Climate migration in Africa: an overview of the phenomenon

Rainer Maria Baratti
18/01/2021
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Africa (EN)

Climate and environmental migrations are a phenomenon discussed at the various environmental forums. However, each context brings with it differences in causes and consequences. In the meantime, a response on both fronts is becoming gradually urgent, while at the international level there are increasing difficulties in reaching agreement.

Environmental and climate migrations

Climate migration in Africa is an increasingly central topic in migration debate. As early as 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations’ scientific forum for studying global warming and its effects, noted that the greatest impact could be on human migration. Therefore, it is necessary to remember the subtle difference between environmental migration, due to direct human action (e.g. caused by environmental damage such as oil spills), and climate migration: migration caused by the meteorological impact of climate change. To clarify, it should be recalled that the scientific community has long recognised the anthropogenic origin of climate change. However, it should be specified that it is not easy to distinguish between the two types of migration and they often move in parallel, adding up in their effects on human mobility.

At the same time, the meteorological impact of climate change can be divided into two distinct migration factors: climatic processes and non-climatic factors. To the one hand, climate processes include phenomena such as rising sea levels, salinisation of agricultural land, salinisation of water and soil, desertification and increasing water scarcity, as well as climatic events such as floods and irregularities (as well as violence) in rainfall. To the other hand, non-climatic factors are political instability, population growth or community resilience to natural disasters. Finally, all these factors contribute to the degree of vulnerability that people and societies experience.

Rainfalls’ effects in Africa and climate migration

With regard to climatic migrations in Africa, an increasing irregularity of rainfall is observed in large parts of sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in arid and semi-arid areas. Certainly, this leads to an increasingly unpredictable start and early end of the rainy season, prolonged phases of seasonal drought, and more intense rainfall. In addition, the trend seems to be towards a reduction in the general level of rainfall and an increase in occasional heavy rainfall. This means increasing difficulties for agricultural systems dependent on rainfall for irrigation. Consequently, these dynamics pose a persistent threat to food security as they result in the loss of large crops and staple foods such as maize and millet. In addition, changes in rainfall are accompanied by flooding, river overflows and flooding caused by cyclone activity in coastal areas.

In Africa, from the point of view of climate migration, we have different effects depending on the area affected. On the highlands of East Africa, floods destroy settlements and agricultural fields, often forcing farmers to abandon their cultivated areas. In the lowlands, river floods and large-scale flooding mainly affect livestock farmers operating in arid and semi-arid areas, threatening also urban workers. In southern Africa, land near large river basins and coastal areas (particularly in southeastern Africa and Madagascar) are affected by high intensity flooding, triggering temporary or permanent migration. In conclusion, it must be said that the high dependence on agriculture and livestock forces small-scale farmers and pastoral communities to diversify their sources of income. This leads to an increase in circular and seasonal migration flows within the African continent, which represents a fundamental adaptation and resilience strategy.

Climate Migration and forms of mobility within Africa

In Africa we can see rural-urban and rural-rural circular labour mobility flows that are a common reaction in all regions of the continent. In this case we speak about ‘migration as adaptation’ to climate change. Often, individuals migrate for a certain period of time in order to earn money and employ it to mitigate the difficulties of their households. However, it must be remembered that there are the so-called ‘trapped populations’, i.e. those many households that are affected by the consequences of climate change but do not have enough resources to move. In addition, there is no ‘automaticity’ to displacement because of labour exploitation, unavailability of employment. Hence, harsh living and working conditions for migrants sometimes weaken the positive potential of migration.

The most mobile communities in terms of climate migration are pastoral and semi-pastoral communities. Firstly, these are forced to move or temporarily relocate due to drought. Secondly, such displacements can take two different forms: processes of local sedentarisation or migration to urban contexts. Both of these two forms can have negative implications. For instance, communities often settle along rivers to allow livestock to drink and thus increase their vulnerability to flooding. Meanwhile, migration to urban contexts often leads newcomers to live in the slums of mega-cities. Here, in addition to the sanitation problems they may face, they may be subject to increasing violence.

