The origin of the oppression: women’s role in Islam.

After the last appointment of LM Pride’s column that delved into the current status of LGBTQ+ rights in Egypt, today we explore the context of another country in the MENA region, with deeply contradictory characters. In Yemen, in fact, the discussion surrounding LGBTQ+ rights is severely hampered by the civil conflict, triggered by the 2011 Arab Springs, which has been perpetuated since 2015 between pro-government Sunni forces and the Shiite Zaidi Houthi movement, after the latter advanced on the capital Sanaa. The political situation in the country is turbulent, with four regional administrations in the south of the country refusing to follow the central government’s guidelines following the 2015 constitutional reform, and major international powers such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, supporting the parties, vying for influence over the territory. In the background, a civil war that counted more than 230,000 dead in 2020 and left an estimated 24 million people in need of humanitarian support in 2021 – one of the most catastrophic conflicts of our time. All of this has only exacerbated trends already present in the deeply conservative country, which is firmly tied to its Islamic roots – according to the most recent data, 99% of the local population is Muslim, with uncertain estimates regarding the split between Sunni and Shia, though according to the U.S. State Department, they hover around 65% and 35% respectively. In Yemen, then, being a queer person effectively implies a risk to one’s life, and the conflict has wiped out any possibility of effective debate or policy advancement for the LGBTQ+ community. Legislative Framework and Impact on Civil Society Yemen was previously made up of two territorial units: the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the southern region, and the Yemen Arab Republic in the northern region. Then unified in 1990, and after the secessionist Marxist movements in the South were finally crushed four years later, the country built its political and legal identity on the characters of the Islamic State that had ruled the North until then. So, just as in Afghanistan, Yemen’s legislative framework is dictated by the Shari’ah. In this sense, sexual relations between persons of the same sex are considered in the same way as relations outside the marriage bond, and therefore prohibited as a threat to the institution of marriage and procreation. In particular, homosexual “sodomy” is condemned by a Hadd punishment, as it would cross the limits of the “law of God”.As can be seen in the Constitution, Yemen proclaims itself an “Arab, Islamic and independent sovereign state” in Article 1, and Article 3 points to the Islamic Shari’ah as the source of all legislation. This has very heavy implications on the LGBTQ+ community. Despite the fact that Article 6 and 41 profess Yemen’s adherence to the UN Charter and the International Declaration of Human Rights, respectively, and the formal equality of citizens and their rights, the status of queer people is in fact criminalized in the Penal Code. In Section 11, concerning “Adultery, Defamation and Corruption of Morality”, one can read how the judicial system harshly condemns homosexuality and lesbianism, providing for capital punishment in the first case: Article 264: Homosexuality is the contact of one man with another through his posterior; both sodomites, male or female, are punished by flogging of one hundred strokes if unmarried. Imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year is lawful. If married, the penalty is death by stoning. Article 268: Lesbianism is sexual intercourse between two women. Anyone who performs such an act shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years. If the act takes place with coercion, the imprisonment may be extended to seven years. A substantial difference between the penalties for lesbianism and homosexuality is immediately apparent. There is also a lack of any definition and mention of other gender identities and sexual orientations included in the LGBTQ+ community, which are in any case punished under the general definition of acts of sodomy or outrage to public ethics. This underscores how the Yemeni legislative system was formed on the basis of patriarchal norms rooted in a binary conception of gender and male domination in any relevant social field, offering him a superior position to that of any minority. Consequently, while the relationship between two men is seen as “demasculinizing”, a renunciation of one’s privileges, and therefore to be harshly punished even with death, any other queer identity is erased and reduced to the category of homosexuality. It is no coincidence that, with regard to gender and sexual identity discrimination, the latest report of the Council for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on the Yemeni context harshly criticized “the abuse of the judicial system to reinforce traditional gender roles”. Perception and Social Status Already living in an inherently discriminatory context, the civil conflict meant that the LGBTQ+ community, along with other minorities in the country as is often the case in violent situations, were further ostracized and persecuted by all sides. In the report of the Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen compiled in 2020 for OHCHR there are chilling testimonies of queer people in the country. Prior to the outbreak of violence, although stigma was already