The Southeastern Anatolian Project, better known as GAP (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi), is a network of infrastructures being built on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers with the dual function of generating electricity and providing irrigation systems for the surrounding area. Since the subject has already been analysed in Large Movements, the intention of this article is to integrate some elements by reading the project under three main lenses. The national dimension, linked to the energy dimension and to the role of the project in Turkish domestic politics. The international dimension, investigating the role of the European Union in promoting or limiting the development of the project. And finally, the local component by looking at the specific case of the Ilisu dam on the one hand, and the opposition movements against these projects on the other hand. This third component will be explored later.
Project characteristics and its state of progress
Although projects for the exploitation of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers have a history going back several decades, the GAP was launched only in 1989, not only as a plan for the exploitation of the resources of the two rivers, but as a real “project of integrated and multi-sectoral socio-economic development“. The project would therefore envisage the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric plants and irrigation systems (Figure 1), which should accompany the socio-economic development of the area in a context of strong economic and demographic growth. The commissioning of the Ataturk Dam in 1993 was followed by the construction of other infrastructures, the last of which was the Ilisu Dam inaugurated in 2020, the third largest of the entire project.
Table 1 shows data from 2015 and it partially reconstructs the progress of the work. Cross-referencing this information with that provided by the official website the table reveals that at least ten plants are currently in operation. In this regard, it is necessary to highlight an important element with regard to the possibility of finding sources on the subject. After skimming through the main academic, official and popular sources, it is important to underline that data on production costs, funding, companies and more technical aspects of the projects themselves are only partially available for each individual infrastructure and are often extremely fragmented and not very up-to-date. If, on the one hand, the hypothesis of the language difference is certainly valid as a potential limitation for the retrieval of these data, on the other hand, it should be pointed out that government sources do not provide all the necessary information for an overall understanding of the project. Given this difficulty, the next article will examine the specific case of the Ilisu Dam to try to provide a more detailed picture.
The role of hydropower in Turkey’s energy mix
The Turkish government’s need to promote such an infrastructure network with such insistence is comes from energetic and economic interests, but also from geopolitical reasons, both domestically and internationally. The Euphrates River accounts for more than 19.4% of the national hydroelectric potential (433 GWh per year), while the Tigris corresponds to 11.2%. The GAP once completed should be able to exploit 27,419 GWh/y of this potential, or 10.9% of the annual electricity produced in Turkey in 2014. Comparing this information with the International Energy Agency’s 2019 data, Turkey relies on hydropower to generate about 30% of its electricity (Figure 2). The remainder is covered to a very large extent by natural gas and coal, two resources that are mainly imported from abroad and therefore strategically provide less security and stability.
The full commissioning of the GAP would cover one third of this 30%, demonstrating its centrality in the economic development and political strategy of contemporary Turkey. Strengthening hydropower indirectly would mean partially decreasing the weight of natural gas and coal imports, thus reducing dependence on international players such as Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran. This would represent a significative step for a country which is seeking to establish itself as a hegemonic regional player. At the same time, the social and environmental effects would have repercussions on the local population in the area, made up mainly of Kurds, perceived as a threat by the central government. This would have the further aim of weakening, without the direct use of weapons, a resistance front that, especially since the outbreak of the war in Syria, has repeatedly been able to turn the spotlight on cases of military aggression and human rights violations.
EU non-intervention
To understand the role of the European powers in the realisation of the GAP, it is necessary to analyse the subject from two perspectives. On the one hand, there is the economic element, dictated above all by the desire to stimulate growth and development in the easternmost regions. On the other are the environmental and social factors. Although such projects are promoted as “clean energy” and sustainable infrastructure, the environmental and social effects are enormously destabilising. The construction of a large number of dams is producing large number of flooding and desertification, which not only have negative effects on the biodiversity of the area, but also on the people living there, who are often forced into mass migration. For the whole project, this would mean about 200,000 displaced people. Looking at the role played by the EU, everything should be read within a framework that has seen, at least until 2016, as a strong pressure from Turkey to be accepted as a member of the Union. The latter asked for a whole series of parameters both economic, social and environmental for the new member state. If we go back to the origin of the project, it was precisely in this direction, that negotiations were opened between the EU and the GAP Administration in 1996. During these negotiations, the EU decided to finance part of the “GAP Regional Development Programme” with 47 million euros, with a project aimed at “reducing inequalities, stimulating economic growth, and protecting the environmental and cultural heritage”. Later, the EU would allocate a further 14 million to finance a project to mitigate the risks of flooding caused by the construction of the dams.
The European approach appears to be a timid attempt to mitigate the negative effects that this infrastructure has generated and is still generating. On the one hand, there is awareness of the social and environmental risks associated with the construction of the project, as evidenced both by the investments made to mitigate these problems and by various questions submitted to the European Parliament. On the other hand, this awareness does not seem to have been followed by any strong action that would attempt, if not to block the most harmful projects, at least to mitigate their effects in a concrete way. According to the project’s official website, the EU is not the only international actor involved. FAO and UNDP have also been brought in on specific projects, but again, measures to counter the negative effects of these projects appear to have been marginal.
In the next article we will analyse in detail the effects that the infrastructure has had and is having on the social and environmental level, trying to reconstruct which have been the main forms of opposition from the local population with a specific focus on the role of the Kurdish political organisations present in the area.
- Adriano Della Brunahttps://migrazioniontheroad.largemovements.it/en/author/adriano-dellabruna/