The Shia Family Law and other violations of women’s rights in Afghanistan

In these days also the Italian media are following the escalation of violence that led the Taliban on Sunday, August 15 to finally take Kabul and thus regain full control of the country. This after 20 years of a massive Western presence that should have favored the construction of a democratic regime in a country torn apart by more than 40 years of war.   Some useful data related to the “democratization process”   Military expenditures of $2000 billions, including:   United States: over $1000 billion. Note that the U.S. has not paid directly with its own state funds but, as in all wars in which it has participated, has resorted to federal sovereign debt. This means that military spending has been paid for by the USA’s major creditors, first and foremost China which has a credit of 1180 billion dollars (figure updated in August 2020).   2. Italy: about 8 billion dollars   – Civilian development cooperation projects, aimed at the construction of schools, roads, hospital and training and remuneration of local personnel (mediators, interpreters, workers, engineers): just $ 792 million   Two military operations in total:    Enduring Freedom: the objective of the operation was to kill Bin Laden. The leader of Al Qaeda, in fact, had taken refuge in Afghan territory and the Taliban had refused to hand him over to the United States. Bush, persuaded that it would have been a blitzkrieg, on 7/10/2001 ordered the first bombings on Kabul and Jalalabad.  The objective of the mission was achieved on 2/05/2011 and on 28/12/2014 Barak Obama announces the formal termination of the operation.    Resolute Support Mission: mission started on 1/01/2015 with the dual objective of training and supporting both the Afghan army and democratic institutions in the fight against Taliban extremism on the one hand and in the establishment of a democratic system on the other. These are objectives which, despite Biden and Blinken’s declarations to justify the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan, have never been achieved. This is made even more evident by the rapidity with which the Taliban managed to arrive in Kabul despite being numerically much inferior given that:   b.1) military official Afghan army trained by NATO: about 325 thousand units   b.2) Taliban fighters: about 65 thousand units     Western military presence concentrated in the cities, with little penetration into the villages and almost zero contact with the most isolated villages. The Taliban have taken advantage of this opportunity to reorganize themselves over the years, camouflaging themselves among the population and feeding the population’s hatred towards the western contingents – perceived as real occupiers   At least 241,000 victims in about 20 years of war (underestimated number), many of them civilians   UN Assistance Mission stated that the number of civilian casualties in 2021 is likely to be the highest ever recorded since the Organization was founded   Internally displaced persons (IDPs) according to UNHCR: approximately 600,000.00, 80% of whom are women and children   About 1,000 people a day cross the border with Turkey illegally, for this reason Erdogan is accelerating the construction of a wall on the border with Iran. This follows the American request last August 13 – judged hypocritical by the Turkish government – to allow refugees to take refuge in Turkey because they fear a humanitarian catastrophe resulting from their rapid withdrawal from the territory   Some EU member states (including Belgium, Austria, Denmark and Greece) continue forced repatriations to Afghanistan despite the fact that countries such as Germany, Holland and France have suspended them precisely because the country is not safe   Analyzing these data it is natural to wonder if the actual intention of the NATO coalition led by the United States was really to provide the country with democratic structures since almost nothing has been done in this direction. On the other hand, the purchase and sale of armaments and military spending in general have proved to be a profitable business on Afghan soil.   This is confirmed by the lack of interest in the living conditions of civilians, understandable from:   1. paucity of development projects implemented over the years;   2. blind cynicism of some EU countries towards the latest news coming from Afghanistan;   3. ineffectiveness of the Joint Statement signed by 60 countries of the world (including Italy, USA, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Qatar and Great Britain) where it asks “those in positions of power and authority in Afghanistan” to ensure the protection of human rights and property of civilians, without specifying who are these people in positions of power. The statement then calls for Afghan citizens who wish to leave to do so, stating that the international community is ready to assist them.    So far, however, no humanitarian corridor has been created; on the contrary, as we have seen, rejections towards Afghanistan continue.  Why did the military of the official Afghan army not resist?  These days there are many questions about why, despite the great discrepancy in the allocation of resources in favor of military spending rather than the implementation of activities aimed at the real development of the country, the Afghan military has found itself unable to react to the Taliban advance.    