culturally present in the Yemeni social fabric, the people interviewed felt they could express themselves freely within safe spaces created by the community predominantly in large cities. However, beginning in 2015, it became impossible to maintain these spaces, and the parties to the conflict all participated in the wave of violence that was unleashed against non-conforming sexual subjectivities.Also in this report, the Panel verified a number of violations of the rights of various transgender and non-binary people by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in the capital Sanaa, under the control of the Houthi movement, following arbitrary detentions based on the alleged sexual identity of the victims during a campaign against “immorality” conducted from 2018 to 2020. Under detention, respondents were subjected to rape, sexual torture, forced medical examinations, and corporal punishment

In our previous two articles we discussed LGBTQ+ rights in Kenya and the human rights violations taking place insidethe Kakuma refugee camp. Carrying on the investigation that Large Movements APS is conducting together with International Support Human Rights, in this in-depth section we will try to analyze the specific situation of J., the fictitious name of one of Kakuma’s gay guests, with whom we had the opportunity to speak. Like so many others living in Kakuma, J. left his Home Country because of the discrimination he suffered from friendsand family because of his homosexuality. He sought for refuge in neighboring Kenya.                        Hope and a desire for freedom accompanied him along his journey, but the reality of things turned out to be much starker and harsher than he couldhave imagined. The testimony of J. During the interview, J. frequently used the words contained in the so-called “Word Cloud” depicted below. The mostvisible words are those that J. used most frequently during the interview. As we can easily see, these words give us a particularly bitter picture of the stark reality that J. and the other LGBTQ+guests of Kakuma are forced to endure: Arrival in Kakuma. J. is a Ugandan citizen who was forced to flee his Country because he suffered violence from friends, family members, and from the national government because of his homosexuality. He thus fled to Kenya andarrived in Kakuma on March 3, 2020. Once there, the camp administration confiscated his passport and national ID card, which, to date, have not been returned to him. Thereafter, he remained in the first reception area for 20 days and was later transferred into the inner areas of the camp. Starting from the reception area, J. recounts receiving his first death threats from other refugees. These had scared him so much that he still remembers the great fear he felt when he was transferred to the inner areas ofKakuma camp with the rest of the guests. The fire and the first violence. On April 13, the house he was staying in was set on fire, and after passing out from the smoke, J. was taken to the camp hospital by the Police the next day. There he had been harassed by the hospital staff, who claimed that no burning would have occurred if LGBTQ+ people did not live in Kakuma. The day after the incident, members of the UNHCR and Kenyan government staff went to the site to assess the situation, assuring J. thatthey would take action against those responsible as soon as possible. To date, J. is still awaiting updates about the statusof the investigation. A few weeks later, the interviewee continued, while he and some of his companions were collecting water, they wereattacked and beaten by some Ethiopian nationals who were guests at the camp as well. The attackers claimed that Kakuma’s homosexual guests could not drink their own water, otherwise they would contaminate it. Again, J. reportedthe attack to the camp Police, who assured him they would start investigations and call back all the victims of the attack later to collect their testimonies. Once they went to the camp Police again, however, the victims were asked to removetheir shoes and were forced to spend the night in their cells. The next morning, they were taken to the Kakuma Police Station, where the officers called them faggots in front of the other inmates. This exposed them to even further danger, since they were forced to stay – without being given any reason for this – for three days in a cell with  potentiallyhomophobic people, to whom their homosexuality had been revealed. After returning to the camp, J. and others continued to report new cases of assault, always receiving the same response: since there are not enough evidence to support what the victims report, no formal action can be taken by the Kenyanpolice or UNHCR staff in Kakuma. The attacks continue, but no one listens. On April 27, 2020, J. and other LGBTQ+ people residing in Kakuma went to the UNHCR facility demanding protection, but their demands were described as “mere” unauthorized protests and as such not even examined. A short time after these events, J. and other members of the LGBTQ+ community in Kakuma suffered further attacks by camp residents. During these attacks, J. was wounded in the lower abdomen sustaininginjuries so severe that he urinated blood for many months. He was also severely injured in the arm, attacked with a machete while retrieving his phone from the camp’s charging area. As a result of those repressive attacks, J. continued,40 other people were taken to the hospital. On March 15, 2021, J. was attacked again with a petrol bomb during the night. He spent ten months in the hospital recovering from this attack, while being harassed from staff and receiving poor medical care – i.e. lack of covering his wounds to the point that his “legs started to rot.