Environmental and political risks

While environmental changes and their potential consequences are the key agents of climate migration, they are also linked to political, social, economic and cultural factors. In other words, the risk of climate migration is particularly serious in the presence of a generally unstable socio-political framework and prolonged armed conflicts. Let’s take an example of a fragile context with water scarcity caused by drought. In this case we are in a context with limited access to resources. First, we may have an increased likelihood of conflict over access to water between farmers and herders. Secondly, the materialisation of conflict or resource scarcity itself may lead to climate migration. Thirdly, the element of terrorism should not be overlooked. Africa is the continent that suffers most from the violence of terrorism. Often the choice to pick up a gun and serve the cause of a terrorist group is linked to a kind of law of the strongest: ‘I have the weapons, I can grab that resource’. Often the resource we are talking about is water, other times it may be the very management of a portion of territory. So, the choice of affiliation to a terrorist group is always more tied to the capacity of sustenance and nourishment.

In conclusion this article may understand that when we talk about the environment, we are also talking about society. Hence, we cannot distinguish environment between man. The fight against climate change, as well as environmental protection, are increasingly necessary to bring stability to all our societies. Finally, it must be borne in mind that each context lives with its own fragilities and that any slight change in a system (in this case we have spoken of environmental changes) can have tragic consequences.

Rainer Maria Baratti

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Somali piracy

Claudia Rosati 18 January 2021

Somali piracy is often described solely and exclusively as criminal, but what if it has also another function, namely that of guardians of the sea? In this article, an attempt will be made to investigate the nature of the phenomenon, even if there are still few sources that show an alternative vision to the internationally diffused one. Therefore, we will try to identify the elements which define piracy not only as a criminal act, but also as an alternative water defence “force”, a service which the Transitional Government is unable to take full responsibility for. Historical background Modern piracy, which has developed mainly in geopolitically strategic areas, has assumed all the characteristics of the historical definition of “marauder of the sea”. Unlike its analogues, Somali piracy has acquired different characteristics which have made it a particularly difficult phenomenon to study and, above all, to eradicate. These differences are due to the presence of many factors, and in particular, the political situation which Somalia lives. This, in fact, has given rise to a series of key phenomena in the development of piracy. Therefore, the complexity of the Somali situation, lies in the existence and overlapping of different dynamics, local, but also regional and international, which necessitate an all-inclusive approach. However, in this article we will examine one of the many aspects of this phenomenon, trying to answer to the question on the nature of the piracy that has developed in Somali context. Using Somali terms, an attempt will be made to understand whether they fall into the category of burcad badeed, stricto sensu ‘marauders of the sea’, or badaadinta badah, ‘saviours of the sea’. Since the joint efforts of the international community succeeded in eradicating this problem in 2012, the seizure of the oil tanker Aris 13 in 2017 has raised again the attention to the problem, which had been dormant for years, to the area, also portending a return of the same piracy. This attack, however, seems to have been only a brief interlude due to the lowering of the guard of the measures undertaken