In many villages and towns, in fact, the official army surrendered even before engaging in battle or at most they negotiated the surrender. In the areas where they fought, the army suffered real defeats with a large number of people – both civilians and military – who reached Emergency’s clinics with obvious war wounds.  In order to understand why this extreme weakness of the official military is so prevalent, we need to take a step back and take a closer look at the kind of support that NATO operations were providing to the Afghan military.  As a detailed and well-structured analysis of  Il Post points out in, and to which we refer for completeness, the collapse of the army is attributable to:   1. corruption of the Afghan government and army commanders, who “inflated” the numbers of soldiers actually recruited so as to justify the huge funding received from NATO – the actual destination of which appears doubtful;   2. the living conditions of the soldiers were so poor that many could not afford to buy the rifles with which they were equipped because they were worth several months of their salary. Moreover, the government had suspended payments

In contemporary Western society, human rights are cardinal principles of the civil state that allow each individual to be free. What we would like to investigate in this article is how these rights are pursued in Middle Eastern societies, such as Afghanistan, which are characterised by a confessional state organisation. The case of Afghanistan is particularly interesting for several reasons. Among them, the focus will be on the situation of women in Afghan society, especially on the symbolic meaning of the burqa and its historical evolution.      The true role of the burqa has always been at the centre of heated debates. The Qur’an does not prescribe that it be worn by women. Time and millenary tradition have imposed it as a symbol of oppression and submission, and at the same time as a symbol of the tradition and religiousness of Muslim women.     There are various interpretations, but it is clear that historically, the practices relating to the compulsory wearing of the burqa began with the installation of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Socio-political reconstruction of Afghan women’s freedom of expression In the history of Afghanistan, it is possible to draw a clear line that defines how the role of women and their rights in society have changed over the centuries.    The movement for women’s rights arose during the reign of Amir Adbur Rahan Khan, from 1880 to 1901. Suffering and conversions were frequent during this ruler’s years in power, but it also managed to bring a wind of modernisation to a practically new-born state.    Social reforms were adopted leading to an improvement in the position of women in society, including the right to divorce, an increase in the legal age of marriage and women’s property rights.At this point, a dilemma arose that is as great as it is topical: how far can traditional Islam and modernity coexist in the same state?    One of the answers to this question was given by Mahmud Tarzi, a member of the Young Turk movement, who recognised the need for the Islamic world to adapt to a reformist and progressive approach to modernity. After a period of exile in Turkey, he returned to Afghanistan in 1905 thanks to Amir Habibullah, spreading his ideas and becoming the cornerstone of the Young Afghans nationalist movement.          One of Tarzi’s principles was based on the central role of education in the struggle for social reform. Thanks to his struggles, the first girls’ schools opened in Afghanistan during these years.Further improvements took place during the reign of Amanullah, son and successor of Amir Habibullah, between 1919 and 1929. Thanks to him, inspired by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a new constitution was drafted that protected and guaranteed civil rights for all equally for both women and men. With these new directives, the state outlawed traditional dress codes that were considered particularly oppressive, especially for women, and also removed the obligation to wear a veil. In addition, numerous schools were opened, forced marriages and polygamy practices were abolished.It was a true cultural revolution that, in just under 20 years, positively affected the fate of a country that was a slave to tradition and still immature in terms of democracy and legislation. All this innovation brought not only avant-garde and cultural progress, but also general discontent that led to traditionalist uprisings. These were able to overthrow the Amanullah regime, bringing to power, in 1929, the traditionalist leader Muhammad Nadir Shah. The new ruler closed all girls’ schools and reintroduced all restrictions on women’s freedom, including the obligation to wear a veil.The traditionalist wave ended in 1933, when Muhammad Nadir Shah was assassinated and was succeeded by Muhammad Zahir Shah, son of the previous ruler.   From 1933 to 1973, the years of the reign of Zahir Shah, Afghanistan took the reformist road, fully implementing some of the initiatives of Amanullah. Thanks to this return to a more open approach, a new Constitution introduced a democratic scenario and granted Afghan women the right to vote. Universities and schools were also opened to women, thus bringing Afghan society up to date with the western world.     The flourishing era of modernisation that Afghanistan was experiencing came to an abrupt halt in the late 1970s.     