“ He was then transferred to a private facility in Nairobi, where his safetywas still not guaranteed because  both he and the other residents, were constantly threatened with the possibility of new future attacks because of their sexual orientation.  Of course, this whole situation was reported by J. to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Kenyan authorities but no action has been taken so far to provide him with the protection he is entitled to. The awaiting. After the attacks, J. asked to be transferred to a more secure facility. He was then interviewed for the concession of the refugee status in February 2022. He is now waiting for the confirmation of his status. This procedure,which according to the Kenyan law should have taken a maximum of six months, is still on going with J. not having received any feedback so far.  Living conditions in Kakuma have proven to be harsh, to say the least, for J. and the other LGBTQ+ people in the camp. And because it is impossible for him to return to Uganda, where his sexuality would make it impossible for him to liveas a free man, resettlement is the best chance he has to conduct a new normal life, where he can not only live freely and safely, but also be useful to others and to society. Kenya report card To understand the weight of the interviewee’s testimony, it is necessary to analyze the Kenyan  LGBTQ+ rights situationand shed light on what is happening inside the Kakuma refugee camp. According to the Equaldex database, Kenya records an equality index – an experimental assessment of the degree of recognition and protection, in a given region, from a legal and social perspective of theLGBTQ+ community – of 25/100. Thus, a low acceptance and total tolerance is inferred, which in turn perfectly reflects the absence of recognizedcivil rights for the Kenyan LGBTQ+ community. The above finds direct exemplification within Freedom House’s annual report, where one can read that Kenya holds a score of 48/100, a rating that indicates the Country as partially free. Among the assets andindices taken into consideration, those relevant to our investigation are certainly the scores on political rights and civil liberties of the LGBTQ+community, with peculiar reference to refugees and asylum seekers. From the analysis, we find that policies and practices do not ensure equal treatment of various segments of thepopulation, thus making Kenyan society unequal and fragmented. Specifically, LGBTQ+ people remain cut off from the economic and social development machine and reports of policeabuse of refugees and asylum seekers continue. For example, we report that Somalis currently residing in Kenya are often subject to harsh government crackdowns because they are stereotypically considered simultaneously refugees and terrorists – a misconception exacerbated by Shabaab attacks in Kenya since 2010. In addition, refugees and asylum seekers from neighboring Countries, particularly children, are victims of sex trafficking and subject to al-forced labor. But what happens when members of the LGBTQ+ community and straight refugees and asylum seekers are housed together? And again, what happens when a migrant is LGBTQ+? The harshness of Kakuma. The answer to these questions can be found by analyzing the conditions in the Kakumarefugee camp. As already recounted during our first article dedicated to this topic, the camp is located in the Rift Valley, one of the most arid and isolated areas of the Country. Moreover, the living conditions inside the camps are well below any minimum standard of human dignity. For example, it is reported that pest infestations are frequent, food is scarce and sanitation facilities are collapsing. However, as J. reported, the already hostile conditions of those living in Kakuma are exacerbated if we focus on theportion of LGBTQ+ asylum seekers, forced to live with people from their own Countries of origin – primarily Ugandaand Somalia. This cohabitation exposes them to the same homophobic practices, the same violence and harassment that are very often the basis for their flight from their own Countries. These acts of violence and brutality are the “normality” inside Kakuma and all the victims we spoke to complained that they have no real protection from UNHCR, which oftenfails to respond to their requests for help and/or protection. Therefore, many LGBTQ+ applicants and refugees in Kakuma have decided to live out of shacks, sleeping in the open to protect each other and even on the streets of Nairobi, which are considered safer than their assigned housing. Light at the end of the tunnel. Although the road to full acceptance is still long