until then and the withdrawal of the NATO forces of the “Ocean Shield” mission, which ended in 2016. But what if this is just a symptom of a return that could be even more dangerous than the previous one? In this framework, it could be useful to understand the nature of the acts of the Somali pirates and to understand if the initial role of defenders of the sea has disappeared during the evolution that piracy has undergone, becoming finalized only and exclusively to actions of depredation, or if this has only been “hidden” in order to more easily legitimize the actions carried out by the international community. Such an attempt, however, will be very difficult due to the scarcity of data and news by the ‘European eye’. Here, therefore, we will only try to provide some food for thought. Fishermen or professionals? When a political vacuum arose in the country in 1991 due to the fall of Siad Barre’s regime, it was immediately apparent that there was also no centralised structure capable of having effective control over the entire Somali territory and, consequently, its waters. It was from this situation that external actors, mainly European and Chinese fishing vessels and criminal organisations, began to take advantage. Intensive fishing and the dumping of toxic waste were the main motivations for local fishermen to improvise disorganised attacks on invading strangers. Despite this, foreign depredation cannot be defined as the only motivation. Indeed, a more complex picture is added to this: the lack of a centralised state able to take charge of society’s needs, a clan organisation of Somali society that acts as a different representative of order and bearer of principles of political organisation different from those of the modern and post-modern state, and a state of poverty and considerable humanitarian crisis. Therefore, until the 2000’s, one speaks more of a phenomenon aimed at survival, in which the boundary between pirate, fisherman and smuggler is very blurred. It can therefore be assumed that at this stage, although the population that derived its livelihood from the sea had reached considerable levels of frustration due to illegal foreign fishing activities, it had not managed to create a structure that could be considered as a ‘guardian of the waters’. In recent years, in fact, we have mainly witnessed the phenomenon that has been defined as ‘piracy of opportunity’, which can be deduced above all from its discontinuity, the low profitability of the attacks and the short range of action. However, it cannot be ruled out that it was during this period that the criminal-style piracy groups we are accustomed to knowing began to form and develop. In fact, according to a former Somali pirate leader, Farah Hirsi Kulan “Boya”, the passage to a professionalized piracy took place already in 1994. From fortuitous pirates of to a full-fledged coastguard? From the first sporadic and disorganised attacks, pirate activities in a few years changed completely and became a very profitable business. Many claim that there has been a shift from a protest phenomenon to one exclusively based on profit, although this may not be exactly the case. In a political context like that of Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government is the only institutional and internationally recognized power which is not able to extend its authority beyond Mogadishu, allowing other types of “political organizations” to take over control of the space. In fact, “for the entire Somali territory, every level of administration is, to a large extent, entrusted to the hands of clans, village chiefs and warlords” and it is among these leaders that we recognize the most influential figures in piracy. Some of the pirate organisations, which are defined as organised crime, also sought to assume a degree of institutionalisation. They wanted to demonstrate that they were able to carry out not only activities of pillage, kidnapping for ransom or, in any case, connected to enrichment, but also a function