It was in 1978 when the Afghan communists took power in a coup d’état and began a campaign of social reforms between traditionalism and modernisation. This dangerous balance was then broken in December 1979 when Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan to support the communist government. From then on, the Afghan resistance formed by the Mujahideen fought long battles against the Soviet army. It was only in the 1980s that some powers, including the United States of America, began to provide them with military support and equipment. Afghanistan was now at the centre of the Cold War dynamics, but it also had to fight for internal stability, which was becoming only a distant memory. In 1989, the Soviets announced their retreat, leaving a wounded country in an unprecedented civil war.           In such a conflictual climate, women found themselves living in a historical moment of social degradation: death, destruction, violence and suicides had become a daily occurrence.In the uncertainty and chaos, the Taliban managed to impose their authority. They presented themselves as a worthy alternative to the civil war that was destroying the country, but the reality did not match the facts.            Afghan women never stopped fighting for a war that seemed to be against them.In the national context that was being created, restrictive policies from the traditional code of the Pashtun people, the Pashtunwali, echoed strict interpretations of Sharia, Islamic law, bringing misogyny and control into society.    The right to education, to have a job, to freedom of expression of one’s ideas and one’s body, to medical care, all this was presented to women as a reminder of the years of modernisation. With the advent of the Taliban regime, the role of women was minimised and, in many contexts, eliminated.Every woman was hidden behind the burqa and completely removed from the public life of Afghan society.           With the defeat of the Taliban in

Afghanistan is a country affected by extreme natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, landslides, floods and droughts, which have caused losses of life and livelihood.  According to the World Bank, these extreme events mainly occurred in the early 21st century, have shown the extreme vulnerability of Afghan communities to the impacts of environmental degradation. This vulnerability has been amplified by the conditions of conflict, poverty, malnutrition and inequality that have afflicted and continue to afflict the population. According to the report ‘Climate risk country profile. Afghanistan” by the World Bank, the country is the fifth most vulnerable nation in the world to the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation due to a combination of political, geographical and social factors. Climate crisis and hydrogeological risks in Afghanistan Afghanistan has an arid continental climate with temperatures varying considerably depending on altitude: mountainous regions experience temperatures below 0°C, while southern regions experience temperatures above 35°C. Afghan weather conditions have a complex intra-annual interaction with large-scale climatic phenomena, in particular, the El Niño weather event and the Indian Ocean dipole, leading to droughts in many areas of the country. The territory is extremely vulnerable to hydrogeological phenomena, which are increasing in frequency due to the effects of climate change. In the period between 1970-2016 globally there has been an increase in the occurrence of natural disasters and this trend is also confirmed in Afghanistan by the report “Managing Natural Disasters in Afghanistan. Risks, Vulnerabilities and general guidelines” by SESRIC. According to the report, while natural disasters in Afghanistan accounted for 0.7% globally, in 2016 the estimate rose to 1.6%. The country is experiencing more and more natural disasters on its territory. Between 1970 and 2016, Afghanistan was mainly affected by floods (46% of cases), earthquakes (18%) and landslides (12%).  While it is true that many administrative regions face multiple risks, the increasing drought in the country is a cause for concern. Floods in Afghanistan Floods are the most frequent natural disaster in Afghanistan, with the administrative provinces located in the western and central parts of the country being extremely vulnerable to this type of natural hazard. Particularly at risk are the areas of Hirat, Ghor, Faryab, Jawzjan, Daykundi, Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz, Badakhshan and Uruzgan. River floods occur mainly as a result of heavy rainfall and are reinforced by the rapid melting of snow and glaciers in the mountains. On 25 April and 6 June 2015, floods hit the Guzargah-e-Nur district of Baghlan province: thousands of people fled, more than 100 residents lost their lives, 4 villages were destroyed dragging more than 2,000 houses with them, and several agricultural fields and thousands of livestock were irretrievably lost. Earthquakes and landslides in Afghanistan Afghanistan is located in an area of high seismic activity and the country is vulnerable to medium to large intensity earthquakes, as it lies along the Indo-Eurasian tectonic boundary. The areas of Samangan, Baghlan, Takhar and Badakhshan are particularly at risk. Earthquakes in the last 20 years have killed about 8,000 people and it is estimated that a major seismic event in the Kabul province could cause about 8,500 deaths and over 500 million dollars in damage.  