Kakuma’s queer voice: A.’s story

Gianmarco Cristaudo
02/02/2023
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Africa (EN)
KAKUMA, KENYA, LMPRIDE

In our previous articles, we discussed the conditions of the LGBTQ+ community in Kenya and the human rights violations taking place inside the Kakuma refugee camp.
We then took the testimony of J, the first case in our in-depth look at human rights violations within Kakuma.
Continuing, then, the investigation that Large Movements APS is conducting together with International Support Human Rights, in this article we will look at the specific situation of A., the fictitious name of a lesbian woman guest in Kakuma with whom we had the opportunity to speak.
Like so many others living in Kakuma, A. fled her home country because of the discrimination she faced from friends and family because of her homosexuality and sought refuge in neighboring Kenya. The chance to escape the mistreatment and discrimination she endured and the hope of building a better life for herself were the driving forces that pushed her far from home, but the reality she came up against was as harsh on her as the one she escaped from.

Arrival in Kakuma

A is a Ugandan citizen. She fled her country when her family found out about her homosexuality. In fact, A. was strongly discriminated against and suffered severe homophobic attacks of various kinds, to the point that her family, before she managed to flee for Kenya, was about to force her into marriage. She arrived in Kakuma in November 2019 and still resides there.

The violence and unheeded complaints

As soon as she arrived, A. was faced with very difficult living conditions for the LGBTQ+ community residing in Kakuma. Indeed, the coexistence between queer people and other refugees led to several attacks and assaults at the expense of LGBTQ+ guests in the camp. Because of this, A. reports, both she and other members of the queer community residing in Kakuma are deeply afraid for their lives. In July 2020, what had been A.’s home in the camp was set on fire by other guests, and she lost almost all of her belongings in the fire, including basic necessities such as clothes and medicine. After all, the rest of the camp residents repeatedly reported that queer people like A. are not welcome, calling them “a curse” or threatening them with beatings, sexual assaults, and arson attacks.
The situation has been repeatedly reported to UNHCR and the authorities, but both have consistently dismissed A. and failed to provide protection and safeguards from the severe violence suffered by A. and other LGBTQ+ residents. When A.’s house was hit by arson in July 2020, although she immediately reported the incident to UNHCR staff present in the camp, she received support only from the other queer residents of the camp, who provided her with the basic necessities she needed that were destroyed in the fire.

Relocations

One of the main problems preventing the provision of timely services and the effective guarantee of basic human rights is the extreme difficulty in obtaining information, particularly on relocations. In fact, UNHCR staff present in the camp and components of the RAS, the Kenyan government department that manages the entire relocation and refugee status granting process, do not provide clear information or at all. A. herself has never applied for resettlement not only because it is very difficult to get information about the necessary procedures (every time she has tried she has not been assisted, by the very people directly responsible for informing her about it) but also because of her status. One cannot access the resettlement program, in fact, if one has not been granted refugee status. Status which, according to Kenyan law, must be granted or denied within 6 months of the processing of the application. Despite the fact that A. has been in Kakuma for almost 3 years, however, he still has no news about the outcome of his asylum claim.
The fact that he has not applied for relocation, therefore, does not mean that A. does not recognize its importance. So much so that A. told us that she believes that outplacement is the only option that can restore hope to LGTBQ+ people housed in Kenya given that in the context in which they currently find themselves, they cannot move freely, are not provided with basic necessities such as sanitary napkins, and live in fear of being attacked again.
What’s more, she and all the other LGBTQ+ people in Kakuma are traumatized by the treatment they received in the camp. Most of all, they feel like their lives are stuck inside Kakuma, where every day is the same as the last, and they are very scared of the idea of growing old in the camp. A. wants to go back to school and finish her studies. He wants to find a job so he can support himself. He wants a better future for the children in the camp so that they can go back to school as they should, because, as he rightly says, education is a human right.

