In addition, environmental rights are recognized in a heterogeneous manner in the various countries of the world and this is certainly due to very different sensitivities. Some legal systems have felt the urgency to recognize environmental rights before others for reasons that affect them more closely, while others continue to dodge the issue due to economic and political interests, which in fact impose themselves on the weaker social and environmental interests, often crushing them. Among the countries that are active in the search for greater protection of environmental rights are some Latin American countries, including Argentina, where in 2004 a group of residents of the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin (in the province of Buenos Aires) raised the issue of the pollution of the area due to the activities of 44 companies operating there. The aim was not only to protest against the companies, but also to obtain recognition of rights that did not exist until then, or at least had not been considered, due to the damage suffered as a result of the pollution of the basin. The claims did not only concern compensation for the damage already produced by these activities, but had a longer-term vision. The plaintiffs demanded an increase in the quality of life, the repair of the disaster caused and the prevention of future ones as fundamental commitments that the Argentine Supreme Court, before which the case had been presented, should recognize and enforce on the part of government and local authorities. This case represents a victory on the level of recognition of the rights of the environment in the hands of a certain community directly affected by an environmental disaster or damage to the quality of the environment by other subjects, which on that occasion were indicated as the State, the Province of Buenos Aires and the City of Buenos Aires. The environmental damage fell on the entire community, which was therefore the victim and claimed the right to compensation, the cessation of polluting activities and the implementation of remedies to restore the previous condition. Since that time, the Court has established an action plan that ACUMAR (the government agency responsible for the Matanza-Riachuelo River Basin) must implement. Among the goals of the plan are to initiate public information dissemination, control pollution from industries, clean up landfills, expand water supply, develop an emergency health plan and adopt an international measurement system to assess compliance with the plan’s goals (Mendoza Beatriz Silva et al vs. State of Argentina et al on damages resulting from environmental pollution of Matanza/Riachuelo river, 2008). What happened around the Matanza-Riachuelo river has set the conditions to face the environmental issues throughout the country submitting them to a new perspective, that is the defense of the quality of life, collective health and promotion of human rights in a wider range, including therefore also those arising from environmental aspects, which also have considerable effects on economic, social and cultural rights. From a local claim arose the need to provide at the national level a greater commitment on the part of the competent authorities, which in this case is represented by ACUMAR, and allowed for a broader participation of civil society in the process of elaboration and monitoring of environmental and other policies. In order to allow a wider participation of civil society, a fundamental requirement is access to information, which favors a clear vision of the problem to be analyzed, stimulating discussion and subsequent resolution through the activation of collective practices. What has been said so far is a clear example of how the value attributed and shared of the environment by a community strengthens its action on the political and social level, allowing the achievement of results that, taken as a whole, can gradually build a global society more respectful and grateful towards nature. Perhaps it is still necessary to stimulate a more holistic vision of the system in which the human being lives, that is to say, one that includes every single part of the Planet and takes care of its life, existence and preservation, instead of tending to its devastation at the expense of something or someone else, so that there is no doubt about whether and what rights belong to it. If you liked the article share it!

