Kakuma’s queer voice: G.’s story

Giuseppe Antonio Mura e Gianmarco Cristaudo
23/03/2023
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Africa (EN)

In our previous articles we talked about the conditions of the LGBTQ+ community in Kenya and the human rights violations taking place inside the Kakuma refugee camp.

We then took up the testimony of J, the first case in our in-depth look at human rights violations within Kakuma, and the testimony of A, a lesbian female guest at Kakuma.

Continuing, then, the investigation that Large Movements APS is conducting together with International Support Human Rights, in this article we will analyze the specific situation of G., the fictitious name of an LGBTQ+ boy from Kakuma with whom we had the opportunity to speak.

As reported in previous cases, G. also stated that he left his home country as a result of the various assaults he suffered because of his sexuality and sought refuge in neighboring Kenya. The hope of being able to live away from the fear and violence he suffered in what he once called “home” was his compass that guided him along his journey, but life in Kakuma turned out to be far more terrible than he could have imagined.

The short stay in Kakuma

G. is a Ugandan citizen. He fled his country when life in his homeland had become unbearable after several assaults he suffered because of his sexuality. He arrived in Kakuma in April 2020 and left a year later, in April 2021, when living conditions inside the camp had become very risky, having experienced numerous violent attacks, along with the entire LGBTQ+ community in Kakuma: he was almost set on fire in May 2020 and they tried to poison him twice. It is therefore not surprising that G. describes the conditions inside the Kakuma camp as “horrible.”

Police and UNHCR staff negligence

G. said he reported to the police and UNHCR staff each time he was subjected to an assault. However, all the emails he wrote were ignored to the point that in April 2021 he was forced to flee for his life after surviving yet another assault.
He also told us that upon his arrival he was chosen as the spokesperson for LGBTQ+ people in Kakuma. And it is because of this close contact he has with other people inside the camp that he can assure us that every queer person he knows has experienced the same neglect from the authorities and UNHCR staff.

Intimidation, threats, and arbitrary detentions are means often used to oppress the LGBTQ+ community in Kakuma and force them into silence, so much so that G. states that many UNHCR reports from Kenya share information and data that are not at all reliable or close to the truth of the camp, because such information is the result of the use of force on LGBTQ+ refugees, confirming that Kakuma is not a safe place for queer people and that they need and deserve international protection and to be relocated as soon as possible.

The questionability of the management of relocations

The management of relocations is also questionable. Relocations are so important to LGBTQ+ people in Kakuma because, first and foremost, they give them hope. Hope to live and love freely, to be the person they are, and to become productive members of society. Above all, relocation means freedom and security for G. and those in Kakuma who still live in fear, unable to move freely even when attacked. Although G. never applied for it, as according to him a relocation was implicit in his asylum application, since Kenya is a hostile country for queer people, he told us how the relocation situation was handled while he was in the camp: at first, UNHCR told them that there were only a few available resettlement places and that they were not able to relocate everyone. Then, under the pretext of the health emergency from Covid-19, they delayed the relocations but since the outbreak of the pandemic, the relocations have not happened yet. In addition, the relocations have been used as a weapon by the Kenyan government and sometimes UNHCR staff against the most active and vocal members of the LGBTQ+ community who sought to expose the violations taking place in the camp. Essentially, those who tried to report the very serious conduct in Kakuma, such as G., were threatened that they would never be transferred. In June 2021, after the death of 22-year-old activist Chriton Atuhwera in Kakuma camp two months earlier, G. and LGBTQ+ people inside the camp launched a petition to UNHCR demanding protection and to be transferred. UNHCR officials responded with intimidation to those who wanted to join the petition, saying they would be returned if they signed. “It’s not just about keeping quiet, but they have been proactive in silencing the LGBTQ community,” G. said on the matter.