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Gianmarco Cristaudo

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Oil spills in the Niger Delta: environmental and health disasters in Nigeria

Rainer Maria Baratti 18 January 2021

The Niger Delta is one of the five most polluted ecosystems in the world due to oil spills that still affect both the environment and local populations, such as the Ikebiri and Ogoni. The oil industry, historically in a country like Nigeria, is the main cause of violent conflicts, environmental disasters and health disasters that are now structural. Moreover, this issue is also of interest to Italy since the civil trial at the Court of Milan involving ENI, with its Nigerian subsidiary, and the Ikebiri people, in 2018 . The environmental situation in the Niger Delta and the health damage suffered by the Nigerian population The Niger Delta is an oil-rich region in south-eastern Nigeria, where the activities of multinational oil companies (such as Shell, Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco, Total Fina Elf, Eni/Agip) have caused serious environmental, social and economic damages. Specifically, pollution is caused by crude oil leaking from old pipelines that stretch for hundreds of kilometres in the territory. In addition to oil spills into the river water and along its banks, another major problem in the area is gas flaring, the burning of excess gas extracted with oil. This gas could be pumped back into the ground or used for Nigeria’s energy needs. Instead, it is burnt by multinational companies because this makes the extraction of oil faster, thus lowering operating and production costs. As a result, people living in these areas breathe polluted air, eat contaminated fish (what little is left in the area) and drink water mixed with oil. According to the United Nations Environment Programme, toxicity levels are 900 times higher than those permitted by the World Health Organisation (WHO). Consequently, the spread of health diseases has also increased: respiratory problems, skin and eye diseases, gastrointestinal disorders, leukaemia and cancer. Finally, it should be noted that mining, by polluting the reservoir and the land, has destroyed subsistence farming. Added to this is the expropriation of land from the Nigerian people by the government under treaties signed with multinationals in the 1960s and unchanged since then. The oil industry in Nigeria Oil itself represents 95% of Nigeria’s exports and 65% of its national budget. This is the reason why the theme of violent conflicts over the management of this resource is recurrent in the country’s colonial and post-colonial history. The oil industry in the Niger Delta involves both the government of Nigeria and the subsidiaries of large multinational companies, such as Shell, Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco, Total Fina Elf and Eni/Agip, as well as some Nigerian companies. In this regard, oil exploration and production is carried out by ‘joint ventures’ involving the government-controlled Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and one or more foreign oil companies that have signed partnership and participation contracts with the NNPC. In this way, the NNPC holds the majority share, leaving the multinationals with the operational role on the ground. In fact, the companies manage huge swathes of land, with Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) alone managing an area of over 31,000 square kilometres, building much of the oil infrastructure close to the homes, crops and water sources of the communities. However, communities in the Niger Delta do not benefit from the oil wealth and, despite the presence of 606 oil wells, Nigeria remains one of the poorest countries in Africa. The only ones to get rich from oil are the multinationals and the local elites: a situation that has led to protests and mobilisation on the one hand, and violent repression, on the other, by the state and private security agents hired by the companies. It should also be noted that 60% of the population of the Niger Delta survives through activities directly related to the ecosystem. In other words, when crops and fishing grounds are damaged, the inhabitants are unable to find alternative sources of income to those lost and sink deeper into poverty. In this ecosystem, therefore, it is not possible to live according to Nigeria’s motto “Unity and faith, peace and progress”, as people are increasingly presented with two alternatives: struggle or migration. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta Local communities, mainly supported by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, oppose the exploitative policies of multinational corporations and demand the reclamation of waterways and land as well as a fairer distribution of oil revenues as compensation for ecological debt. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, the main population of the Niger Delta region, has been conducting a non-violent campaign against environmental degradation since 1990. The Ogoni are an indigenous people affected by the intense exploitation of oil resources granted by the military junta to the multinational company Shell in the 1980s. According to the agreement between the parties, although formally the land remained in the hands of the people, Shell was allowed to exploit the resources present and was obliged to allocate only 1.5% of the royalties from the profits to the local population. After numerous battles led by the Movement an agreement was reached, hence Shell must give more than 15% of the royalties to the people. Additionally, a major achievement of Movement leader Ken Sawro-Wiwa has been to attract international attention by using strong and impactful concepts to describe the problem. One of the most striking examples is the concept of ‘ecological warfare’. However, in 1995, Ken Sawro-Wiwa and eight activists were arrested and sentenced to death by the government for allegedly ordering the murder of four traditional and pro-government leaders, despite the fact that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights had called for a stay of execution on the grounds of ‘unfair trial’. Nigeria was subsequently convicted in 2001 for not having a fair trial and for failing to comply with the Commission’s order. In addition, Nigeria was convicted of violating the collective rights of the Ogoni people, in particular