The Southeastern Anatolian Project, better known as GAP (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi), is a network of infrastructures being built on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers with the dual function of generating electricity and providing irrigation systems for the surrounding area. Since the subject has already been analysed in Large Movements, the intention of this article is to integrate some elements by reading the project under three main lenses. The national dimension, linked to the energy dimension and to the role of the project in Turkish domestic politics. The international dimension, investigating the role of the European Union in promoting or limiting the development of the project. And finally, the local component by looking at the specific case of the Ilisu dam on the one hand, and the opposition movements against these projects on the other hand. This third component will be explored later. Project characteristics and its state of progress Although projects for the exploitation of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers have a history going back several decades, the GAP was launched only in 1989, not only as a plan for the exploitation of the resources of the two rivers, but as a real “project of integrated and multi-sectoral socio-economic development“. The project would therefore envisage the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric plants and irrigation systems (Figure 1), which should accompany the socio-economic development of the area in a context of strong economic and demographic growth. The commissioning of the Ataturk Dam in 1993 was followed by the construction of other infrastructures, the last of which was the Ilisu Dam inaugurated in 2020, the third largest of the entire project. Table 1 shows data from 2015 and it partially reconstructs the progress of the work. Cross-referencing this information with that provided by the official website the table reveals that at least ten plants are currently in operation. In this regard, it is necessary to highlight an important element with regard to the possibility of finding sources on the subject. After skimming through the main academic, official and popular sources, it is important to underline that data on production costs, funding, companies and more technical aspects of the projects themselves are only partially available for each individual infrastructure and are often extremely fragmented and not very up-to-date. If, on the one hand, the hypothesis of the language difference is certainly valid as a potential limitation for the retrieval of these data, on the other hand, it should be pointed out that government sources do not provide all the necessary information for an overall understanding of the project. Given this difficulty, the next article will examine the specific case of the Ilisu Dam to try to provide a more detailed picture. The role of hydropower in Turkey’s energy mix The Turkish government’s need to promote such an infrastructure network with such insistence is comes from energetic and economic interests, but also from geopolitical reasons, both domestically and internationally. The Euphrates River accounts for more than 19.4% of the national hydroelectric potential (433 GWh per year), while the Tigris corresponds to 11.2%. The GAP once completed should be able to exploit 27,419 GWh/y of this potential, or 10.9% of the annual electricity produced in Turkey in 2014. Comparing this information with the International Energy Agency’s 2019 data, Turkey relies on hydropower to generate about 30% of its electricity (Figure 2). The remainder is covered to a very large extent by natural gas and coal, two resources that are mainly imported from abroad and therefore strategically provide less security and stability. The full commissioning of the GAP would cover one third of this 30%, demonstrating its centrality in the economic development and political strategy of contemporary Turkey. Strengthening hydropower indirectly would mean partially decreasing the weight of natural gas and coal imports, thus reducing dependence on international players such as Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran. This would represent a significative step for a country which is seeking to establish itself as a hegemonic regional player. At the same time, the social and environmental effects would have repercussions on the local population in the area, made up mainly of Kurds, perceived as a threat by the central government. This would have the further aim of weakening, without the direct use of weapons, a resistance front that, especially since the outbreak of the war in Syria, has repeatedly been able to turn the spotlight on cases of military aggression and human rights violations. EU non-intervention To understand the role of the European powers in the realisation of the GAP, it is necessary to analyse the subject from two perspectives. On the one hand, there is the economic element, dictated above all by the desire to stimulate growth and development in the easternmost regions. On the other are the environmental and social factors. Although such projects are promoted as “clean energy” and sustainable infrastructure, the environmental and social effects are enormously destabilising. The construction of a large number of dams is producing large number of flooding and desertification, which not only have negative effects on the biodiversity of the area, but also on the people living there, who are often forced into mass migration. For the whole project, this would mean about 200,000 displaced people. Looking at the role played by the EU, everything should be read within a framework that has seen, at least until 2016, as a strong pressure from Turkey to be accepted as a member of the Union. The latter asked for a whole series of parameters both economic, social and environmental for the new member state. If we go back to the origin of the project, it was precisely in this direction, that negotiations were opened between the EU and the GAP Administration in 1996. During these negotiations, the EU decided to finance part of the “GAP Regional Development Programme” with 47 million euros, with a project aimed at “reducing inequalities, stimulating economic growth, and protecting the environmental and cultural heritage”. Later, the EU would allocate a further