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Giuseppe Antonio Mura

Gianmarco Cristaudo

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Talibè children in Senegal: life in the balance between abuse and begging

Rainer Maria Baratti 18 January 2021

Dustiness, dirtiness, and barefoot children, most of them Talibè, holding empty tomato cans or plastic bowls in their hands populate the streets of Dakar and in many other cities in Senegal. A 2007 UNICEF study on child begging in Dakar, the capital of Senegal, found that more than 90% of the children are Taliban. However, official statistics are still missing and children between 8 and 15 years of age are involved. Talibé and Marabutto in Senegal The term Talibè in the Wolof language means ‘disciple’ and refers to children attending the Daara, the Koranic schools run by the Marabuttos, who teach the precepts of Islam on the basis of mnemonic learning of the Koran. For centuries, the Daaras in Senegal have ensured that Islamic education has spread to all segments of the West African country’s population. Here, however, physical punishment is often carried out, which for many West African Muslim countries is considered an important part of the educational process. Between the Talib and his Marabout there is a relationship of devotion and strict obedience as the Marabout offers his guidance and protection to his disciples who express their trust through financial support or tithing. In Senegal, the issue of the Taliban is not seen in a homogeneous way, some promoting its spread while others close it down. In addition, parents who decide to send their children to a Daara often do so through de facto fostering, because of their own economic difficulties, and to offer a better future to the child by building a relationship with the Muslim brotherhood to which the Marabout belongs and consequently to prepare the child for a career as a Marabout. It should be noted, however, that the Taliban’s education remains essentially linked to West African values in terms of children’s education. Begging, punishment and life in the Daara Originally, begging by the Taliban consisted of asking for food to supplement the Daara’s supplies when the Marabout’s fields crops could not support the needs. This practice evolved as the Daara developped in an urban environment and required a change for the income. Thus, the practice of almsgiving resulted in children giving money instead of food. The problem of Marabout abuse of Taliban children in Senagal is not subject to state regulation and as a result some schools abuse the relationship between disciple and teacher. Often, what should be an institution of education can take on negative facets. Some Marabouts exploit Taliban for labour or forced begging on the streets, instead of teaching Koran to them. In some cases, this exploitation exposes children to disease, injury, death, physical and sexual abuse inside or outside the Daara. A Human Rights Watch survey of 175 Taliban children in Senegal estimated an average of just under 8 hours a day, every day, of begging for between 373 CFA (0.56 €) and 445 CFA (0.67 $) on holidays. This is a difficult amount to achieve as just under 30% of the Senegalese population lives on less than 593 CFA (0.90 €) a day and 55% live on less than 949 CFA (1.44 €). In addition to money, food quotas such as sugar and rice are often demanded. If this quota is not met, there is a risk of physical abuse, and for example, many children show scars and bruises, due to the application of electric cables or sticks. However, is the older Talib, who becomes the assistant to the Marabout, to be responsible for punishing younger Talibels who do not pay back their daily quota or who return late. In cases where the Marabout does not supervise the children, the older Talib has absolute power over them and he can rob them or abuse them physically or sexually. In general, children risk beatings, sexual abuse, chaining, imprisonment and numerous forms of neglect and danger in at least 8 of the 14 administrative regions of Senegal. In addition, there are risks associated with the trafficking and migration of Taliban children in Africa, including the illicit transportation of Taliban groups across regions and national borders. The Senegalese Taliban often lack basic necessities and accommodation, having to endure longer hours of begging or sleeping on the streets. Indeed, conditions in urban Daara are often characterised by malnutrition, lack of clothing, exposure to disease and poor hygiene. Often hundreds of Taliban children live in extremely dirty and squalid conditions in unfinished buildings with no walls, floors or windows. Here rubbish, sewage and flies clog the ground and the air, and children often sleep crammed into dozens in an open-air room, most of them without mosquito nets and therefore at risk of infection or disease. Moreover, the situation is exacerbated when the children become ill, they are forced to beg to pay for their treatment. The many rights violated From a legal point of view, there are many issues related to human rights and children’s rights. Hence, the situation of Taliban children in Senegal calls into question several international conventions. When we talk about the Taliban, we face with cases of slavery, forced labour and human trafficking. Some NGOs argue that when a Marabout acquires custody of a Talibé to force him to beg, this practice is a “practice akin to slavery” as defined by the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery (1956). Furthermore, the Forced and Compulsory Labour Convention (1930) describes forced labour as “work which is performed by any person under threat of any penalty and for which the person in question has not offered himself voluntarily”. In addition, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has deemed the practice of exploitation of the Taliban in Senegal to fall within the scope of the Convention concerning the Prohibition of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999), equating forced begging with slavery. In turn, Human Rights Watch, considering ILO’s point of view, has argued that the Marabouts, when they transport the Taliban with the primary intention of obtaining work from them, are involved in child trafficking. In this regard, reference is made to