In Peru, as in most Latin American societies, gender equality is obstructed by the so-called machismo. Although women can enjoy basic rights, such as the right to vote and to own property, there is a cultural and sociological factor in the structure of communities that hinders the emancipation of women in all areas of society. The phenomenon of machismo, which is widespread throughout the continent (but also in the rest of the world), is identifiable in the literacy rate, in the difficulty of access to the profession and to health care, and in the scarce political participation of Peruvian women; it is more present in the rural areas of the country.      In the countryside areas, where the social differences between the two genders are at their peak, machismo stereotypes penetrate the community consciousness much more than in the big cities. Indeed, most of the population associates women with the domestic sphere, assigning them, perhaps unconsciously, the role of mother and wife, thus depriving them of the right to choose their own destiny. From an early age, Peruvian girls lose their aspiration for a lifestyle different from the traditional one, and their school performance suffers. In smaller towns, it is extremely difficult to find a woman in a position of power, whether in a profession or in politics. The lack of examples to emulate reinforces the belief that women should be confined to the home, leaving only men to pursue a professional career.    Statista estimates, in 2021, Peru ranked 17th in the Gender Gap Index, out of 26 Latin American countries. We will now analyse Peruvian women’s access to the spheres of society, highlighting those in which machismo is predominant in violating gender equality. Education, profession and politics: analysing the gender gap In 2020, a World Bank survey in Peru recorded a 5 percentage point difference between male literacy (97%), and female literacy (92%) among the population over 15 years old. Both percentages, although still on the rise, have slowed in the last year of COVID-19 pandemic, when the population has been forced to forego education to cope with the resulting crisis. The gender gap is widest in rural areas and within indigenous communities speaking native languages. However, we assist to an improvement thanks to the reforms of customary laws in recent decades, which are opening up the professional world to new generations of women, thus encouraging them to continue their studies. Since the enactment of these reforms, the percentage of women’s participation in the labour force has also improved, reaching 70.6% last year, according to estimates by the International Labour Organization.Peru illustrates how legal reforms – especially when accompanied by declining fertility – can effectively drive increased female labour force participation and financial inclusion, also benefiting the country’s GDP. However, economic and cultural constraints continue to limit women’s professional opportunities. Although the country has one of the smallest gender gaps in Latin America in terms of access to employment, Peruvian women tend to be relegated to lower paid jobs such as nursing and teaching. What’s more, domestic responsibilities and family care needs further limit their work options. In 2015, women earned about 19% less than men in hourly earnings; a gap that widens further when we consider indigenous women. Indeed, in poor, rural and indigenous communities, typical jobs of the informal economy, made up of small and medium-sized family businesses, prevail (only 30% of these businesses are formal). This means that most women are in a position of extreme vulnerability to market risks. These women remain excluded from government policies to promote and protect women’s employment, and from the financial literacy needed to actually develop their businesses and/or bring them into the formal economy. Government figures show that 60 per cent of all women workers in the country continue to work in the informal economy, and only 15 per cent have health coverage, while only 4 per cent enjoy pension benefits. The country has a ninety-eight day maternity leave policy and other programmes to support working mothers, yet women working in the informal sector do not benefit.         Regarding the political situation, women gained the right to vote in Peru in 1955, one of the last countries in the Latin American region. Nevertheless, the country is making concrete progress for equal political representation through the promulgation of reforms that have made equality and alternation criteria mandatory since the general elections of 2021. It is since the approval of Law No. 31030 that presidential lists must have at least one woman or one man in their composition, placed alternately, with the aim of achieving a system of equal representation in composition and political agenda by 2031.            Currently there are several strategies used to monitor the implementation of the law and women’s participation. In this context, one of the tools is the Línea de Investigación de la Dirección Nacional de Educación y Formación Cívica Ciudadana (DNEF), which analyses information on electoral processes in order to improve its dissemination among citizens and the media, with the aim of influencing the strengthening of the political system and democracy.            According to a survey carried out last March by the DNEF, the last parliamentary elections saw the presence of 3 women out of 16 in the Andean Congress. The proportion has improved in recent years thanks to electoral quotas. However, it should be noted that the positions held by women on the electoral lists remain low. Women’s safety and health: the downside of the Gender Gap in Peru Violence against women is a worrying phenomenon in all Latin American countries. An increasing number of violent murders of women committed by men in the last two decades has forced Latin American countries to adopt specific measures to limit this phenomenon, especially after the Convention of Belém do Pará: among these, the inclusion of ‘feminicide’ as a specific aggravated crime in the various national legislations. Despite the difficulties in measuring and comparing the incidence of this type of crime in different countries, linked to the lack of capacity and the lack