During last year’s spring, International Support – Human Rights and Large Movements APS decided to join forces and combine their expertise. The goal was to raise awareness of Kenyan LGBTQ+ refugees and asylum-seekers community with a campaign addressed at the general public and the political decision-makers. Partnership and Roles Committed for more than 10 years to the protection of Kenyan LGBTQ+ refugees, International Support – Human Rights is an organization that, starting from 2018 with the help of international partners and their pressures, achieved several resettlements. The association has always worked closely with UNHCR to push the UN agency to implement policies which could guarantee a safer environment for LGBTQ+ community inside their camps. International Support – Human Rights also facilitated the adoption of a 2021 European Parliament Resolution by working as an intermediary between the lawmakers and the vulnerable category of asylum-seekers. With this measure, European countries committed to supporting Kenya in improving the hospitality conditions inside two of the biggest refugee camps in Africa. Moreover, International Support has been at the forefront during emergencies. For example, in a 2021 fire that cost the life of an LGBTQ+ refugee, the organization sent rescues and requested specific investigations. Large Movements APS decided to collaborate given its much wider mission to create an ever-growing and solidifying network of associations, united by a similar modus operandi to promote a long-needed shift in the narration regarding international cooperation and social inclusion. Such like-minded methodology also concerns the sharing of the best practices developed on-site by other associations to learn important lessons about how to realize projects with an increasing social impact. Furthermore, since one of our long-term objectives is to enhance dialogue between institutions and those directly affected by migratory policies to draft laws and projects which effectively take into consideration the needs of such communities, International Support – Human Rights’s experience is paramount in our team’s training and growth. Conversely, Large Movements APS immediately provided the partnership with its competencies relating to infotainment and project-making to create an advocacy strategy as innovative and creative as possible. Ist Phase: Research and Analysis Thanks to our joint efforts, in this last year we successfully: Analysed international legislation regarding this subject; Gathered information on the current situation of the Kenyan LGBTQ+ community by interviewing the various actors involved (UNHCR personnel, on-site NGOs, LGBTQ+ refugees and asylum-seekers, investigative journalists working in Kenya, and Kenyan police); Collected sufficient proof to detail LGBTQ+s refugees and asylum seekers’ stories concerning their endured violations of human rights. This first phase resulted in the following points. Legislative Framework As mentioned above, we collected evidence and material that confirm the poor protection of the LGBTQ+ community residing in Kakuma camp. Subsequently, it is possible to affirm that there is a lack of protection towards this category of vulnerable people. While LGBTQ+ refugees are routinely subject to violence and attacks; in particular, trans people, lesbian women and their children, queer disabled people are exposed to abuse. These represent clear violations of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and other conventions ratified by Kenya. All of these recognize equal and inalienable rights for everyone, deriving from their human dignity. Additionally, to further grasp the seriousness of the situation, it is useful to mention some articles and Conventions enshrining fundamental principles that the country of Kenya has accepted as universal: Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide that no one shall be subject to torture and/or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishments. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) establishes norms and principles to eliminate discrimination of all forms against women, both in private and in public life. Furthermore, the Convention on the Rights of the Child establishes children’s fundamental rights, including the right to life, health, education and free expression; The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights contracted by Kenya as a member State of the Organization of African Unity. This document recognizes that: i) fundamental human rights derive from human actions; ii) their respect is paramount to guarantee a decent life; iii) international protection is an essential instrument for the equal and effective enjoyment of these rights. The Charter reiterates the respect of each signatory State to every human right and freedom’s basic principles included in Declarations, Charters and other measures adopted by the Organization of African Unity, the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations. Article 2 of the Charter mentioned above also asserts