Uganda: Safe Haven or Dust Under the Rug? We discuss this with Maëlle Noir

On 20 March 1994 in Mogadishu, Somalia, Ilaria Alpi, together with her cameraman Miran Hrovatin, was murdered. The journalist had carried out several missions for TG3 since 1992 to report on the UN peace mission ‘Restore Hope’ and the Somali context of the civil war that broke out following the fall of Siad Barre’s regime, in 1991. The investigation of the Alpi-Hrovatin case focused on the journalist’s last report, which should have been broadcast on the evening of 20 March. Only fragments and incomplete footage of that report remain, as the full version never reached Italy. Neither the motive, nor the instigator, nor the executors of that murder are still clear. Giancarlo Marocchino is one of the main protagonists of the Alpi-Hrovatin case. He is a Piedmontese transporter who was an influential businessman in Mogadishu, for several years. For the SISMI, according to one of the declassified notes, he was “an able and cunning entrepreneur” to work for everyone and to disentangle himself in Somalia ravaged by civil war. According to SISMI, he was involved in the logistics and he was suspected of trafficking in arms and in toxic and radioactive waste. The latter are suspicions still not confirmed by the courts. In the background of the investigation, it is also necessary to keep in mind the Somali context, and in particular the Italian involvement in Somalia. The final report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the death of Ilaria Alpi and Miran Hrovatin, approved in February 2006, analysed various causes of the murder, taking also into account fundamentalism and criminality in the country. An analysis of Ilaria Alpi’s notebooks bring to  three lines of investigation from the themes of the last reportage: arms trafficking, toxic waste trafficking and the effects of Italian cooperation in Somalia. Italian cooperation in Somalia Before the beginning of the civil war in Somalia, Italy was a close ally of the government of Siad Barre, Somali president-dictator until 1991. For instance, Italy sold arms to Somalia which stockpiled them in various warehouses in the country, and they were object of interest of the militias and warlords, following the fall of the regime. It is generally acknowledged that Italy supported, economically and politically, Siad Barre even at a time when the regime appeared completely discredited in the eyes of international public opinion and the majority of the Somali people. Among Alpi’s lines of enquiry was Italy’s cooperation with developing countries, particularly Somalia. The journalist was interested in the phenomenon of aid in general and how it was managed, as well as whether it could have been used for illicit enrichment rather than the purpose for which it was given. In particular, Alpi was interested in the Garoe-Bosaso road and the Shifco fishing project. Italian parliament started development cooperation in Somalia in 1979, with substantial funding. In particular, during the period 1986-1989, the volume of Italian investment in Somalia and the Horn of Africa increased exponentially and it was only interrupted by the outbreak of civil war in 1992. The final report of the parliamentary commission states that in the decade 1981-1990, 80% of the funds were allocated to the implementation of projects defined as ‘physical’. Out of the total, 49% were allocated to the construction of large infrastructures, 21% to productive investments and 15% to investments defined as “socio-communitarian” (projects that can be considered as benefiting the population). This set-up of Italian cooperation has been marked by programming shortcomings and a lack of coordination with multilateral and international initiatives. Moreover, the actual success of these cooperation initiatives was heavily undermined by the prerogative to protect the interests of Italian companies, lobbies and pressure groups in Somali, not taking into account the real needs of the country. The analysis of these policies of international cooperation was conducted during the season of Tangentopoli. In this context, a number of enquiries brought to light a reality in which allocations for cooperation with developing countries were a significant part of the entire Italian bribe system. The investigations uncovered costly and unnecessary projects, multi-billion dollar allocations, bribes and trafficking of all kinds, including arms to Somalia. In this regard, the 1994 Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into Cooperation with Developing Countries went on a mission to Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya from 29 January to 31 January 1996. The report stressed that there had been many management errors and that a lot of money had gone into the wrong hands. Among the most controversial works financed by the Italian government there were Garoe-Bosaso road and the port of Bosaso, as well as the ocean fishing project and its fishing company ‘Shifco’. With regard to the road, the average cost per km was 605 million, which is disproportionate to the average expenditure in Italy, but also compared to other roads built with development cooperation funds in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, at the beginning of 1979, an attempt was made to undertake an ocean fishing project marked by disasters and failures. This led to the creation of the ‘Shifco’ company, which arranged for the transfer of fishing vessels after the anti-Barre war of 1990 to the waters of the Gulf of Aden. There is a suspicion that this initiative, characterised by serious design errors, served firstly to enrich private Italian and Somali groups, even not necessarily through illicit means. Arms trafficking in Somalia Before embarking on her last trip, Ilaria Alpi had identified the area of Bosaso, a port city in the north of Somalia, as an area of ‘journalistic interest’ and she had the intention to investigate there about arms trafficking and the intertwining with ‘bad cooperation’ and the trafficking of toxic waste. Indeed, Alpi pursue some research on the Shifco ships, looking for evidence. The last interview before the murder seems to focus on this aspect. The cameraman Alberto Calvi, with whom Alpi had worked on previous missions to Somalia, reported that the journalist had always looked for evidence in relation to arms and drug trafficking. As a possible lead