INQUIRY ON THE REFUGEE CAMP OF KAKUMA: Hellish conditions for LGBTQ+ migrants

Martina Bossi 25 August 2022

For this inquiry, we had the opportunity to meet Tobias Pellicciari, Director of International Support – Human Rights “Migration and Asylum Program in Europe”. Tobias has worked for many years in the field of migrants’ and refugees’ reception in Europe, with a special focus on sexual minorities. Thanks to his experience and the interviews that the team of LMPride carried on with some of the victims, in this article we can offer a complete picture of the conditions in which LGBTQ+ migrants are forced to live in Kenya. In particular, the attention will be on the Kakuma refugee camp, managed by the High Commissioner for Refugees – also known as UNHCR. Large Movements team has already reported on how homophobia in Kenya an issue in every stratum and aspect of society and civilisation is still, and how the Kenyan LGBTQ+ community is highly stigmatised and marginalised. In this interview, however, we want to shed light on the conditions of migrants and asylum seekers who, having fled their country of origin, mostly from Uganda, are discriminated because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. Picture of the area Kakuma is situated in north-western Kenya, specifically in Turkana County in the Rift Valley. The refugee camp was founded in 1992 to accommodate 16,000 women and men fleeing the war in Sudan. Today hosts more than 200,000 people, making it one of the largest refugee camps in the world. The area in which the camp is located is predominantly dry and highly sensitive to the climate change effects. These factors have made almost impossible to cultivate the land, more and more threatened by the advancing desert. The Kakuma refugee camp has been built on an isolated area, outside the city centre. According to the Kenyan government indeed, this would guarantee safety of both the local population and the hosts of the camp. As a result, accessing to essential services (hospital, employment, etc.) is quite difficult for refugees and asylum seekers in Kakuma. Moreover, the living conditions in the camp are almost below any minimum standards of human dignity: insect infestations, scarcity of food and absence of health support. The already difficult living conditions of the people living in Kakuma become even more complicated for the members of the LGBTQ+ community. Most of them reside in separate sectors (known as ‘blocks’), to better ensure the general safety – according to UNHCR staff. What it means living in Kakuma for an LGBTQ+ person According to our interviewees, the isolation of the LGBTQ+ community in Kakuma has worsened the living conditions of this vulnerable group of refugees and asylum seekers. The separation of most of them from the rest of the hosts of the camp indeed, makes them more visible and vulnerable to aggressions. Most of the LGBTQ+ asylum seekers come from the same Countries of origin as the queer applicants – mainly Uganda and Somalia – so they are likely to engage in the same homophobic behaviour, violence and harassment that drove Kakuma’s guests to leave their homeland. By making them more visible – by confining them all to the same area – therefore, UNHCR would have effectively increased the risk for LGBTQ+ refugees and asylum seekers of experiencing persecution and violence. Violent and brutal acts are committed on a daily basis within the Kakuma camp and all the victims we spoke to complain that they have not received proper protection from UNHCR . Indeed, UNHCR very often does not respond to refugees’ and asylum seekers’ requests for help and/or protection. The situation is not much better for the LGBTQ+ refugees and asylum seekers who do not reside in the separated blocks. They are identified by the other guests as queer people and they are subject to the same attacks and violence. Many LGBTQ+ refugees and asylum seekers in Kakuma preferred to live outside the barracks, sleeping in the open to protect each other. Those who fear the most because they constantly receive death threats from the hosts of the camp, often sleep as homeless in the streets of Nairobi. They say to feel safer than sleeping in their allocated accommodation in the camp. Very often among them, there are lesbian women with their children – also subjected to the same violence that their mothers have to suffer. The decision to sleep outside came after a series of fires set by other residents at the lodgings of the queer refugees and asylum seekers during the night. Emblematic of how out of control the situation is within the camp and of the serious failures of UNHCR staff to protect this vulnerable category of refugees and asylum seekers, is the case of the 15th March 2021 fire: two homosexual men were burnt alive by other Kakuma’s residents. After two long days, UNHCR did not even provide proper health care to the fire victims, who remained in the camp without even having access to appropriate medical care. After intense pressure from International Support – Human Rights, UNHCR transferred the two victims with an ambulance to a hospital 125km far from Kakuma, despite the fact that the ambulance staffs themselves and the local community had indicated the Nairobi hospital as the only one equipped with the right medical machines and treatments for those kinds of injuries. Only on the 18th March, UNHCR – under pressure from the European Commission, alerted by Tobias – transported the victims to the Nairobi hospital by helicopter. Unfortunately, one of the two men died as the result of the very serious burns he suffered and, more importantly, the lack of timely and adequate medical treatments. The only statement issued by UNHCR following this tragedy was almost a month later and consisted in a generic request to the Kenyan authorities to investigate. The investigations, even though haven’t brought to a formal recognition of the attacker yet, have led to some fundamental clues which – together with the eye-witness testimonies – could provide at least enough benefit of the doubt to isolate the person, if not