Due to its rugged and mountainous nature and the location of villages, towns and cities, Afghanistan is a country highly vulnerable to landslides. In this case, the areas of Logar, Baghlan, Samangan, Balkh, Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan) are particularly at risk. On 2 May 2014, a series of heavy rains caused multiple landslides in the Nowabad area of Aab-e-Barik village in Badakhshan, causing significant loss of life and widespread damage to homes and agriculture. Droughts in Afghanistan According to the World Bank Report, Afghanistan is affected by drought because of two deficits: 1) deficit in rainfall; 2) deficit in surface and groundwater flow. These two deficits are combined with inadequate land and crop management, thus impoverishing agricultural production. Research conducted by Iqbal et Al. on the situation of farming families in Herat province indicates the many negative economic, social and environmental impacts of drought. The study shows how it has reduced the availability of work for unskilled workers, impacting their standard of living and financial situation. This leads on the one hand to conflicts over hoarding resources and on the other to increased migration.  Afghanistan’s ecosystems are severely degraded due to decades of deforestation and drought, which can also be attributed to factors such as population growth, mismanagement and overexploitation of resources, local conflicts and unreliable land tenure. Ecosystem degradation, in turn, transforms flora compositions, degrades soil nutrients and reduces water availability. Today, most of Afghanistan’s soils are already degraded and 75% of the country is already affected by desertification, while forest cover has been reduced by up to 80%, from more than 3 million hectares in the 1950s to 1 million hectares today. Unless concrete actions are taken to combat climate change, the situation is bound to get worse. The study by Nauman et Al. shows that droughts in Afghanistan could double, if not triple, by 2050 due to a decrease in rainfall. This phenomenon is already taking place because of reduced spring rainfall and increased evaporation rates in the north-western, central and north-eastern regions. In the northeast, global warming is affecting the river system that historically supplied Afghanistan’s water supply during long periods of drought. The study by Naumann et. Al. predicted that the ongoing reduction in the region’s glacial mass will lead to a drastic reduction in water supplies by 2050, affecting livelihoods. Currently, the areas, particularly at risk, are Zabul, Kandahar, Hilmand, Nimroz, Farah, Hirat, Badghis, Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh, Sar-e-pul, Bamyan, Daykundi, Uruzgan, Ghor. Susceptibility to environmental degradation and social vulnerabilities of the Afghan population Since 1970, Afghanistan has had to cope with economic and non-economic losses due to natural disasters and environmental degradation. A country’s susceptibility to such phenomena is measured by population density, dependence on agriculture, the quality of public infrastructure, the spatial distribution of population and economic assets, and the quality of urban planning. Afghanistan’s communities are ethnically and

Looking at the history of Afghanistan, the image that emerges is that of a country that is often split and fragmented, devastated by conflicts that have made it politically unstable and in which different systems of law coexist more or less harmoniously, which can refer to sources which are very different from each other. It is in Islam, the official state religion according to what the Constitution states, that the country has often found its unity. If these are the premises, however, it is quite obvious to expect a very difficult life for LGBTQ+ people. In fact, sexual minorities in Afghanistan live in a dramatic condition in a country that hardly tolerates anything that deviates from the Islamic morality established and reaffirmed by political and religious authorities. Without the possibility of living one’s condition openly, without a public debate that reaffirms the needs and requirements of people who are not necessarily hetero or cis, without laws and guarantees that protect the most vulnerable categories, being queer in Afghanistan means living outside the law and society in a space of isolation on the edge of the country where risk and danger are always around the corner. Legislative Framework and Impact in Civil Society Article 6 of the Afghan constitution affirms the importance of the commitment to respect human dignity and civil rights, however it is possible to note that not all categories of citizens are considered worthy of such protection. The LGBTQ+ community, together with other minorities, is oppressed every day not only by the Islamic tradition, but also by the judicial system, which often resorts to religion without clear limitations. The Afghan Republic is in fact an Islamic republic, which therefore bases its values ​​on this religion, referring to sharia or “God’s law”, which can also be applied in the judicial field. The art. 130 of the Constitution in fact states that “in the absence of a legal provision applicable to the specific case, the courts judge… in accordance with the Hanafi jurisprudence”. Sharia is based on two main sources: the Koran and the Sunna, composed of the hadith, or what was transmitted (through actions, behaviours or words) by the Prophet Mohammed, and which is not derived from written documents, but from testimonies indirect and interpretations; among the various legal schools, the Hanafi one is nowadays the most widespread within the Islamic world and is considered the most liberal and tolerant, as it provides for punishments less frequently