Somali piracy

Claudia Rosati 18 January 2021

Somali piracy is often described solely and exclusively as criminal, but what if it has also another function, namely that of guardians of the sea? In this article, an attempt will be made to investigate the nature of the phenomenon, even if there are still few sources that show an alternative vision to the internationally diffused one. Therefore, we will try to identify the elements which define piracy not only as a criminal act, but also as an alternative water defence “force”, a service which the Transitional Government is unable to take full responsibility for. Historical background Modern piracy, which has developed mainly in geopolitically strategic areas, has assumed all the characteristics of the historical definition of “marauder of the sea”. Unlike its analogues, Somali piracy has acquired different characteristics which have made it a particularly difficult phenomenon to study and, above all, to eradicate. These differences are due to the presence of many factors, and in particular, the political situation which Somalia lives. This, in fact, has given rise to a series of key phenomena in the development of piracy. Therefore, the complexity of the Somali situation, lies in the existence and overlapping of different dynamics, local, but also regional and international, which necessitate an all-inclusive approach. However, in this article we will examine one of the many aspects of this phenomenon, trying to answer to the question on the nature of the piracy that has developed in Somali context. Using Somali terms, an attempt will be made to understand whether they fall into the category of burcad badeed, stricto sensu ‘marauders of the sea’, or badaadinta badah, ‘saviours of the sea’. Since the joint efforts of the international community succeeded in eradicating this problem in 2012, the seizure of the oil tanker Aris 13 in 2017 has raised again the attention to the problem, which had been dormant for years, to the area, also portending a return of the same piracy. This attack, however, seems to have been only a brief interlude due to the lowering of the guard of the measures undertaken until then and the withdrawal of the NATO forces of the “Ocean Shield” mission, which ended in 2016. But what if this is just a symptom of a return that could be even more dangerous than the previous one? In this framework, it could be useful to understand the nature of the acts of the Somali pirates and to understand if the initial role of defenders of the sea has disappeared during the evolution that piracy has undergone, becoming finalized only and exclusively to actions of depredation, or if this has only been “hidden” in order to more easily legitimize the actions carried out by the international community. Such an attempt, however, will be very difficult due to the scarcity of data and news by the ‘European eye’. Here, therefore, we will only try to provide some food for thought. Fishermen or professionals? When a political vacuum arose in the country in 1991 due to the fall of Siad Barre’s regime, it was immediately apparent that there was also no centralised structure capable of having effective control over the entire Somali territory and, consequently, its waters. It was from this situation that external actors, mainly European and Chinese fishing vessels and criminal organisations, began to take advantage. Intensive fishing and the dumping of toxic waste were the main motivations for local fishermen to improvise disorganised attacks on invading strangers. Despite this, foreign depredation cannot be defined as the only motivation. Indeed, a more complex picture is added to this: the lack of a centralised state able to take charge of society’s needs, a clan organisation of Somali society that acts as a different representative of order and bearer of principles of political organisation different from those of the modern and post-modern state, and a state of poverty and considerable humanitarian crisis. Therefore, until the 2000’s, one speaks more of a phenomenon aimed at survival, in which the boundary between pirate, fisherman and smuggler is very blurred. It can therefore be assumed that at this stage, although the population that derived its livelihood from the sea had reached considerable levels of frustration due to illegal foreign fishing activities, it had not managed to create a structure that could be considered as a ‘guardian of the waters’. In recent years, in fact, we have mainly witnessed the phenomenon that has been defined as ‘piracy of opportunity’, which can be deduced above all from its discontinuity, the low profitability of the attacks and the short range of action. However, it cannot be ruled out that it was during this period that the criminal-style piracy groups we are accustomed to knowing began to form and develop. In fact, according to a former Somali pirate leader, Farah Hirsi Kulan “Boya”, the passage to a professionalized piracy took place already in 1994. From fortuitous pirates of to a full-fledged coastguard? From the first sporadic and disorganised attacks, pirate activities in a few years changed completely and became a very profitable business. Many claim that there has been a shift from a protest phenomenon to one exclusively based on profit, although this may not be exactly the case. In a political context like that of Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government is the only institutional and internationally recognized power which is not able to extend its authority beyond Mogadishu, allowing other types of “political organizations” to take over control of the space. In fact, “for the entire Somali territory, every level of administration is, to a large extent, entrusted to the hands of clans, village chiefs and warlords” and it is among these leaders that we recognize the most influential figures in piracy. Some of the pirate organisations, which are defined as organised crime, also sought to assume a degree of institutionalisation. They wanted to demonstrate that they were able to carry out not only activities of pillage, kidnapping for ransom or, in any case, connected to enrichment, but also a function