that: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms outlined in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Following UNHCR Guidelines on the definition of Social Group, it could also be possible to include sexual orientation and gender identity – nonetheless, the Article appears clear in any way. Article 7 of the same Charter also establishes that: “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.” Numerous other legal norms relating to this kind of advocacy could be mentioned, however, these few lines alone can be considered sufficient to assert the existence of a universal principle according to which the life of LGBTQ+ individuals in Kenya ought to be protected in the same way the local and refugee population is. Evidence from the territory The gathered testimonies prove that repeated and systemic violence has been perpetuated against the LGBTQ+ community staying in Kenyan refugee camps. Specifically, the victims – Kenya-residing LGBTQ+ refugees and asylum-seekers – reported: Physical assaults (with machetes, knives, rocks and sticks); Uncountable homicidal attempts through poisoning and fires – even during the night; Sexual assaults against defenceless women and minors; Death threats, harassment and verbal assaults; Being impeded access to water, following the WHO – World Food Programme foodstuff distribution’s budget cuts; Children of homosexual parents being denied access to

In our previous two articles we discussed LGBTQ+ rights in Kenya and the human rights violations taking place insidethe Kakuma refugee camp. Carrying on the investigation that Large Movements APS is conducting together with International Support Human Rights, in this in-depth section we will try to analyze the specific situation of J., the fictitious name of one of Kakuma’s gay guests, with whom we had the opportunity to speak. Like so many others living in Kakuma, J. left his Home Country because of the discrimination he suffered from friendsand family because of his homosexuality. He sought for refuge in neighboring Kenya.                        Hope and a desire for freedom accompanied him along his journey, but the reality of things turned out to be much starker and harsher than he couldhave imagined. The testimony of J. During the interview, J. frequently used the words contained in the so-called “Word Cloud” depicted below. The mostvisible words are those that J. used most frequently during the interview. As we can easily see, these words give us a particularly bitter picture of the stark reality that J. and the other LGBTQ+guests of Kakuma are forced to endure: Arrival in Kakuma. J. is a Ugandan citizen who was forced to flee his Country because he suffered violence from friends, family members, and from the national government because of his homosexuality. He thus fled to Kenya andarrived in Kakuma on March 3, 2020. Once there, the camp administration confiscated his passport and national ID card, which, to date, have not been returned to him. Thereafter, he remained in the first reception area for 20 days and was later transferred into the inner areas of the camp. Starting from the reception area, J. recounts receiving his first death threats from other refugees. These had scared him so much that he still remembers the great fear he felt when he was transferred to the inner areas ofKakuma camp with the rest of the guests. The fire and the first violence. On April 13, the house he was staying in was set on fire, and after passing out from the smoke, J. was taken to the camp hospital by the Police the next day. There he had been harassed by the hospital staff, who claimed that no burning would have occurred if LGBTQ+ people did not live in Kakuma. The day after the incident, members of the UNHCR and Kenyan government staff went to the site to assess the situation, assuring J. thatthey would take action against those responsible as soon as possible. To date, J. is still awaiting updates about the statusof the investigation. A few weeks later, the interviewee continued, while he and some of his companions were collecting water, they wereattacked and beaten by some Ethiopian nationals who were guests at the camp as well. The attackers claimed that Kakuma’s homosexual guests could not drink their own water, otherwise they would contaminate it. Again, J. reportedthe attack to the camp Police, who assured him they would start investigations and call back all the victims of the attack later to collect their testimonies. Once they went to the camp Police again, however, the victims were asked to removetheir shoes and were forced to spend the night in their cells. The next morning, they were taken to the Kakuma Police Station, where the officers called them faggots in front of the other inmates. This exposed them to even further danger, since they were forced to stay – without being given any reason for this – for three days in a cell with  potentiallyhomophobic people, to whom their homosexuality had been revealed. After returning to the camp, J. and others continued to report new cases of assault, always receiving the same response: since there are not enough evidence to support what the victims report, no formal action can be taken by the Kenyanpolice or UNHCR staff in Kakuma. The attacks continue, but no one listens. On April 27, 2020, J. and other LGBTQ+ people residing in Kakuma went to the UNHCR facility demanding protection, but their demands were described as “mere” unauthorized protests and as such not even examined. A short time after these events, J. and other members of the LGBTQ+ community in Kakuma suffered further attacks by camp residents. During these attacks, J. was wounded in the lower abdomen sustaininginjuries so severe that he urinated blood for many months. He was also severely injured in the arm, attacked with a machete while retrieving his phone from the camp’s charging area. As a result of those repressive attacks, J. continued,40 other people were taken to the hospital. On March 15, 2021, J. was attacked again with a petrol bomb during the night. He spent ten months in the hospital recovering from this attack, while being harassed from staff and receiving poor medical care – i.e. lack of covering his wounds to the point that his “legs started to rot.