than the other madhahib (law schools). This is certainly not reassuring since, with the spread of Islamic fundamentalism since the 19th century, what was previously generally tolerated, such as same-sex relationships, has now become liable to hudud (corporal punishment) and harsher sanctions, including capital punishment, in use during the Taliban regime but in disuse since its fall. The so-called “secular” law within the Afghan republic criminalizes homosexuality. Although the penal code was reformed in 2017, no new protections aimed at LGBTQ+ minorities were introduced, indeed all the articles that punish non-heterocompliant behaviours were maintained. The Penal Code, in fact, in the Fourth Chapter (“Crimes against Chastity and Public Morals”) legislates in these terms: – the art. 398 legitimizes the crime of honor, the explicit justification of which can be, in addition to adultery, the discovery of a homosexual relationship, as it compromises the honor of the entire family. – sections 647, 648 and 649 instead provide for long prison sentences for the crimes of sodomy, with aggravating circumstances in the event of differences in age, power, and violation of the honor of the family of the subjects involved. -section 645 punishes those who commit “musahaqah“, or those who engage in a sexual relationship between two women. -sections 649 and 650 not only criminalize the “tafkhiz” (homosexual relationship without penetration), but also those who favour it, i.e. those who introduce the two subjects to each other or who gets them a place to commit the act. In addition to these crimes, given the country’s mixed judicial system, penalties deriving directly from the sharia can be added at the discretion of the individual judge, which can culminate in serious humiliation and corporal punishment. The death penalty itself, which the Taliban regime routinely used to punish such crimes, is a largely abandoned practice. However, we must not delude ourselves that it is no longer universally applied. The great fragmentation of Afghanistan and from a political point of view and from a legal point of view helps to create many different centers of power, local and central, secular and religious, institutional and subversive, and it can therefore happen that whoever holds the reins of power can also dispose of the right of life and death over the citizens he administers. If the sharp aversion carried out by the judicial authorities were not enough, the LGBTQ+ community in Afghanistan is still heavily oppressed also due to the many obstacles that prevent the emergence of a public debate on the issues of sexual minorities; in fact, the law prohibits publications that go “against the morals of the country” and even postal exchanges with “obscene content” are not permitted, which greatly complicates the work of activists and makes it illegal and dangerous to support and contribute to the advancement of civil rights. Perception and Social Status A country with a deep religious sentiment such as Afghanistan in which over 99% of the population professes the Islamic faith and within which different systems of laws coexist which, despite their contradictions and internal conflicts, all agree in condemning homosexuality and any other conduct judged contrary to the morals derived from Islam is certainly not the context in which the LGBTQ+ community can thrive in peace. Afghan sexual minorities, in fact, not only do not enjoy any type of guarantee or protection (egalitarian marriage, civil unions, gestation for others, adoption for same-sex couples are all practices prohibited by law) but are also openly opposed by the government’s institutions, by public opinion and by the citizens who make up the Real Country.

When we think about Taliban, the first image that comes to mind is that of the Islamic extremists who are on the pages of newspapers and news previews. Nevertheless, the term Taliban has an entirely different meaning. Indeed, the Taliban (from the Arabic ṭāleb, singular of ṭālebān) is nothing more than a student of Koranic schools in the Iranian area. The Taliban culture and tradition are characterised by being based on a mixture of Shari’a and Pashtunwali, the code of honour of the Pashtun people. The latter is inspired by the Deobandi Sunni current (a religious current from the Indian subcontinent and Afghanistan), based on the principles of solidarity, austerity and patriarchal management of every aspect of family life. Another important influence is the Wahhabi, the Jihadist and the Pan-Islamist. Like the Wahhabis and Deobandi, the Taliban are so strongly opposed to Shia Islam that they do not recognise the Afghan Shia Hazara as Muslims. Unlike Wahhabi thinking, the Taliban do not deny popular practices, do not destroy the tombs of the pirs (masters or guides in Sufism) and believe that dreams are future revelations. But how did the image of the Taliban that we know today come about? What was its role in the area and what is it today? The beginning of a new nation and civil war What can be defined, for narrative convenience, as a movement, it was born as a reaction to the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghan soil. The resistance, in fact, started from the Koranic schools and in 1992, it imposed itself as an armed force capable of responding to the needs of a totally devastated State – economically, socially and politically. The Taliban were able to come to terms with the warlords and to exclude from the conflict all the other armed groups that were gradually being created, unifying them