During last year’s spring, International Support – Human Rights and Large Movements APS decided to join forces and combine their expertise. The goal was to raise awareness of Kenyan LGBTQ+ refugees and asylum-seekers community with a campaign addressed at the general public and the political decision-makers. Partnership and Roles Committed for more than 10 years to the protection of Kenyan LGBTQ+ refugees, International Support – Human Rights is an organization that, starting from 2018 with the help of international partners and their pressures, achieved several resettlements. The association has always worked closely with UNHCR to push the UN agency to implement policies which could guarantee a safer environment for LGBTQ+ community inside their camps. International Support – Human Rights also facilitated the adoption of a 2021 European Parliament Resolution by working as an intermediary between the lawmakers and the vulnerable category of asylum-seekers. With this measure, European countries committed to supporting Kenya in improving the hospitality conditions inside two of the biggest refugee camps in Africa. Moreover, International Support has been at the forefront during emergencies. For example, in a 2021 fire that cost the life of an LGBTQ+ refugee, the organization sent rescues and requested specific investigations. Large Movements APS decided to collaborate given its much wider mission to create an ever-growing and solidifying network of associations, united by a similar modus operandi to promote a long-needed shift in the narration regarding international cooperation and social inclusion. Such like-minded methodology also concerns the sharing of the best practices developed on-site by other associations to learn important lessons about how to realize projects with an increasing social impact. Furthermore, since one of our long-term objectives is to enhance dialogue between institutions and those directly affected by migratory policies to draft laws and projects which effectively take into consideration the needs of such communities, International Support – Human Rights’s experience is paramount in our team’s training and growth. Conversely, Large Movements APS immediately provided the partnership with its competencies relating to infotainment and project-making to create an advocacy strategy as innovative and creative as possible. Ist Phase: Research and Analysis Thanks to our joint efforts, in this last year we successfully: Analysed international legislation regarding this subject; Gathered information on the current situation of the Kenyan LGBTQ+ community by interviewing the various actors involved (UNHCR personnel, on-site NGOs, LGBTQ+ refugees and asylum-seekers, investigative journalists working in Kenya, and Kenyan police); Collected sufficient proof to detail LGBTQ+s refugees and asylum seekers’ stories concerning their endured violations of human rights. This first phase resulted in the following points. Legislative Framework As mentioned above, we collected evidence and material that confirm the poor protection of the LGBTQ+ community residing in Kakuma camp. Subsequently, it is possible to affirm that there is a lack of protection towards this category of vulnerable people. While LGBTQ+ refugees are routinely subject to violence and attacks; in particular, trans people, lesbian women and their children, queer disabled people are exposed to abuse. These represent clear violations of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and other conventions ratified by Kenya. All of these recognize equal and inalienable rights for everyone, deriving from their human dignity. Additionally, to further grasp the seriousness of the situation, it is useful to mention some articles and Conventions enshrining fundamental principles that the country of Kenya has accepted as universal: Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide that no one shall be subject to torture and/or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishments. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) establishes norms and principles to eliminate discrimination of all forms against women, both in private and in public life. Furthermore, the Convention on the Rights of the Child establishes children’s fundamental rights, including the right to life, health, education and free expression; The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights contracted by Kenya as a member State of the Organization of African Unity. This document recognizes that: i) fundamental human rights derive from human actions; ii) their respect is paramount to guarantee a decent life; iii) international protection is an essential instrument for the equal and effective enjoyment of these rights. The Charter reiterates the respect of each signatory State to every human right and freedom’s basic principles included in Declarations, Charters and other measures adopted by the Organization of African Unity, the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations. Article 2 of the Charter mentioned above also asserts that: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms outlined in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Following UNHCR Guidelines on the definition of Social Group, it could also be possible to include sexual orientation and gender identity – nonetheless, the Article appears clear in any