Ilaria Alpi’s murder and the investigation of toxic waste trafficking in Somalia

Rainer Maria Baratti 18 January 2021

On 20 March 1994 in Mogadishu, Somalia, Ilaria Alpi, together with her cameraman Miran Hrovatin, was murdered. The journalist had carried out several missions for TG3 since 1992 to report on the UN peace mission ‘Restore Hope’ and the Somali context of the civil war that broke out following the fall of Siad Barre’s regime, in 1991. The investigation of the Alpi-Hrovatin case focused on the journalist’s last report, which should have been broadcast on the evening of 20 March. Only fragments and incomplete footage of that report remain, as the full version never reached Italy. Neither the motive, nor the instigator, nor the executors of that murder are still clear. Giancarlo Marocchino is one of the main protagonists of the Alpi-Hrovatin case. He is a Piedmontese transporter who was an influential businessman in Mogadishu, for several years. For the SISMI, according to one of the declassified notes, he was “an able and cunning entrepreneur” to work for everyone and to disentangle himself in Somalia ravaged by civil war. According to SISMI, he was involved in the logistics and he was suspected of trafficking in arms and in toxic and radioactive waste. The latter are suspicions still not confirmed by the courts. In the background of the investigation, it is also necessary to keep in mind the Somali context, and in particular the Italian involvement in Somalia. The final report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the death of Ilaria Alpi and Miran Hrovatin, approved in February 2006, analysed various causes of the murder, taking also into account fundamentalism and criminality in the country. An analysis of Ilaria Alpi’s notebooks bring to three lines of investigation from the themes of the last reportage: arms trafficking, toxic waste trafficking and the effects of Italian cooperation in Somalia. Italian cooperation in Somalia Before the beginning of the civil war in Somalia, Italy was a close ally of the government of Siad Barre, Somali president-dictator until 1991. For instance, Italy sold arms to Somalia which stockpiled them in various warehouses in the country, and they were object of interest of the militias and warlords, following the fall of the regime. It is generally acknowledged that Italy supported, economically and politically, Siad Barre even at a time when the regime appeared completely discredited in the eyes of international public opinion and the majority of the Somali people. Among Alpi’s lines of enquiry was Italy’s cooperation with developing countries, particularly Somalia. The journalist was interested in the phenomenon of aid in general and how it was managed, as well as whether it could have been used for illicit enrichment rather than the purpose for which it was given. In particular, Alpi was interested in the Garoe-Bosaso road and the Shifco fishing project. Italian parliament started development cooperation in Somalia in 1979, with substantial funding. In particular, during the period 1986-1989, the volume of Italian investment in Somalia and the Horn of Africa increased exponentially and it was only interrupted by the outbreak of civil war in 1992. The final report of the parliamentary commission states that in the decade 1981-1990, 80% of the funds were allocated to the implementation of projects defined as ‘physical’. Out of the total, 49% were allocated to the construction of large infrastructures, 21% to productive investments and 15% to investments defined as “socio-communitarian” (projects that can be considered as benefiting the population). This set-up of Italian cooperation has been marked by programming shortcomings and a lack of coordination with multilateral and international initiatives. Moreover, the actual success of these cooperation initiatives was heavily undermined by the prerogative to protect the interests of Italian companies, lobbies and pressure groups in Somali, not taking into account the real needs of the country. The analysis of these policies of international cooperation was conducted during the season of Tangentopoli. In this context, a number of enquiries brought to light a reality in which allocations for cooperation with developing countries were a significant part of the entire Italian bribe system. The investigations uncovered costly and unnecessary projects, multi-billion dollar allocations, bribes and trafficking of all kinds, including arms to Somalia. In this regard, the 1994 Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into Cooperation with Developing Countries went on a mission to Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya from 29 January to 31 January 1996. The report stressed that there had been many management errors and that a lot of money had gone into the wrong hands. Among the most controversial works financed by the Italian government there were Garoe-Bosaso road and the port of Bosaso, as well as the ocean fishing project and its fishing company ‘Shifco’. With regard to the road, the average cost per km was 605 million, which is disproportionate to the average expenditure in Italy, but also compared to other roads built with development cooperation funds in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, at the beginning of 1979, an attempt was made to undertake an ocean fishing project marked by disasters and failures. This led to the creation of the ‘Shifco’ company, which arranged for the transfer of fishing vessels after the anti-Barre war of 1990 to the waters of the Gulf of Aden. There is a suspicion that this initiative, characterised by serious design errors, served firstly to enrich private Italian and Somali groups, even not necessarily through illicit means. Arms trafficking in Somalia Before embarking on her last trip, Ilaria Alpi had identified the area of Bosaso, a port city in the north of Somalia, as an area of ‘journalistic interest’ and she had the intention to investigate there about arms trafficking and the intertwining with ‘bad cooperation’ and the trafficking of toxic waste. Indeed, Alpi pursue some research on the Shifco ships, looking for evidence. The last interview before the murder seems to focus on this aspect. The cameraman Alberto Calvi, with whom Alpi had worked on previous missions to Somalia, reported that the journalist had always looked for evidence in relation to arms and drug trafficking. As a possible lead