Oil spills in the Niger Delta: environmental and health disasters in Nigeria

Rainer Maria Baratti 18 January 2021

The Niger Delta is one of the five most polluted ecosystems in the world due to oil spills that still affect both the environment and local populations, such as the Ikebiri and Ogoni. The oil industry, historically in a country like Nigeria, is the main cause of violent conflicts, environmental disasters and health disasters that are now structural. Moreover, this issue is also of interest to Italy since the civil trial at the Court of Milan involving ENI, with its Nigerian subsidiary, and the Ikebiri people, in 2018 . The environmental situation in the Niger Delta and the health damage suffered by the Nigerian population The Niger Delta is an oil-rich region in south-eastern Nigeria, where the activities of multinational oil companies (such as Shell, Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco, Total Fina Elf, Eni/Agip) have caused serious environmental, social and economic damages. Specifically, pollution is caused by crude oil leaking from old pipelines that stretch for hundreds of kilometres in the territory. In addition to oil spills into the river water and along its banks, another major problem in the area is gas flaring, the burning of excess gas extracted with oil. This gas could be pumped back into the ground or used for Nigeria’s energy needs. Instead, it is burnt by multinational companies because this makes the extraction of oil faster, thus lowering operating and production costs. As a result, people living in these areas breathe polluted air, eat contaminated fish (what little is left in the area) and drink water mixed with oil. According to the United Nations Environment Programme, toxicity levels are 900 times higher than those permitted by the World Health Organisation (WHO). Consequently, the spread of health diseases has also increased: respiratory problems, skin and eye diseases, gastrointestinal disorders, leukaemia and cancer. Finally, it should be noted that mining, by polluting the reservoir and the land, has destroyed subsistence farming. Added to this is the expropriation of land from the Nigerian people by the government under treaties signed with multinationals in the 1960s and unchanged since then. The oil industry in Nigeria Oil itself represents 95% of Nigeria’s exports and 65% of its national budget. This is the reason why the theme of violent conflicts over the management of this resource is recurrent in the country’s colonial and post-colonial history. The oil industry in the Niger Delta involves both the government of Nigeria and the subsidiaries of large multinational companies, such as Shell, Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco, Total Fina Elf and Eni/Agip, as well as some Nigerian companies. In this regard, oil exploration and production is carried out by ‘joint ventures’ involving the government-controlled Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and one or more foreign oil companies that have signed partnership and participation contracts with the NNPC. In this way, the NNPC holds the majority share, leaving the multinationals with the operational role on the ground. In fact, the companies manage huge swathes of land, with Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) alone managing an area of over 31,000 square kilometres, building much of the oil infrastructure close to the homes, crops and water sources of the communities. However, communities in the Niger Delta do not benefit from the oil wealth and, despite the presence of 606 oil wells, Nigeria remains one of the poorest countries in Africa. The only ones to get rich from oil are the multinationals and the local elites: a situation that has led to protests and mobilisation on the one hand, and violent repression, on the other, by the state and private security agents hired by the companies. It should also be noted that 60% of the population of the Niger Delta survives through activities directly related to the ecosystem. In other words, when crops and fishing grounds are damaged, the inhabitants are unable to find alternative sources of income to those lost and sink deeper into poverty. In this ecosystem, therefore, it is not possible to live according to Nigeria’s motto “Unity and faith, peace and progress”, as people are increasingly presented with two alternatives: struggle or migration. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta Local communities, mainly supported by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, oppose the exploitative policies of multinational corporations and demand the reclamation of waterways and land as well as a fairer distribution of oil revenues as compensation for ecological debt. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, the main population of the Niger Delta region, has been conducting a non-violent campaign against environmental degradation since 1990. The Ogoni are an indigenous people affected by the intense exploitation of oil resources granted by the military junta to the multinational company Shell in the 1980s. According to the agreement between the parties, although formally the land remained in the hands of the people, Shell was allowed to exploit the resources present and was obliged to allocate only 1.5% of the royalties from the profits to the local population. After numerous battles led by the Movement an agreement was reached, hence Shell must give more than 15% of the royalties to the people. Additionally, a major achievement of Movement leader Ken Sawro-Wiwa has been to attract international attention by using strong and impactful concepts to describe the problem. One of the most striking examples is the concept of ‘ecological warfare’. However, in 1995, Ken Sawro-Wiwa and eight activists were arrested and sentenced to death by the government for allegedly ordering the murder of four traditional and pro-government leaders, despite the fact that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights had called for a stay of execution on the grounds of ‘unfair trial’. Nigeria was subsequently convicted in 2001 for not having a fair trial and for failing to comply with the Commission’s order. In addition, Nigeria was convicted of violating the collective rights of the Ogoni people, in particular

