Somali piracy is often described solely and exclusively as criminal, but what if it has also another function, namely that of guardians of the sea? In this article, an attempt will be made to investigate the nature of the phenomenon, even if there are still few sources that show an alternative vision to the internationally diffused one. Therefore, we will try to identify the elements which define piracy not only as a criminal act, but also as an alternative water defence “force”, a service which the Transitional Government is unable to take full responsibility for.
Historical background
Modern piracy, which has developed mainly in geopolitically strategic areas, has assumed all the characteristics of the historical definition of “marauder of the sea”. Unlike its analogues, Somali piracy has acquired different characteristics which have made it a particularly difficult phenomenon to study and, above all, to eradicate. These differences are due to the presence of many factors, and in particular, the political situation which Somalia lives. This, in fact, has given rise to a series of key phenomena in the development of piracy. Therefore, the complexity of the Somali situation, lies in the existence and overlapping of different dynamics, local, but also regional and international, which necessitate an all-inclusive approach.
However, in this article we will examine one of the many aspects of this phenomenon, trying to answer to the question on the nature of the piracy that has developed in Somali context. Using Somali terms, an attempt will be made to understand whether they fall into the category of burcad badeed, stricto sensu ‘marauders of the sea’, or badaadinta badah, ‘saviours of the sea’.
Since the joint efforts of the international community succeeded in eradicating this problem in 2012, the seizure of the oil tanker Aris 13 in 2017 has raised again the attention to the problem, which had been dormant for years, to the area, also portending a return of the same piracy. This attack, however, seems to have been only a brief interlude due to the lowering of the guard of the measures undertaken until then and the withdrawal of the NATO forces of the “Ocean Shield” mission, which ended in 2016. But what if this is just a symptom of a return that could be even more dangerous than the previous one?
In this framework, it could be useful to understand the nature of the acts of the Somali pirates and to understand if the initial role of defenders of the sea has disappeared during the evolution that piracy has undergone, becoming finalized only and exclusively to actions of depredation, or if this has only been “hidden” in order to more easily legitimize the actions carried out by the international community. Such an attempt, however, will be very difficult due to the scarcity of data and news by the ‘European eye’. Here, therefore, we will only try to provide some food for thought.
Fishermen or professionals?
When a political vacuum arose in the country in 1991 due to the fall of Siad Barre’s regime, it was immediately apparent that there was also no centralised structure capable of having effective control over the entire Somali territory and, consequently, its waters. It was from this situation that external actors, mainly European and Chinese fishing vessels and criminal organisations, began to take advantage. Intensive fishing and the dumping of toxic waste were the main motivations for local fishermen to improvise disorganised attacks on invading strangers.
Despite this, foreign depredation cannot be defined as the only motivation. Indeed, a more complex picture is added to this: the lack of a centralised state able to take charge of society’s needs, a clan organisation of Somali society that acts as a different representative of order and bearer of principles of political organisation different from those of the modern and post-modern state, and a state of poverty and considerable humanitarian crisis. Therefore, until the 2000’s, one speaks more of a phenomenon aimed at survival, in which the boundary between pirate, fisherman and smuggler is very blurred.
It can therefore be assumed that at this stage, although the population that derived its livelihood from the sea had reached considerable levels of frustration due to illegal foreign fishing activities, it had not managed to create a structure that could be considered as a ‘guardian of the waters’.
In recent years, in fact, we have mainly witnessed the phenomenon that has been defined as ‘piracy of opportunity’, which can be deduced above all from its discontinuity, the low profitability of the attacks and the short range of action. However, it cannot be ruled out that it was during this period that the criminal-style piracy groups we are accustomed to knowing began to form and develop. In fact, according to a former Somali pirate leader, Farah Hirsi Kulan “Boya”, the passage to a professionalized piracy took place already in 1994.
From fortuitous pirates of to a full-fledged coastguard?
From the first sporadic and disorganised attacks, pirate activities in a few years changed completely and became a very profitable business.