INQUIRY ON THE REFUGEE CAMP OF KAKUMA: Hellish conditions for LGBTQ+ migrants

Martina Bossi 25 August 2022

For this inquiry, we had the opportunity to meet Tobias Pellicciari, Director of International Support – Human Rights “Migration and Asylum Program in Europe”. Tobias has worked for many years in the field of migrants’ and refugees’ reception in Europe, with a special focus on sexual minorities. Thanks to his experience and the interviews that the team of LMPride carried on with some of the victims, in this article we can offer a complete picture of the conditions in which LGBTQ+ migrants are forced to live in Kenya. In particular, the attention will be on the Kakuma refugee camp, managed by the High Commissioner for Refugees – also known as UNHCR. Large Movements team has already reported on how homophobia in Kenya an issue in every stratum and aspect of society and civilisation is still, and how the Kenyan LGBTQ+ community is highly stigmatised and marginalised. In this interview, however, we want to shed light on the conditions of migrants and asylum seekers who, having fled their country of origin, mostly from Uganda, are discriminated because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. Picture of the area Kakuma is situated in north-western Kenya, specifically in Turkana County in the Rift Valley. The refugee camp was founded in 1992 to accommodate 16,000 women and men fleeing the war in Sudan. Today hosts more than 200,000 people, making it one of the largest refugee camps in the world. The area in which the camp is located is predominantly dry and highly sensitive to the climate change effects. These factors have made almost impossible to cultivate the land, more and more threatened by the advancing desert. The Kakuma refugee camp has been built on an isolated area, outside the city centre. According to the Kenyan government indeed, this would guarantee safety of both the local population and the hosts of the camp. As a result, accessing to essential services (hospital, employment, etc.) is quite difficult for refugees and asylum seekers in Kakuma. Moreover, the living conditions in the camp are almost below any minimum standards of human dignity: insect infestations, scarcity of food and absence of health support. The already difficult living conditions of the people living in Kakuma become even more complicated for the members of the LGBTQ+ community. Most of them reside in separate sectors (known as ‘blocks’), to better ensure the general safety – according to UNHCR staff. What it means living in Kakuma for an LGBTQ+ person According to our interviewees, the isolation of the LGBTQ+ community in Kakuma has worsened the living conditions of this vulnerable group of refugees and asylum seekers. The separation of most of them from the rest of the hosts of the camp indeed, makes them more visible and vulnerable to aggressions. Most of the LGBTQ+ asylum seekers come from the same Countries of origin as the queer applicants – mainly Uganda and Somalia – so they are likely to engage in the