“ He was then transferred to a private facility in Nairobi, where his safetywas still not guaranteed because  both he and the other residents, were constantly threatened with the possibility of new future attacks because of their sexual orientation.  Of course, this whole situation was reported by J. to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Kenyan authorities but no action has been taken so far to provide him with the protection he is entitled to. The awaiting. After the attacks, J. asked to be transferred to a more secure facility. He was then interviewed for the concession of the refugee status in February 2022. He is now waiting for the confirmation of his status. This procedure,which according to the Kenyan law should have taken a maximum of six months, is still on going with J. not having received any feedback so far.  Living conditions in Kakuma have proven to be harsh, to say the least, for J. and the other LGBTQ+ people in the camp. And because it is impossible for him to return to Uganda, where his sexuality would make it impossible for him to liveas a free man, resettlement is the best chance he has to conduct a new normal life, where he can not only live freely and safely, but also be useful to others and to society. Kenya report card To understand the weight of the interviewee’s testimony, it is necessary to analyze the Kenyan  LGBTQ+ rights situationand shed light on what is happening inside the Kakuma refugee camp. According to the Equaldex database, Kenya records an equality index – an experimental assessment of the degree of recognition and protection, in a given region, from a legal and social perspective of theLGBTQ+ community – of 25/100. Thus, a low acceptance and total tolerance is inferred, which in turn perfectly reflects the absence of recognizedcivil rights for the Kenyan LGBTQ+ community. The above finds direct exemplification within Freedom House’s annual report, where one can read that Kenya holds a score of 48/100, a rating that indicates the Country as partially free. Among the assets andindices taken into consideration, those relevant to our investigation are certainly the scores on political rights and civil liberties of the LGBTQ+community, with peculiar reference to refugees and asylum seekers. From the analysis, we find that policies and practices do not ensure equal treatment of various segments of thepopulation, thus making Kenyan society unequal and fragmented. Specifically, LGBTQ+ people remain cut off from the economic and social development machine and reports of policeabuse of refugees and asylum seekers continue. For example, we report that Somalis currently residing in Kenya are often subject to harsh government crackdowns because they are stereotypically considered simultaneously refugees and terrorists – a misconception exacerbated by Shabaab attacks in Kenya since 2010. In addition, refugees and asylum seekers from neighboring Countries, particularly children, are victims of sex trafficking and subject to al-forced labor. But what happens when members of the LGBTQ+ community and straight refugees and asylum seekers are housed together? And again, what happens when a migrant is LGBTQ+? The harshness of Kakuma. The answer to these questions can be found by analyzing the conditions in the Kakumarefugee camp. As already recounted during our first article dedicated to this topic, the camp is located in the Rift Valley, one of the most arid and isolated areas of the Country. Moreover, the living conditions inside the camps are well below any minimum standard of human dignity. For example, it is reported that pest infestations are frequent, food is scarce and sanitation facilities are collapsing. However, as J. reported, the already hostile conditions of those living in Kakuma are exacerbated if we focus on theportion of LGBTQ+ asylum seekers, forced to live with people from their own Countries of origin – primarily Ugandaand Somalia. This cohabitation exposes them to the same homophobic practices, the same violence and harassment that are very often the basis for their flight from their own Countries. These acts of violence and brutality are the “normality” inside Kakuma and all the victims we spoke to complained that they have no real protection from UNHCR, which oftenfails to respond to their requests for help and/or protection. Therefore, many LGBTQ+ applicants and refugees in Kakuma have decided to live out of shacks, sleeping in the open to protect each other and even on the streets of Nairobi, which are considered safer than their assigned housing. Light at the end of the tunnel. Although the road to full acceptance is still long