Kakuma’s queer voice: G.’s story

Giuseppe Antonio Mura e Gianmarco Cristaudo 23 March 2023

In our previous articles we talked about the conditions of the LGBTQ+ community in Kenya and the human rights violations taking place inside the Kakuma refugee camp. We then took up the testimony of J, the first case in our in-depth look at human rights violations within Kakuma, and the testimony of A, a lesbian female guest at Kakuma. Continuing, then, the investigation that Large Movements APS is conducting together with International Support Human Rights, in this article we will analyze the specific situation of G., the fictitious name of an LGBTQ+ boy from Kakuma with whom we had the opportunity to speak. As reported in previous cases, G. also stated that he left his home country as a result of the various assaults he suffered because of his sexuality and sought refuge in neighboring Kenya. The hope of being able to live away from the fear and violence he suffered in what he once called “home” was his compass that guided him along his journey, but life in Kakuma turned out to be far more terrible than he could have imagined. The short stay in Kakuma G. is a Ugandan citizen. He fled his country when life in his homeland had become unbearable after several assaults he suffered because of his sexuality. He arrived in Kakuma in April 2020 and left a year later, in April 2021, when living conditions inside the camp had become very risky, having experienced numerous violent attacks, along with the entire LGBTQ+ community in Kakuma: he was almost set on fire in May 2020 and they tried to poison him twice. It is therefore not surprising that G. describes the conditions inside the Kakuma camp as “horrible.” Police and UNHCR staff negligence G. said he reported to the police and UNHCR staff each time he was subjected to an assault. However, all the emails he wrote were ignored to the point that in April 2021 he was forced to flee for his life after surviving yet another assault.He also told us that upon his arrival he was chosen as the spokesperson for LGBTQ+ people in Kakuma. And it is because of this close contact he has with other people inside the camp that he can assure us that every queer person he knows has experienced the same neglect from the authorities and UNHCR staff. Intimidation, threats, and arbitrary detentions are means often used to oppress the LGBTQ+ community in Kakuma and force them into silence, so much so that G. states that many UNHCR reports from Kenya share information and data that are not at all reliable or close to the truth of the camp, because such information is the result of the use of force on LGBTQ+ refugees, confirming that Kakuma is not a safe place for queer people and that they need and deserve international protection and to be relocated as soon as possible. The questionability of the management of relocations The management of relocations is also questionable. Relocations are so important to LGBTQ+ people in Kakuma because, first and foremost, they give them hope. Hope to live and love freely, to be the person they are, and to become productive members of society. Above all, relocation means freedom and security for G. and those in Kakuma who still live in fear, unable to move freely even when attacked. Although G. never applied for it, as according to him a relocation was implicit in his asylum application, since Kenya is a hostile country for queer people, he told us how the relocation situation was handled while he was in the camp: at first, UNHCR told them that there were only a few available resettlement places and that they were not able to relocate everyone. Then, under the pretext of the health emergency from Covid-19, they delayed the relocations but since the outbreak of the pandemic, the relocations have not happened yet. In addition, the relocations have been used as a weapon by the Kenyan government and sometimes UNHCR staff against the most active and vocal members of the LGBTQ+ community who sought to expose the violations taking place in the camp. Essentially, those who tried to report the very serious conduct in Kakuma, such as G., were threatened that they would never be transferred. In June 2021, after the death of 22-year-old activist Chriton Atuhwera in Kakuma camp two months earlier, G. and LGBTQ+ people inside the camp launched a petition to UNHCR demanding protection and to be transferred. UNHCR officials responded with intimidation to those who wanted to join the petition, saying they would be returned if they signed. “It’s not just about keeping quiet, but they have been proactive in silencing the LGBTQ community,” G. said on the matter. If you liked the article, share it!