Somali piracy

Claudia Rosati 18 January 2021

Somali piracy is often described solely and exclusively as criminal, but what if it has also another function, namely that of guardians of the sea? In this article, an attempt will be made to investigate the nature of the phenomenon, even if there are still few sources that show an alternative vision to the internationally diffused one. Therefore, we will try to identify the elements which define piracy not only as a criminal act, but also as an alternative water defence “force”, a service which the Transitional Government is unable to take full responsibility for. Historical background Modern piracy, which has developed mainly in geopolitically strategic areas, has assumed all the characteristics of the historical definition of “marauder of the sea”. Unlike its analogues, Somali piracy has acquired different characteristics which have made it a particularly difficult phenomenon to study and, above all, to eradicate. These differences are due to the presence of many factors, and in particular, the political situation which Somalia lives. This, in fact, has given rise to a series of key phenomena in the development of piracy. Therefore, the complexity of the Somali situation, lies in the existence and overlapping of different dynamics, local, but also regional and international, which necessitate an all-inclusive approach. However, in this article we will examine one of the many aspects of this phenomenon, trying to answer to the question on the nature of the piracy that has developed in Somali context. Using Somali terms, an attempt will be made to understand whether they fall into the category of burcad badeed, stricto sensu ‘marauders of the sea’, or badaadinta badah, ‘saviours of the sea’. Since the joint efforts of the international community succeeded in eradicating this problem in 2012, the seizure of the oil tanker Aris 13 in 2017 has raised again the attention to the problem, which had been dormant for years, to the area, also portending a return of the same piracy. This attack, however, seems to have been only a brief interlude due to the lowering of the guard of the measures undertaken until then and the withdrawal of the NATO forces of the “Ocean Shield” mission, which ended in 2016. But what if this is just a symptom of a return that could be even more dangerous than the previous one? In this framework, it could be useful to understand the nature of the acts of the Somali pirates and to understand if the initial role of defenders of the sea has disappeared during the evolution that piracy has undergone, becoming finalized only and exclusively to actions of depredation, or if this has only been “hidden” in order to more easily legitimize the actions carried out by the international community. Such an attempt, however, will be very difficult due to the scarcity of data and news by the ‘European eye’. Here, therefore, we will only try to provide some food for thought. Fishermen or professionals? When a political vacuum arose in the country in 1991 due to the fall of Siad Barre’s regime, it was immediately apparent that there was also no centralised structure capable of having effective control over the entire Somali territory and, consequently, its waters. It was from this situation that external actors, mainly European and Chinese fishing vessels and criminal organisations, began to take advantage. Intensive fishing and the dumping of toxic waste were the main motivations for local fishermen to improvise disorganised attacks on invading strangers. Despite this, foreign depredation cannot be defined as the only motivation. Indeed, a more complex picture is added to this: the lack of a centralised state able to take charge of society’s needs, a clan organisation of Somali society that acts as a different representative of order and bearer of principles of political organisation different from those of the modern and post-modern state, and a state of poverty and considerable humanitarian crisis. Therefore, until the 2000’s, one speaks more of a phenomenon aimed at survival, in which the boundary between pirate, fisherman and smuggler is very blurred. It can therefore be assumed that at this stage, although the population that derived its livelihood from the sea had reached considerable levels of frustration due to illegal foreign fishing activities, it had not managed to create a structure that could be considered as a ‘guardian of the waters’. In recent years, in fact, we have mainly witnessed the phenomenon that has been defined as ‘piracy of opportunity’, which can be deduced above all from its discontinuity, the low profitability of the attacks and the short range of action. However, it cannot be ruled out that it was during this period that the criminal-style piracy groups we are accustomed to knowing began to form and develop. In fact, according to a former Somali pirate leader, Farah Hirsi Kulan “Boya”, the passage to a professionalized piracy took place already in 1994. From fortuitous pirates of to a full-fledged coastguard? From the first sporadic and disorganised attacks, pirate activities in a few years changed completely and became a very profitable business. Many claim that there has been a shift from a protest phenomenon to one exclusively based on profit, although this may not be exactly the case. In a political context like that of Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government is the only institutional and internationally recognized power which is not able to extend its authority beyond Mogadishu, allowing other types of “political organizations” to take over control of the space. In fact, “for the entire Somali territory, every level of administration is, to a large extent, entrusted to the hands of clans, village chiefs and warlords” and it is among these leaders that we recognize the most influential figures in piracy. Some of the pirate organisations, which are defined as organised crime, also sought to assume a degree of institutionalisation. They wanted to demonstrate that they were able to carry out not only activities of pillage, kidnapping for ransom or, in any case, connected to enrichment, but also a function