Many claim that there has been a shift from a protest phenomenon to one exclusively based on profit, although this may not be exactly the case.
In a political context like that of Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government is the only institutional and internationally recognized power which is not able to extend its authority beyond Mogadishu, allowing other types of “political organizations” to take over control of the space. In fact, “for the entire Somali territory, every level of administration is, to a large extent, entrusted to the hands of clans, village chiefs and warlords” and it is among these leaders that we recognize the most influential figures in piracy.
Some of the pirate organisations, which are defined as organised crime, also sought to assume a degree of institutionalisation.
They wanted to demonstrate that they were able to carry out not only activities of pillage, kidnapping for ransom or, in any case, connected to enrichment, but also a function of “defence” and “control”.
Furthermore, a large part of the Somali society began to enjoy the benefits brought by the pirate activities. Indeed, this reality is progressively promoted a form of legitimization towards these criminal groups, guaranteeing their members also a sort of protection and respect.
One of the most interesting phenomena, therefore, was precisely the creation of a deep connection between these groups and the family network and clans which, combined with the practice of creating in the minds of the members the idea of being a true coastal defence force, favoured the consolidation of this attempt at institutionalisation. Finally, the ‘new motivations’ also contributed to the creation of a sort of consciousness or, better, identity that reinforced their idea that they had really become the only ones capable of safeguarding the sea.
To better understand this phenomenon, a closer look at some of these groups may be useful.
The National Volunteer Coast Guard of Somalia, for example, was a group that operated mainly off the coast of Kisimaio and Koyaama Island in the south. Already the name suggests their intention to act as a sort of coast guard.
We see, in fact, that in addition to the typical activities of piracy, acts of forced taxation aimed at a full-scale regularisation of foreign fishing also stood out. In an interview with one of the leaders, Sugule Ali, he stated ‘We don’t consider ourselves sea bandits. We consider sea bandits [to be] those who illegally fish and dump in our seas’. We consider those who illegally fish and dump toxic waste in our seas to be sea bandits’, a statement that allows us to understand how the local perception is very different from ours. For these people, the real threat is from foreign fishing boats, a reality that legitimises piracy as a reaction to external violence.
The situation would seem to change when one considers the group of Somali Marines. This was defined by many sources as the most structured and sophisticated organization which operated around Harardhere.
Above all, the ability to operate at a great distance from the coasts, the great internal organization and the possible alliance with people connected to Al-Shabaab were emphasized.
All this leads one to think of an organization finalized only and exclusively to the profitable activity of kidnapping goods and people passing through. In reality, this is the only idea that literature and strategic studies have created on the general concept of piracy, denying any possibility that could justify the actions of these groups.
The intention here is not to legitimise the violent acts perpetrated over the years by the pirates, nor to assume their actions to be just, rather the intention is to emphasise how the scarcity of direct testimony from the local population and the pirates themselves makes the reconstruction of Somali piracy incomplete.
The disappearance, perhaps only momentary, of the phenomenon has then crystallised the vision of the Somali pirate by juxtaposing it with piracy in general.
The need to understand in depth the extent and nature of the problem is above all a function of the attempt to find a definitive solution to what had become an international problem. It must be remembered that an important ‘slice’ of international maritime trade, especially that of hydrocarbons, passes through the Gulf of Aden. For this reason, great and costly efforts have been made by various actors, both private and public, to combat the problem.
The solution adopted may have put an end to the issue only temporarily.
If, as we have hypothesised here, piracy, in addition to being a sophisticated network of criminal organisations, has also taken on the role of an alternative defence, it may return in the future stronger than before. In this sense, there is evidence that some foreign vessels have returned to fishing illegally in Somali waters, a situation that could lead to a return of piracy as a defence force.
Therefore, it is necessary to maintain the focus on the region and to pursue deep and careful policies, also directed at the civil society, that would make the terrain less fertile for the resurgence of piracy. In particular, the concern is also that its revival could undergo an even more dangerous mutation than the previous one and, therefore, from criminal piracy, as it was described until 2012, become politically motivated terrorist piracy.