way. Article 7 of the same Charter also establishes that: “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.” Numerous other legal norms relating to this kind of advocacy could be mentioned, however, these few lines alone can be considered sufficient to assert the existence of a universal principle according to which the life of LGBTQ+ individuals in Kenya ought to be protected in the same way the local and refugee population is. Evidence from the territory The gathered testimonies prove that repeated and systemic violence has been perpetuated against the LGBTQ+ community staying in Kenyan refugee camps. Specifically, the victims – Kenya-residing LGBTQ+ refugees and asylum-seekers – reported: Physical assaults (with machetes, knives, rocks and sticks); Uncountable homicidal attempts through poisoning and fires – even during the night; Sexual assaults against defenceless women and minors; Death threats, harassment and verbal assaults; Being impeded access to water, following the WHO – World Food Programme foodstuff distribution’s budget cuts; Children of homosexual parents being denied access to

The darkness of the forest freezes the hearts while the icy winter wind kills. Thousands of people are running through the forest, dogs bark in the distance and voices shout in a language they do not know. There is no light in the forest at night, there is no path to follow, one cannot see out of the palm of one’s nose. Hundreds of people hold their hands to navigate and above all to not get lost. Their final destination? Poland, the first European country on their route. This is not an adventurous film, this is not Rambo or the Hunger Games, but reality, this is what is happening on the border between Belarus, Poland and Lithuania. Thousands of people have been escorted to the border by Lukashenko’s government, where they have been left to their own devices, pushed towards Poland on the one hand, pushed back outside the European borders on the other. According to Poland, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko is deliberately provoking a new refugee crisis in Europe by organising the movement of migrants from the Middle East to Minsk, promising them safe passage to Europe, as revenge for the sanctions imposed by Brussels on the authoritarian regime. The prime minister then decided to stage a reprisal made up of the bodies of men, women and children. Thousands of refugees and asylum seekers were pushed out of Minsk, transported to the Polish border where they were used as perfect pawns of a sick game. At the border, all these individuals were left to their own devices, to navigate their way through the dense northern European forest in search of a way to cross the border. The Polish government, however, decided to respond with extreme violence to this war of bodies rather than weapons. Some 20,000 Polish border guards, assisted by the army, have been deployed on the frontier in a show of force alien to the country since the end of the cold war. The forces patrol the border, which is covered by metres of barbed wire fences, to prevent anyone from crossing. In this way, they carry out rejections, like those implemented last year on the border between Bosnia and Croatia. Refugees huddled at the border are not only refused entry but also shelter from the freezing Polish winter. Hundreds of people, mothers, fathers, children can be seen sitting on the frozen ground, waiting for an OK from the police. Not even the humanitarian organisations that have been there, nor the Polish ones, such as Grupa Granica, a network of Polish NGOs active at the border since the beginning of the humanitarian crisis, have been granted access. A safe zone of three kilometres has been created where no one except police can enter. This means that the refugees have to walk through the forest for three kilometres before they can meet any organisation that can provide them with shelter, medical care, or even just basic necessities they might need. Added to this is the brutality of the border police who do not shy away from treating with violence any person who even tries to cross the border. Water cannons are violently directed at any person who even tries to approach the border, brutally throwing the harmless victims to the ground. Many people also suffer electrocution wounds to the neck, bruises from being kicked by guns, and cuts and bruises from being pushed over barbed wire fences, as Lorenzo Tondo’s article in The Guardian testifies. Thus, one wonders where are all those fundamental rights guaranteed to every individual that the European states signed up to in the Nice Charter. One wonders what has happened to that right in Article 18 of the same Charter, which guarantees the right to asylum, but also, and above all, all those rights, even above the European Union itself, which prohibit and protect against refoulement and rejections. One wonders what Europe, the homeland but also the mother of fundamental rights, is doing while it silently watches a humanitarian crisis unfold at its borders. We at Large Movement demand that the rights of women, men and children who find themselves stranded between the two borders are respected, that humanitarian organisations are allowed safe passage through the safe zone, that refugees are provided with humanitarian and legal assistance, but above all, that they are allowed to cross the border safely without being exposed to illegal violence, thus ensuring the respect of their fundamental rights. If you liked the article Share us!