all under the aegis of the Koran. For these reasons, the Taliban initially enjoyed excellent support from ethnic Afghans, Pashtuns and Pakistanis. According to Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani historian, the Pakistani government supported the Taliban because they let the Pakistani Mafia of truck drivers traffic undisturbed on their roads. This is borne out by the reconstruction of the motorway lines between Pakistan and the neighbouring former Soviet republics, which began immediately after the end of the war with the Soviets and was carried out entirely by Pakistani emissaries. The United States also initially supported the Taliban regime, for military and diplomatic reasons. On the one hand, the Taliban had been able to defeat the Soviets and had driven them far back into the territories they had conquered. On the other hand, this movement, although judged excessively radical by many Western actors, seemed to be the only one capable of unifying and stabilising Afghanistan on the world geopolitical scene. For their part, at that time, the Taliban’s exclusive priority was the security of the Afghan people. One of the most representative events which explains the role that the Taliban had at that time by the population of the region – which, having never been proved or denied, and makes it the contours of a legend – is what happened in the spring of 1994, in the village of Sang Hesar, near Kandahar. It is said that some warlords had kidnapped and raped two girls from the village. Mullah Muhammad ‘Omar, a veteran of the mujaheddin faction defined as Ḥarakat-i Inqilāb Islāmī (Islamic Revolution Movement), gathered about thirty Taliban men and went to retrieve the girls, steal weapons from the warlords involved and finally hanged the commander from a cistern as a warning to anyone who might think of doing it again. Later, Mullah ‘Omar, interviewed on the subject, declared: We were fighting against Muslims who had taken the wrong path. How could we be comfortable with so many crimes committed against women and poor people? The new Afghan state Between 1995 and 1996, after having conquered almost the entire Afghan territory, the Taliban emerged victorious from the civil war. Thanks to the consensus gained following the victory first against the Soviet occupiers and then against the various factions into which the resistance was divided and which had been competing for the government of the territory since the Russians had abandoned the region, the Taliban imposed a theocratic regime based on the strict application of Koranic laws. In the winter of 1995, they laid siege to the capital Kabul, blocking all entry routes and bombing it. In March 1996, Head of State Burhanuddin Rabbani and Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar attempted to respond to the provocations, but had to admit surrender on 26 September 1996, abandoning Kabul and fleeing north. The next day, to assert their power, the Taliban killed the last president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Mohammad Najibullah, who had been living in the UN building with his brother for protection since 1992. To glorify the new state as much as possible, Afghan power had to be asserted in any form. For instance, the two Pehlawan brother generals, on 20 May 1997, rebelled against the Uzbek warlord, Rashid Dostum, and asked the Taliban for help. With this help they managed to drive Dostum back to Uzbekistan. In 2001, they lost power after NATO intervened following reports of links between the Taliban and al-Qā‛ida and other Islamic terrorist groups. However, the Taliban continued their fight against the international coalition troops in Afghanistan and also against the government troops that were also stationed in the northern regions of Pakistan. From 2014 to the present In 2014, presidential elections were held, and the Taliban tried to influence the outcome, as some candidates had promised to negotiate with them and refused to sign agreements with the United States. This context gave rise to two factions within the Taliban: one that worked on anti-election campaigning; the other, more extremist, opposed to the ‘soft’ line represented by political dialogue, which continued to perpetrate terrorist attacks. In December 2014, the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) mission – a

In Reporters Without Borders’ world press freedom rankings, Afghanistan is ranked 122nd out of 180 countries, and on Freedom House’s global map it is classified as a non-free country. Restrictive laws, threats and terrorist attacks seriously undermine freedom of information, in a situation of political and economic instability made worse by the Covid-19 pandemic. From a single Taliban radio station, Shariat Ghag (Voice of Sharī’a), there are now 163 radio stations, 74 television stations and 85 newspapers, magazines and websites in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, freedom of speech and opinion remain fundamental rights that are constantly under threat.  