same homophobic behaviour, violence and harassment that drove Kakuma’s guests to leave their homeland. By making them more visible – by confining them all to the same area – therefore, UNHCR would have effectively increased the risk for LGBTQ+ refugees and asylum seekers of experiencing persecution and violence. Violent and brutal acts are committed on a daily basis within the Kakuma camp and all the victims we spoke to complain that they have not received proper protection from UNHCR . Indeed, UNHCR very often does not respond to refugees’ and asylum seekers’ requests for help and/or protection. The situation is not much better for the LGBTQ+ refugees and asylum seekers who do not reside in the separated blocks. They are identified by the other guests as queer people and they are subject to the same attacks and violence. Many LGBTQ+ refugees and asylum seekers in Kakuma preferred to live outside the barracks, sleeping in the open to protect each other. Those who fear the most because they constantly receive death threats from the hosts of the camp, often sleep as homeless in the streets of Nairobi. They say to feel safer than sleeping in their allocated accommodation in the camp. Very often among them, there are lesbian women with their children – also subjected to the same violence that their mothers have to suffer. The decision to sleep outside came after a series of fires set by other residents at the lodgings of the queer refugees and asylum seekers during the night. Emblematic of how out of control the situation is within the camp and of the serious failures of UNHCR staff to protect this vulnerable category of refugees and asylum seekers, is the case of the 15th March 2021 fire: two homosexual men were burnt alive by other Kakuma’s residents. After two long days, UNHCR did not even provide proper health care to the fire victims, who remained in the camp without even having access to appropriate medical care. After intense pressure from International Support – Human Rights, UNHCR transferred the two victims with an ambulance to a hospital 125km far from Kakuma, despite the fact that the ambulance staffs themselves and the local community had indicated the Nairobi hospital as the only one equipped with the right medical machines and treatments for those kinds of injuries. Only on the 18th March, UNHCR – under pressure from the European Commission, alerted by Tobias – transported the victims to the Nairobi hospital by helicopter. Unfortunately, one of the two men died as the result of the very serious burns he suffered and, more importantly, the lack of timely and adequate medical treatments. The only statement issued by UNHCR following this tragedy was almost a month later and consisted in a generic request to the Kenyan authorities to investigate. The investigations, even though haven’t brought to a formal recognition of the attacker yet, have led to some fundamental clues which – together with the eye-witness testimonies – could provide at least enough benefit of the doubt to isolate the person, if not