Uganda: Safe Haven or Dust Under the Rug? We discuss this with Maëlle Noir

Sara Massimi 20 March 2023

We often hear about the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as in South Sudan, or the continuing violence and reprisals in the Central African Republic. However, we know very little about the people fleeing these conflicts, the refugees, their conditions, and especially about the plight of women fleeing to save both their lives and their families. This is why today we would like to emphasise a part that is often overlooked in conflict narratives: the people who are driven to flee from these contexts and who in the vast majority of cases, contrary to what is often falsely claimed, remain in Africa by seeking asylum in neighbouring states and do not choose to make the very dangerous journey to Europe. One of the African countries hosting a large number of people on the run is Uganda. Today we would like to talk about this with Maëlle Noir, an Irish Research Council PhD scholar at the Irish Centre for Human Rights, University of Galway. Her PhD research addresses the question of gender-based violence against women refugees through an intersectional and decolonial feminist perspective, exploring the relevance of feminist lawyering as an alternative approach to legal practice in the Ugandan urban refugee setting. Maëlle has extensive experience in advocacy and community research as she has been working for the past five years with several national and local civil society organisations in India, Ireland, France and Uganda. She is also a part-time research assistant in a European Union Horizon project on democracy and policy, collaborating with researchers in Slovakia, Austria, Italy and Ireland. Hello, Maëlle, it is a pleasure to have you here with us. Firstly, I would like to ask you about the refugee population reaching Uganda, which are the main nationalities asking for asylum in Uganda, What is the procedure to apply for asylum in the country and where are refugees hosted? It is important to start by stating that over 1.5 million refugees reside in Uganda which makes it the first-largest refugee population in Africa and the fourth-largest in the world. This can be explained by Uganda’s geographical location, at the crossroad of several conflict zones with neighbouring countries including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burundi, Eritrea, Rwanda, etc. Uganda also has a long ‘open door policy’ history which is financially and politically sustained by the Global North which supports the State in welcoming refugees fleeing conflict and prosecution. With regards to nationality, South Sudan, the DRC and Somalia are refugees’ predominant countries of origin in Uganda as they respectively constitute 57.1%, 32% and 4.1% of the total refugee population. However, when it comes to urban refugees, usually located in the capital city of Kampala, in the Southern part of the country, these are mainly Somali, Congolese, Eritrean, South Sudanese, Burundian and Ethiopian. The Ugandan Refugee Act 2006 expands the definition of a refugee provided in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa by including a gender ground. As such, anybody who is outside of their country of origin, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order and has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion or gender may be granted a refugee status. The procedure to seek asylum in Uganda varies depending on if the asylum seeker wishes to settle in a settlement (which is oftentimes granted based on prima facie or ‘automatic’ refugee status. Therefore, groups of people that come from a state UNHCR has recognised as meeting the objective requirements for refugee status. For these individuals, it should be easier and faster to obtain status because the burden of proof of the situation in the country of origin is completely non-existent. Inverted commas have intentionally been left on the term ‘automatic’, however, because in reality this