The Southeastern Anatolian Project, better known as GAP (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi), is a network of infrastructures being built on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers with the dual function of generating electricity and providing irrigation systems for the surrounding area. Since the subject has already been analysed in Large Movements, the intention of this article is to integrate some elements by reading the project under three main lenses. The national dimension, linked to the energy dimension and to the role of the project in Turkish domestic politics. The international dimension, investigating the role of the European Union in promoting or limiting the development of the project. And finally, the local component by looking at the specific case of the Ilisu dam on the one hand, and the opposition movements against these projects on the other hand. This third component will be explored later. Project characteristics and its state of progress Although projects for the exploitation of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers have a history going back several decades, the GAP was launched only in 1989, not only as a plan for the exploitation of the resources of the two rivers, but as a real “project of integrated and multi-sectoral socio-economic development“. The project would therefore envisage the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric plants and irrigation systems (Figure 1), which should accompany the socio-economic development of the area in a context of strong economic and demographic growth. The commissioning of the Ataturk Dam in 1993 was followed by the construction of other infrastructures, the last of which was the Ilisu Dam inaugurated in 2020, the third largest of the entire project. Table 1 shows data from 2015 and it partially reconstructs the progress of the work. Cross-referencing this information with that provided by the official website the table reveals that at least ten plants are currently in operation. In this regard, it is necessary to highlight an important element with regard to the possibility of finding sources on the subject. After skimming through the main academic, official and popular sources, it is important to underline that data on production costs, funding, companies and more technical aspects of the projects themselves are only partially available for each individual infrastructure and are often extremely fragmented and not very up-to-date. If, on the one hand, the hypothesis of the language difference is certainly valid as a potential limitation for the retrieval of these data, on the other hand, it should be pointed out that government sources do not provide all the necessary information for an overall understanding of the project. Given this difficulty, the next article will examine the specific case of the Ilisu Dam to try to provide a more detailed picture. The role of hydropower in Turkey’s energy mix The Turkish government’s need to promote such an infrastructure network with such insistence is comes from energetic and economic interests, but also from geopolitical reasons, both domestically and internationally. The Euphrates River accounts for more than 19.4% of the national hydroelectric potential (433 GWh per year), while the Tigris corresponds to 11.2%. The GAP once completed should be able to exploit 27,419 GWh/y of this potential, or 10.9% of the annual electricity produced in Turkey in 2014. Comparing this information with the International Energy Agency’s 2019 data, Turkey relies on hydropower to generate about 30% of its electricity (Figure 2). The remainder is covered to a very large extent by natural gas and coal, two resources that are mainly imported from abroad and therefore strategically provide less security and stability. The full commissioning of the GAP would cover one third of this 30%, demonstrating its centrality in the economic development and political strategy of contemporary Turkey. Strengthening hydropower indirectly would mean partially decreasing the weight of natural gas and coal imports, thus reducing dependence on international players such as Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran. This would represent a significative step for a country which is seeking to establish itself as a hegemonic regional player. At the same time, the social and environmental effects would have repercussions on the local population in the area, made up mainly of Kurds, perceived as a threat by the central government. This would have the further aim of weakening, without the direct use of weapons, a resistance front that, especially since the outbreak of the war in Syria, has repeatedly been able to turn the spotlight on cases of military aggression and human rights violations. EU non-intervention To understand the role of the European powers in the realisation of the GAP, it is necessary to analyse the subject from two perspectives. On the one hand, there is the economic element, dictated above all by the desire to stimulate growth and development in the easternmost regions. On the other are the environmental and social factors. Although such projects are promoted as “clean energy” and sustainable infrastructure, the environmental and social effects are enormously destabilising. The construction of a large number of dams is producing large number of flooding and desertification, which not only have negative effects on the biodiversity of the area, but also on the people living there, who are often forced into mass migration. For the whole project, this would mean about 200,000 displaced people. Looking at the role played by the EU, everything should be read within a framework that has seen, at least until 2016, as a strong pressure from Turkey to be accepted as a member of the Union. The latter asked for a whole series of parameters both economic, social and environmental for the new member state. If we go back to the origin of the project, it was precisely in this direction, that negotiations were opened between the EU and the GAP Administration in 1996. During these negotiations, the EU decided to finance part of the “GAP Regional Development Programme” with 47 million euros, with a project aimed at “reducing inequalities, stimulating economic growth, and protecting the environmental and cultural heritage”. Later, the EU would allocate a further