Media law and secrecy of sources in Afghanistan  In a June press release, Audrey Azoulay ( UNESCO Director-General) condemned the murder of business journalist Mir Wahed Shah and cameraman Shafiq Amiri, both employees of the Afghan television station Khurshid Tv. They were the only two victims in Afghanistan this year, but only the latest in a long list of 68 people from 2001 to 2020, among journalists and media workers. According to Reporters Without Borders’ annual review, Afghanistan was the most dangerous country in the world in 2018, with 16 deaths and an unprecedented wave of violence. The threat comes, additionally, from both the Taliban and the Islamic State, who were certainly responsible for the killing of at least 30 journalists between the collapse of the government of Quranic students and the Doha peace accords. In this regard, Abdul Mujeeb Khalvatgar, director of Nai Supporting Open Media, a non-governmental organisation that supports Afghan journalists and promotes freedom of the press, denounces that journalists’ safety is worsening daily and, above all, in the total indifference of the Afghan authorities.  Intimidation, violence and pressure undermine both the security and the freedom of those working in Afghan media and do not allow a fully informed public debate on political, social and health issues of general interest. Yet, this is not all. Last June, the government of Ashraf Ghani was forced to suspend parliamentary proceedings on proposed amendments to the Afghan media law, only after a series of strong protests by professional associations. Among the various proposed amendments, the most alarming was the provision obliging journalists to disclose their sources to government officials and security services if requested to do so. Needless to say, the secrecy of sources is a fundamental and primary means of protection against both interference by the authorities and the justified fear of retaliation. The paradox of the Afghan government, which continues to declare itself committed to defending the freedom of the press when, unfortunately, the reality of the facts is far removed from public proclamations, is striking.  The food crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic.  Corruption, clientelism and lack of controls are endemic in the country and were indirectly the cause of the death of a young volunteer journalist from Radio Voice of Ghor. Ahmad Khan Nawid was killed during an anti-government protest in which Afghan security forces used firearms against protesters. The protest arose due to the unfair distribution of food aid intended to support the population during the Covid-19 pandemic. The food crisis has been exacerbated by the impact of the pandemic and over a third of the Afghan population is acutely food insecure. It is estimated that the price of livelihoods has risen by 10 to 20% and one of the main causes is the partial closure of Pakistan and Iran borders. The disruption of supply routes has had serious consequences, mainly due to low local production that is unable to meet domestic demand.  Furthermore, the sharp rise in primary commodity prices, such as oil, flour and pulses, has had a greater impact in urban areas. The cause is the absence of self-production or reserves, but primarily the increase in the level of unemployment, due to the inevitable lockdown measures, which have worsened the already serious economic uncertainty. The Afghan economy is highly dependent on foreign aid, and this is compounded by the inevitable reduction in the flow of remittances, which, in developing countries, plays a fundamental role as an instrument of resilience and economic stabilisation. To provide some order of magnitude, according to IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development) estimates, in 2017, the value of remittances amounted to 410 million dollars, which corresponds to at least 2% of national GDP. The humanitarian aspect adds to the picture of a multidimensional crisis in Afghanistan. Armed conflict and continuing violence have led to an increase in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), 65,000 more forced to abandon their homes and various productive activities.  Investigative journalism and access to information during Covid-19.  Freedom of expression in Afghanistan is, therefore, influenced by state and non-state actors, but also by intangible actors such as Covid-19. The health crisis and its economic implications undermine the financial sustainability of pluralist, independent and quality journalism, which nevertheless tries to uphold a watchdog role. In June, for example, Pajhwok Afghan News, Afghanistan’s most important independent news agency, published an investigation into the smuggling of at least 32 lung ventilators from neighbouring Pakistan, which had been donated to the Afghan Ministry of Health (MoPH) and were intended for intensive care units. Investigative and independent journalism, which does not limit itself to the simple selection of information, is fundamental to the understanding of complex phenomena and realities and, in Afghanistan, sometimes takes on a heroic dimension. Danish Karokhel, director of Pajhwok Afghan News, who was initially summoned by the Parliament’s Culture Committee, was intimidated and subjected to regular interrogation on charges of acting against national security.  Article 34 of the Afghan Constitution states that freedom of expression is inviolable and freedom of speech and opinion are a right of every Afghan. Last February, however, thirty media outlets issued a joint statement reporting a lack of access to information to all government institutions. Access is essentially denied by the Supreme Court, the General Prosecutor’s Office, the Directorate of Security Services, the Ministries of Defence and Finance and the Central Bank. The ability to access reliable and verified information is, of course, a prerequisite and a key component of minimum standards of press freedom. But regrettably, restrictions on access to information, which are used by the government as preventive censorship and a