Talibè children in Senegal: life in the balance between abuse and begging

Rainer Maria Baratti 18 January 2021

Dustiness, dirtiness, and barefoot children, most of them Talibè, holding empty tomato cans or plastic bowls in their hands populate the streets of Dakar and in many other cities in Senegal. A 2007 UNICEF study on child begging in Dakar, the capital of Senegal, found that more than 90% of the children are Taliban. However, official statistics are still missing and children between 8 and 15 years of age are involved. Talibé and Marabutto in Senegal The term Talibè in the Wolof language means ‘disciple’ and refers to children attending the Daara, the Koranic schools run by the Marabuttos, who teach the precepts of Islam on the basis of mnemonic learning of the Koran. For centuries, the Daaras in Senegal have ensured that Islamic education has spread to all segments of the West African country’s population. Here, however, physical punishment is often carried out, which for many West African Muslim countries is considered an important part of the educational process. Between the Talib and his Marabout there is a relationship of devotion and strict obedience as the Marabout offers his guidance and protection to his disciples who express their trust through financial support or tithing. In Senegal, the issue of the Taliban is not seen in a homogeneous way, some promoting its spread while others close it down. In addition, parents who decide to send their children to a Daara often do so through de facto fostering, because of their own economic difficulties, and to offer a better future to the child by building a relationship with the Muslim brotherhood to which the Marabout belongs and consequently to prepare the child for a career as a Marabout. It should be noted, however, that the Taliban’s education remains essentially linked to West African values in terms of children’s education. Begging, punishment and life in the Daara Originally, begging by the Taliban consisted of asking for food to supplement the Daara’s supplies when the Marabout’s fields crops could not support the needs. This practice evolved as the Daara developped in an urban environment and required a change for the income. Thus, the practice of almsgiving resulted in children giving money instead of food. The problem of Marabout abuse of Taliban children in Senagal is not subject to state regulation and as a result some schools abuse the relationship between disciple and teacher. Often, what should be an institution of education can take on negative facets. Some Marabouts exploit Taliban for labour or forced begging on the streets, instead of teaching Koran to them. In some cases, this exploitation exposes children to disease, injury, death, physical and sexual abuse inside or outside the Daara. A Human Rights Watch survey of 175 Taliban children in Senegal estimated an average of just under 8 hours a day, every day, of begging for between 373 CFA (0.56 €) and 445 CFA (0.67 $) on holidays. This is a difficult amount to achieve as just under 30% of the Senegalese population lives on less than 593 CFA (0.90 €) a day and 55% live on less than 949 CFA (1.44 €). In addition to money, food quotas such as sugar and rice are often demanded. If this quota is not met, there is a risk of physical abuse, and for example, many children show scars and bruises, due to the application of electric cables or sticks. However, is the older Talib, who becomes the assistant to the Marabout, to be responsible for punishing younger Talibels who do not pay back their daily quota or who return late. In cases where the Marabout does not supervise the children, the older Talib has absolute power over them and he can rob them or abuse them physically or sexually. In general, children risk beatings, sexual abuse, chaining, imprisonment and numerous forms of neglect and danger in at least 8 of the 14 administrative regions of Senegal. In addition, there are risks associated with the trafficking and migration of Taliban children in Africa, including the illicit transportation of Taliban groups across regions and national borders. The Senegalese Taliban often lack basic necessities and accommodation, having to endure longer hours of begging or sleeping on the streets. Indeed, conditions in urban Daara are often characterised by malnutrition, lack of clothing, exposure to disease and poor hygiene. Often hundreds of Taliban children live in extremely dirty and squalid conditions in unfinished buildings with no walls, floors or windows. Here rubbish, sewage and flies clog the ground and the air, and children often sleep crammed into dozens in an open-air room, most of them without mosquito nets and therefore at risk of infection or disease. Moreover, the situation is exacerbated when the children become ill, they are forced to beg to pay for their treatment. The many rights violated From a legal point of view, there are many issues related to human rights and children’s rights. Hence, the situation of Taliban children in Senegal calls into question several international conventions. When we talk about the Taliban, we face with cases of slavery, forced labour and human trafficking. Some NGOs argue that when a Marabout acquires custody of a Talibé to force him to beg, this practice is a “practice akin to slavery” as defined by the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery (1956). Furthermore, the Forced and Compulsory Labour Convention (1930) describes forced labour as “work which is performed by any person under threat of any penalty and for which the person in question has not offered himself voluntarily”. In addition, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has deemed the practice of exploitation of the Taliban in Senegal to fall within the scope of the Convention concerning the Prohibition of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999), equating forced begging with slavery. In turn, Human Rights Watch, considering ILO’s point of view, has argued that the Marabouts, when they transport the Taliban with the primary intention of obtaining work from them, are involved in child trafficking. In this regard, reference is made to