Somali piracy is often described solely and exclusively as criminal, but what if it has also another function, namely that of guardians of the sea? In this article, an attempt will be made to investigate the nature of the phenomenon, even if there are still few sources that show an alternative vision to the internationally diffused one. Therefore, we will try to identify the elements which define piracy not only as a criminal act, but also as an alternative water defence “force”, a service which the Transitional Government is unable to take full responsibility for. Historical background Modern piracy, which has developed mainly in geopolitically strategic areas, has assumed all the characteristics of the historical definition of “marauder of the sea”. Unlike its analogues, Somali piracy has acquired different characteristics which have made it a particularly difficult phenomenon to study and, above all, to eradicate. These differences are due to the presence of many factors, and in particular, the political situation which Somalia lives. This, in fact, has given rise to a series of key phenomena in the development of piracy. Therefore, the complexity of the Somali situation, lies in the existence and overlapping of different dynamics, local, but also regional and international, which necessitate an all-inclusive approach. However, in this article we will examine one of the many aspects of this phenomenon, trying to answer to the question on the nature of the piracy that has developed in Somali context. Using Somali terms, an attempt will be made to understand whether they fall into the category of burcad badeed, stricto sensu ‘marauders of the sea’, or badaadinta badah, ‘saviours of the sea’. Since the joint efforts of the international community succeeded in eradicating this problem in 2012, the seizure of the oil tanker Aris 13 in 2017 has raised again the attention to the problem, which had been dormant for years, to the area, also portending a return of the same piracy. This attack, however, seems to have been only a brief interlude due to the lowering of the guard of the measures undertaken until then and the withdrawal of the NATO forces of the “Ocean Shield” mission, which ended in 2016. But what if this is just a symptom of a return that could be even more dangerous than the previous one? In this framework, it could be useful to understand the nature of the acts of the Somali pirates and to understand if the initial role of defenders of the sea has disappeared during the evolution that piracy has undergone, becoming finalized only and exclusively to actions of depredation, or if this has only been “hidden” in order to more easily legitimize the actions carried out by the international community. Such an attempt, however, will be very difficult due to the scarcity of data and news by the ‘European eye’. Here, therefore, we will only try to provide some food for thought. Fishermen or professionals? When a political vacuum arose in the country in 1991 due to the fall of Siad Barre’s regime, it was immediately apparent that there was also no centralised structure capable of having effective control over the entire Somali territory and, consequently, its waters. It was from this situation that external actors, mainly European and Chinese fishing vessels and criminal organisations, began to take advantage. Intensive fishing and the dumping of toxic waste were the main motivations for local fishermen to improvise disorganised attacks on invading strangers. Despite this, foreign depredation cannot be defined as the only motivation. Indeed, a more complex picture is added to this: the lack of a centralised state able to take charge of society’s needs, a clan organisation of Somali society that acts as a different representative of order and bearer of principles of political organisation different from those of the modern and post-modern state, and a state of poverty and considerable humanitarian crisis. Therefore, until the 2000’s, one speaks more of a phenomenon aimed at survival, in which the boundary between pirate, fisherman and smuggler is very blurred. It can therefore be assumed that at this stage, although the population that derived its livelihood from the sea had reached considerable levels of frustration due to illegal foreign fishing activities, it had not managed to create a structure that could be considered as a ‘guardian of the waters’. In recent years, in fact, we have mainly witnessed the phenomenon that has been defined as ‘piracy of opportunity’, which can be deduced above all from its discontinuity, the low profitability of the attacks and the short range of action. However, it cannot be ruled out that it was during this period that the criminal-style piracy groups we are accustomed to knowing began to form and develop. In fact, according to a former Somali pirate leader, Farah Hirsi Kulan “Boya”, the passage to a professionalized piracy took place already in 1994. From fortuitous pirates of to a full-fledged coastguard? From the first sporadic and disorganised attacks, pirate activities in a few years changed completely and became a very profitable business. Many claim that there has been a shift from a protest phenomenon to one exclusively based on profit, although this may not be exactly the case. In a political context like that of Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government is the only institutional and internationally recognized power which is not able to extend its authority beyond Mogadishu, allowing other types of “political organizations” to take over control of the space. In fact, “for the entire Somali territory, every level of administration is, to a large extent, entrusted to the hands of clans, village chiefs and warlords” and it is among these leaders that we recognize the most influential figures in piracy. Some of the pirate organisations, which are defined as organised crime, also sought to assume a degree of institutionalisation. They wanted to demonstrate that they were able to carry out not only activities of pillage, kidnapping for ransom or, in any case, connected to enrichment, but also a function