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Climate migration in Africa: an overview of the phenomenon

Rainer Maria Baratti 18 January 2021

Climate and environmental migrations are a phenomenon discussed at the various environmental forums. However, each context brings with it differences in causes and consequences. In the meantime, a response on both fronts is becoming gradually urgent, while at the international level there are increasing difficulties in reaching agreement. Environmental and climate migrations Climate migration in Africa is an increasingly central topic in migration debate. As early as 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations’ scientific forum for studying global warming and its effects, noted that the greatest impact could be on human migration. Therefore, it is necessary to remember the subtle difference between environmental migration, due to direct human action (e.g. caused by environmental damage such as oil spills), and climate migration: migration caused by the meteorological impact of climate change. To clarify, it should be recalled that the scientific community has long recognised the anthropogenic origin of climate change. However, it should be specified that it is not easy to distinguish between the two types of migration and they often move in parallel, adding up in their effects on human mobility. At the same time, the meteorological impact of climate change can be divided into two distinct migration factors: climatic processes and non-climatic factors. To the one hand, climate processes include phenomena such as rising sea levels, salinisation of agricultural land, salinisation of water and soil, desertification and increasing water scarcity, as well as climatic events such as floods and irregularities (as well as violence) in rainfall. To the other hand, non-climatic factors are political instability, population growth or community resilience to natural disasters. Finally, all these factors contribute to the degree of vulnerability that people and societies experience. Rainfalls’ effects in Africa and climate migration With regard to climatic migrations in Africa, an increasing irregularity of rainfall is observed in large parts of sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in arid and semi-arid areas. Certainly, this leads to an increasingly unpredictable start and early end of the rainy season, prolonged phases of seasonal drought, and more intense rainfall. In addition, the trend seems to be towards a reduction in the general level of rainfall and an increase in occasional heavy rainfall. This means increasing difficulties for agricultural systems dependent on rainfall for irrigation. Consequently, these dynamics pose a persistent threat to food security as they result in the loss of large crops and staple foods such as maize and millet. In addition, changes in rainfall are accompanied by flooding, river overflows and flooding caused by cyclone activity in coastal areas. In Africa, from the point of view of climate migration, we have different effects depending on the area affected. On the highlands of East Africa, floods destroy settlements and agricultural fields, often forcing farmers to abandon their cultivated areas. In the lowlands, river floods and large-scale flooding mainly affect livestock farmers operating in arid and semi-arid areas, threatening also urban workers. In southern Africa, land near large river basins and coastal areas (particularly in southeastern Africa and Madagascar) are affected by high intensity flooding, triggering temporary or permanent migration. In conclusion, it must be said that the high dependence on agriculture and livestock forces small-scale farmers and pastoral communities to diversify their sources of income. This leads to an increase in circular and seasonal migration flows within the African continent, which represents a fundamental adaptation and resilience strategy. Climate Migration and forms of mobility within Africa In Africa we can see rural-urban and rural-rural circular labour mobility flows that are a common reaction in all regions of the continent. In this case we speak about ‘migration as adaptation’ to climate change. Often, individuals migrate for a certain period of time in order to earn money and employ it to mitigate the difficulties of their households. However, it must be remembered that there are the so-called ‘trapped populations’, i.e. those many households that are affected by the consequences of climate change but do not have enough resources to move. In addition, there is no ‘automaticity’ to displacement because of labour exploitation, unavailability of employment. Hence, harsh living and working conditions for migrants sometimes weaken the positive potential of migration. The most mobile communities in terms of climate migration are pastoral and semi-pastoral communities. Firstly, these are forced to move or temporarily relocate due to drought. Secondly, such displacements can take two different forms: processes of local sedentarisation or migration to urban contexts. Both of these two forms can have negative implications. For instance, communities often settle along rivers to allow livestock to drink and thus increase their vulnerability to flooding. Meanwhile, migration to urban contexts often leads newcomers to live in the slums of mega-cities. Here, in addition to the sanitation problems they may face, they may be subject to increasing violence. Environmental and political risks While environmental changes and their potential consequences are the key agents of climate migration, they are also linked to political, social, economic and cultural factors. In other words, the risk of climate migration is particularly serious in the presence of a generally unstable socio-political framework and prolonged armed conflicts. Let’s take an example of a fragile context with water scarcity caused by drought. In this case we are in a context with limited access to resources. First, we may have an increased likelihood of conflict over access to water between farmers and herders. Secondly, the materialisation of conflict or resource scarcity itself may lead to climate migration. Thirdly, the element of terrorism should not be overlooked. Africa is the continent that suffers most from the violence of terrorism. Often the choice to pick up a gun and serve the cause of a terrorist group is linked to a kind of law of the strongest: ‘I have the weapons, I can grab that resource’. Often the resource we are talking about is water, other times it may be the very management of a portion of territory. So, the choice of affiliation to a terrorist group is always more tied to the capacity