Ilaria Alpi’s murder and the investigation of toxic waste trafficking in Somalia

Rainer Maria Baratti 18 January 2021

On 20 March 1994 in Mogadishu, Somalia, Ilaria Alpi, together with her cameraman Miran Hrovatin, was murdered. The journalist had carried out several missions for TG3 since 1992 to report on the UN peace mission ‘Restore Hope’ and the Somali context of the civil war that broke out following the fall of Siad Barre’s regime, in 1991. The investigation of the Alpi-Hrovatin case focused on the journalist’s last report, which should have been broadcast on the evening of 20 March. Only fragments and incomplete footage of that report remain, as the full version never reached Italy. Neither the motive, nor the instigator, nor the executors of that murder are still clear. Giancarlo Marocchino is one of the main protagonists of the Alpi-Hrovatin case. He is a Piedmontese transporter who was an influential businessman in Mogadishu, for several years. For the SISMI, according to one of the declassified notes, he was “an able and cunning entrepreneur” to work for everyone and to disentangle himself in Somalia ravaged by civil war. According to SISMI, he was involved in the logistics and he was suspected of trafficking in arms and in toxic and radioactive waste. The latter are suspicions still not confirmed by the courts. In the background of the investigation, it is also necessary to keep in mind the Somali context, and in particular the Italian involvement in Somalia. The final report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the death of Ilaria Alpi and Miran Hrovatin, approved in February 2006, analysed various causes of the murder, taking also into account fundamentalism and criminality in the country. An analysis of Ilaria Alpi’s notebooks bring to three lines of investigation from the themes of the last reportage: arms trafficking, toxic waste trafficking and the effects of Italian cooperation in Somalia. Italian cooperation in Somalia Before the beginning of the civil war in Somalia, Italy was a close ally of the government of Siad Barre, Somali president-dictator until 1991. For instance, Italy sold arms to Somalia which stockpiled them in various warehouses in the country, and they were object of interest of the militias and warlords, following the fall of the regime. It is generally acknowledged that Italy supported, economically and politically, Siad Barre even at a time when the regime appeared completely discredited in the eyes of international public opinion and the majority of the Somali people. Among Alpi’s lines of enquiry was Italy’s cooperation with developing countries, particularly Somalia. The journalist was interested in the phenomenon of aid in general and how it was managed, as well as whether it could have been used for illicit enrichment rather than the purpose for which it was given. In particular, Alpi was interested in the Garoe-Bosaso road and the Shifco fishing project. Italian parliament started development cooperation in Somalia in 1979, with substantial funding. In particular, during the period 1986-1989, the volume of Italian investment in Somalia and the Horn of Africa increased exponentially and it was only interrupted by the outbreak of civil war in 1992. The final report of the parliamentary commission states that in the decade 1981-1990, 80% of the funds were allocated to the implementation of projects defined as ‘physical’. Out of the total, 49% were allocated to the construction of large infrastructures, 21% to productive investments and 15% to investments defined as “socio-communitarian” (projects that can be considered as benefiting the population). This set-up of Italian cooperation has been marked by programming shortcomings and a lack of coordination with multilateral and international initiatives. Moreover, the actual success of these cooperation initiatives was heavily undermined by the prerogative to protect the interests of Italian companies, lobbies and pressure groups in Somali, not taking into account the real needs of the country. The analysis of these policies of international cooperation was conducted during the season of Tangentopoli. In this context, a number of enquiries brought to light a reality in which allocations for cooperation with developing countries were a significant part of the entire Italian bribe system. The investigations uncovered costly and unnecessary projects, multi-billion dollar allocations, bribes and trafficking of all kinds, including arms to Somalia. In this regard, the 1994 Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into Cooperation with Developing Countries went on a mission to Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya from 29 January to 31 January 1996. The report stressed that there had been many management errors and that a lot of money had gone into the wrong hands. Among the most controversial works financed by the Italian government there were Garoe-Bosaso road and the port of Bosaso, as well as the ocean fishing project and its fishing company ‘Shifco’. With regard to the road, the average cost per km was 605 million, which is disproportionate to the average expenditure in Italy, but also compared to other roads built with development cooperation funds in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, at the beginning of 1979, an attempt was made to undertake an ocean fishing project marked by disasters and failures. This led to the creation of the ‘Shifco’ company, which arranged for the transfer of fishing vessels after the anti-Barre war of 1990 to the waters of the Gulf of Aden. There is a suspicion that this initiative, characterised by serious design errors, served firstly to enrich private Italian and Somali groups, even not necessarily through illicit means. Arms trafficking in Somalia Before embarking on her last trip, Ilaria Alpi had identified the area of Bosaso, a port city in the north of Somalia, as an area of ‘journalistic interest’ and she had the intention to investigate there about arms trafficking and the intertwining with ‘bad cooperation’ and the trafficking of toxic waste. Indeed, Alpi pursue some research on the Shifco ships, looking for evidence. The last interview before the murder seems to focus on this aspect. The cameraman Alberto Calvi, with whom Alpi had worked on previous missions to Somalia, reported that the journalist had always looked for evidence in relation to arms and drug trafficking. As a possible lead