Membership in Islam distinguishes approximately 25% of the current global population and is recognized as the state religion in numerous countries across the Middle East and North Africa. Similarly to Christianity, the Islamic faith often entails the subordination of women to men. The patriarchal religious framework takes on varying forms depending on the specific circumstances, leading to behaviors that may discriminate against or oppress women in the different regions where Islam is practiced. Given the recent Iran uprisings against the Islamic regime aimed at curbing violence against women, we believe it is crucial to provide an overview of the role of women within the Islamic religious context. This includes an examination of how such a role translates into norms and behaviors that suppress the freedoms that should rightfully be afforded to all women on their journey toward emancipation. The religion and the sources of Law A distinguishing factor between Islam and Christianity is that the sacred text – the Quran – is presently acknowledged as a legal source in countries where Shari’a (Islamic law) is upheld. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Afghanistan during the Taliban rule, and various other nations embrace Shari’a as a collection of affirmative legal principles, specifically combining Islamic law, state legislation, and local customary practices. The sacred writings that constitute Islamic law are composed of commandments concerning the actions of the believers, which are categorized as prohibited, disapproved, recommended, or compulsory. However, the norms discussed here make up a behavioral or customary code that pertains to worship and ritual obligations; considering them legally binding often entails the violation of citizens’ civil rights. As previously noted, religious regimes that have embraced Shari’a law have also turned into oppressors of the rights and liberties of women within their own nations, implementing the most stringent interpretation of sacred scriptures as the state law. Moving forward, we will examine the position occupied by women within the Islamic community according to the Quran and the writings comprising Shari’a, aiming to grasp the regulations that enforce control over women in countries like Iran. The value of women according to Islamic tradition Shari’a recognizes a fundamental equality between men and women before God. Nevertheless, in the worldly order, the two sexes are deemed complementary and assume diametrically distinct roles. This often translates into the control of women by men, as the latter takes responsibility for the family’s economy and the role of the household head, while women are confined to the domestic sphere, upholding purity in their roles as wives and mothers. According to the scriptures, the status and rights afforded to men are also extended to women, who can receive education, own property, and achieve economic advancement. Indeed, the Quran defends the individuality of women and grants them the freedom to safeguard their honor, receive a share of inheritance, seek redemption, and make decisions about their lives, even in matters of marriage. While both men and women hold equal significance, they have been designed to play distinct roles in reproduction and the perpetuation of the human species, which consequently leads to differing responsibilities. Within the family unit, paternal authority is vested solely in the father, who possesses the right to exercise ta’dib’, a genuine power of correction over his wife, even allowing for the use of force. The faculties granted to Muslim men regarding their wives are undoubtedly superior, but it is important to remember that, according to Revelation, human beings are created by God in two opposing genders with the capacity and moral duty to share love and respect for one another. The rights of women within the Islamic Community Male authority over women is legitimized by a hadith of the Prophet, stating that a woman is deficient in faith and intelligence. The position of women in Islam can be succinctly described by these Quranic phrases: women should treat their husbands as husbands treat them: with kindness. However, men hold a higher status because God has chosen some over others, and they provide resources for their support. There are numerous areas in which women are subordinate to men according to Islamic tradition. These include: the obligation of monogamy, the prohibition of marrying men of different faiths, the prohibition of divorce, the asymmetry of access to divorce, the granting of children, and inheritance. Specifically, the punishment for the murder of a woman is half that for a man, the testimony of two women, if accepted, is considered equivalent to that of one man, and the same principle extends to matters of inheritance. Women are ineligible for the roles of caliph or imam, and they are excluded from serving as judges or guardians. According to Shari’a law, a woman’s ability to take action is constrained until her marriage, which is a pivotal moment as it establishes the foundation of the family. Marriage in Islam is not a sacrament but a ceremony that falls within the natural order and is perceived as a genuine contract between two parties: the husband and the wife or her legal representative. A man can marry up to a maximum of four wives, provided he treats each of them with dignity and equality. Hence, the early Muslim family structure holds a distinct patriarchal character and is founded on male descent. In present times, this manifests as the objectification of women in countries governed by Shari’a law, reducing them to mere commodities within the framework of marital transactions. Many women are compelled into early marriages without their consent, thus fueling the phenomena of child brides and coerced unions. As a general rule, it can be asserted that in the Islamic world, from a legal perspective, the value of two women is deemed equivalent to that of one man. Symbolically, women are perceived as upholders of the purity within the community’s structure, while also embodying the representation of sexuality that requires regulation to prevent adverse effects on the community’s harmony. As a result, women carry the twofold responsibility of safeguarding traditional family values and purity, while also serving as a