Oil spills in the Niger Delta: environmental and health disasters in Nigeria

Rainer Maria Baratti 18 January 2021

The Niger Delta is one of the five most polluted ecosystems in the world due to oil spills that still affect both the environment and local populations, such as the Ikebiri and Ogoni. The oil industry, historically in a country like Nigeria, is the main cause of violent conflicts, environmental disasters and health disasters that are now structural. Moreover, this issue is also of interest to Italy since the civil trial at the Court of Milan involving ENI, with its Nigerian subsidiary, and the Ikebiri people, in 2018 . The environmental situation in the Niger Delta and the health damage suffered by the Nigerian population The Niger Delta is an oil-rich region in south-eastern Nigeria, where the activities of multinational oil companies (such as Shell, Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco, Total Fina Elf, Eni/Agip) have caused serious environmental, social and economic damages. Specifically, pollution is caused by crude oil leaking from old pipelines that stretch for hundreds of kilometres in the territory. In addition to oil spills into the river water and along its banks, another major problem in the area is gas flaring, the burning of excess gas extracted with oil. This gas could be pumped back into the ground or used for Nigeria’s energy needs. Instead, it is burnt by multinational companies because this makes the extraction of oil faster, thus lowering operating and production costs. As a result, people living in these areas breathe polluted air, eat contaminated fish (what little is left in the area) and drink water mixed with oil. According to the United Nations Environment Programme, toxicity levels are 900 times higher than those permitted by the World Health Organisation (WHO). Consequently, the spread of health diseases has also increased: respiratory problems, skin and eye diseases, gastrointestinal disorders, leukaemia and cancer. Finally, it should be noted that mining, by polluting the reservoir and the land, has destroyed subsistence farming. Added to this is the expropriation of land from the Nigerian people by the government under treaties signed with multinationals in the 1960s and unchanged since then. The oil industry in Nigeria Oil itself represents 95% of Nigeria’s exports and 65% of its national budget. This is the reason why the theme of violent conflicts over the management of this resource is recurrent in the country’s colonial and post-colonial history. The oil industry in the Niger Delta involves both the government of Nigeria and the subsidiaries of large multinational companies, such as Shell, Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco, Total Fina Elf and Eni/Agip, as well as some Nigerian companies. In this regard, oil exploration and production is carried out by ‘joint ventures’ involving the government-controlled Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and one or more foreign oil companies that have signed partnership and participation contracts with the NNPC. In this way, the NNPC holds the majority share, leaving the multinationals with the operational role on the ground. In fact, the companies manage huge swathes of land, with Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) alone managing an area of over 31,000 square kilometres, building much of the oil infrastructure close to the homes, crops and water sources of the communities. However, communities in the Niger Delta do not benefit from the oil wealth and, despite the presence of 606 oil wells, Nigeria remains one of the poorest countries in Africa. The only ones to get rich from oil are the multinationals and the local elites: a situation that has led to protests and mobilisation on the one hand, and violent repression, on the other, by the state and private security agents hired by the companies. It should also be noted that 60% of the population of the Niger Delta survives through activities directly related to the ecosystem. In other words, when crops and fishing grounds are damaged, the inhabitants are unable to find alternative sources of income to those lost and sink deeper into poverty. In this ecosystem, therefore, it is not possible to live according to Nigeria’s motto “Unity and faith, peace and progress”, as people are increasingly presented with two alternatives: struggle or migration. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta Local communities, mainly supported by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, oppose the exploitative policies of multinational corporations and demand the reclamation of waterways and land as well as a fairer distribution of oil revenues as compensation for ecological debt. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, the main population of the Niger Delta region, has been conducting a non-violent campaign against environmental degradation since 1990. The Ogoni are an indigenous people affected by the intense exploitation of oil resources granted by the military junta to the multinational company Shell in the 1980s. According to the agreement between the parties, although formally the land remained in the hands of the people, Shell was allowed to exploit the resources present and was obliged to allocate only 1.5% of the royalties from the profits to the local population. After numerous battles led by the Movement an agreement was reached, hence Shell must give more than 15% of the royalties to the people. Additionally, a major achievement of Movement leader Ken Sawro-Wiwa has been to attract international attention by using strong and impactful concepts to describe the problem. One of the most striking examples is the concept of ‘ecological warfare’. However, in 1995, Ken Sawro-Wiwa and eight activists were arrested and sentenced to death by the government for allegedly ordering the murder of four traditional and pro-government leaders, despite the fact that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights had called for a stay of execution on the grounds of ‘unfair trial’. Nigeria was subsequently convicted in 2001 for not having a fair trial and for failing to comply with the Commission’s order. In addition, Nigeria was convicted of violating the collective rights of the Ogoni people, in particular