Uganda: Safe Haven or Dust Under the Rug? We discuss this with Maëlle Noir

Sara Massimi 20 March 2023

We often hear about the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as in South Sudan, or the continuing violence and reprisals in the Central African Republic. However, we know very little about the people fleeing these conflicts, the refugees, their conditions, and especially about the plight of women fleeing to save both their lives and their families. This is why today we would like to emphasise a part that is often overlooked in conflict narratives: the people who are driven to flee from these contexts and who in the vast majority of cases, contrary to what is often falsely claimed, remain in Africa by seeking asylum in neighbouring states and do not choose to make the very dangerous journey to Europe. One of the African countries hosting a large number of people on the run is Uganda. Today we would like to talk about this with Maëlle Noir, an Irish Research Council PhD scholar at the Irish Centre for Human Rights, University of Galway. Her PhD research addresses the question of gender-based violence against women refugees through an intersectional and decolonial feminist perspective, exploring the relevance of feminist lawyering as an alternative approach to legal practice in the Ugandan urban refugee setting. Maëlle has extensive experience in advocacy and community research as she has been working for the past five years with several national and local civil society organisations in India, Ireland, France and Uganda. She is also a part-time research assistant in a European Union Horizon project on democracy and policy, collaborating with researchers in Slovakia, Austria, Italy and Ireland. Hello, Maëlle, it is a pleasure to have you here with us. Firstly, I would like to ask you about the refugee population reaching Uganda, which are the main nationalities asking for asylum in Uganda, What is the procedure to apply for asylum in the country and where are refugees hosted? It is important to start by stating that over 1.5 million refugees reside in Uganda which makes it the first-largest refugee population in Africa and the fourth-largest in the world. This can be explained by Uganda’s geographical location, at the crossroad of several conflict zones with neighbouring countries including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burundi, Eritrea, Rwanda, etc. Uganda also has a long ‘open door policy’ history which is financially and politically sustained by the Global North which supports the State in welcoming refugees fleeing conflict and prosecution. With regards to nationality, South Sudan, the DRC and Somalia are refugees’ predominant countries of origin in Uganda as they respectively constitute 57.1%, 32% and 4.1% of the total refugee population. However, when it comes to urban refugees, usually located in the capital city of Kampala, in the Southern part of the country, these are mainly Somali, Congolese, Eritrean, South Sudanese, Burundian and Ethiopian. The Ugandan Refugee Act 2006 expands the definition of a refugee provided in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa by including a gender ground. As such, anybody who is outside of their country of origin, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order and has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion or gender may be granted a refugee status. The procedure to seek asylum in Uganda varies depending on if the asylum seeker wishes to settle in a settlement (which is oftentimes granted based on prima facie or ‘automatic’ refugee status. Therefore, groups of people that come from a state UNHCR has recognised as meeting the objective requirements for refugee status. For these individuals, it should be easier and faster to obtain status because the burden of proof of the situation in the country of origin is completely non-existent. Inverted commas have intentionally been left on the term ‘automatic’, however, because in reality this presumption is almost never applied) or in the city (non-prima facie refugee, precisely, individuals not belonging to the ‘automatic’ mode) but in both cases, it remains relatively straightforward. For ‘automatic’ refugee status, asylum seekers who reach the border are transferred to one of the numerous reception centres upcountry for a short interview with an agent of the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) before registration and obtention of the refugee status. This process takes between a few days and a maximum of a couple of weeks except if there is a particularly important influx of refugees. It is more difficult to obtain ‘non-automatic’ refugee status, especially to be able to settle in a city. The asylum seeker must register with OPM and go through a series of several interviewees before different stakeholders including a police officer, and an OPM reviewing status officer followed by a final case examination by the Refugee Eligibility Committee. According to UNHCR, around 87.5% of the refugee status applications were successful in 2022. By way of comparison, in 2022 in Italy, over 80% of asylum seekers were denied refugee status. Talking about Ugandan Refugee Camps, what are the reception conditions in the camps? Uganda is often praised by the international community as well as international media for its exemplary welcoming conditions which foster a ‘safe haven’ or even a ‘paradise’ for refugees. Indeed, on paper and in conformity with the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, asylum seekers who have secured their refugee status are automatically provided with a plot of land to cultivate, access to free education and health care as well as the right to work and freedom of movement. However, we know that theory usually drastically differs from practice and it is the case in the Uganda refugee context as well. The supposedly progressive non-encampment policy promoted by the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework is not very well implemented as freedom of movement remains conditioned to the obtention of a permit delivered by OPM and UNHCR. In the settlement, the monlthy allowance currently amounts to 13.000 Uganda

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