Leymah Gbowee

Myrlande Nardi 27 December 2021

In October 2011 Leymah Gbowee, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Tawakkol Kaman were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize as a result of “their non-violent struggle for women’s security and their right to participate in the peace process“. Today, let’s talk about Leymah Gbowee and her perpetual commitment to women’s rights. Civil War in Liberia:Gbowee began her work as an activist with the group Liberia Mass Action for Peace (LMAP) in April 2003. Her native country, Liberia, had been in a state of civil war for 14 years. It all began in 1989 when Charles Taylor entered Liberia and aided by the rebel forces of the National Patriotic Front for Freedom, threatened the capital, Monrovia, and the government of Samuel Doe. After nine months, Doe was killed and Taylor took power. This did not stop the hostilities and although Taylor won the 1997 presidential election with 75% of the vote, a new civil war broke out that same year. Between 1989 and 2003, more than 270,000 people died, the neonatal mortality rate was 157 deaths per 1000 births, and the infant mortality rate for children under 5 was 235 per 1000. As a result of the conflict and the high infant mortality rate, 80% of the rural population was forced to migrate. Unfortunately, the conflict was characterized by the indiscriminate use of rape by all sides, including international troops who intervened to restore peace. Gbowee and other LMAP activists then began to protest against the violence: their rhetoric was based on concerns about the welfare of children and the future of the country. They used three tactics in particular: they organized public demonstrations to emphasize that the real victims of the conflict were women and children, they threatened to undress in public, and they established a political agenda to defend women’s rights both nationally and internationally. Taylor resigned in August 2003 and was forced into exile in Nigeria. A peace agreement was signed and in 2005 presidential elections were held which saw the victory of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf: the first woman to be elected president in an African state. The role of women in peace negotiations: Let’s look together at why these women were so influential. First, the women highlighted the fact that the war had brought only death and destruction. It was not a war for land, money or political power – it was a war that exterminated mothers and children. After that, Gbowee and the other activists emphasized their status as mothers and women and therefore as “guardians of society”. They emphasized their role as mothers and sisters to the men involved in the conflict and stressed the importance of national unity based on family. This rhetoric worked because in Libera the role of women, as mothers, is very strong and there is a sense of respect for them as they are seen as creators and sustainers of the community and nation. The men decided to attend the peace negotiations because their “mothers” had requested it. However, words alone were not enough to bring about a real peace agreement, so the women took action using an act of high symbolic value: they deliberately undressed in public. On July 21, Gbowee and the other activists entered the building where the negotiations were taking place and sat outside the room where the men were arguing. When they were threatened with arrest, Gbowee stated that she would not object but would first undress and shown herself to the assembly naked. She later explained that in Africa it is considered a terrible curse to see a woman, married and elderly, deliberately undress in public: that action would indisputably highlight the deep despair of Liberian women. Moreover, by undressing, she would deprive the men of their “masculinity” and the strength they had used with impunity throughout the conflict, raping and killing without restraint. In doing so, Gbowee was reclaiming her life and body, and in the process ceasing to be a helpless victim and becoming politically powerful and influential. The activists declared that they would only leave the building when Taylor and the other parties involved would actively participate in the negotiations. Negotiations then resumed and an agreement was finally reached. The importance of Leymah Gbowee’s work around the world: After the signing of the peace accords and the end of the war, Gbowee continued her political efforts outside Liberia’s borders. In 2006, she founded the Women Peace and Security Network Africa (WIPSEN-Africa), which works to promote “women’s strategic participation and leadership in peace and security policies in Africa.“ Throughout her speeches and actions, Gbowee emphasizes the power of ordinary women and the symbolic value of the female body. In order to fight patriarchy and promote the power of women as agents of political change, it is crucial to unite as women, mothers, sisters and demand gender equality. We at Large Movements share this sentiment and feel it is important to share with you the story of Leymah Gbowee who has shown the world the influence women can have in peace processes and the true power of pacifism. If you liked the article, share it!

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