presumption is almost never applied) or in the city (non-prima facie refugee, precisely, individuals not belonging to the ‘automatic’ mode) but in both cases, it remains relatively straightforward. For ‘automatic’ refugee status, asylum seekers who reach the border are transferred to one of the numerous reception centres upcountry for a short interview with an agent of the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) before registration and obtention of the refugee status. This process takes between a few days and a maximum of a couple of weeks except if there is a particularly important influx of refugees. It is more difficult to obtain ‘non-automatic’ refugee status, especially to be able to settle in a city. The asylum seeker must register with OPM and go through a series of several interviewees before different stakeholders including a police officer, and an OPM reviewing status officer followed by a final case examination by the Refugee Eligibility Committee. According to UNHCR, around 87.5% of the refugee status applications were successful in 2022. By way of comparison, in 2022 in Italy, over 80% of asylum seekers were denied refugee status. Talking about Ugandan Refugee Camps, what are the reception conditions in the camps? Uganda is often praised by the international community as well as international media for its exemplary welcoming conditions which foster a ‘safe haven’ or even a ‘paradise’ for refugees. Indeed, on paper and in conformity with the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, asylum seekers who have secured their refugee status are automatically provided with a plot of land to cultivate, access to free education and health care as well as the right to work and freedom of movement. However, we know that theory usually drastically differs from practice and it is the case in the Uganda refugee context as well. The supposedly progressive non-encampment policy promoted by the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework is not very well implemented as freedom of movement remains conditioned to the obtention of a permit delivered by OPM and UNHCR. In the settlement, the monlthy allowance currently amounts to 13.000 Uganda

Leymah Gbowee

Myrlande Nardi 27 December 2021

In October 2011 Leymah Gbowee, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Tawakkol Kaman were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize as a result of “their non-violent struggle for women’s security and their right to participate in the peace process“. Today, let’s talk about Leymah Gbowee and her perpetual commitment to women’s rights. Civil War in Liberia:Gbowee began her work as an activist with the group Liberia Mass Action for Peace (LMAP) in April 2003. Her native country, Liberia, had been in a state of civil war for 14 years. It all began in 1989 when Charles Taylor entered Liberia and aided by the rebel forces of the National Patriotic Front for Freedom, threatened the capital, Monrovia, and the government of Samuel Doe. After nine months, Doe was killed and Taylor took power. This did not stop the hostilities and although Taylor won the 1997 presidential election with 75% of the vote, a new civil war broke out that same year. Between 1989 and 2003, more than 270,000 people died, the neonatal mortality rate was 157 deaths per 1000 births, and the infant mortality rate for children under 5 was 235 per 1000. As a result of the conflict and the high infant mortality rate, 80% of the rural population was forced to migrate. Unfortunately, the conflict was characterized by the indiscriminate use of rape by all sides, including international troops who intervened to restore peace. Gbowee and other LMAP activists then began to protest against the violence: their rhetoric was based on concerns about the welfare of children and the future of the country. They used three tactics in particular: they organized public demonstrations to emphasize that the real victims of the conflict were women and children, they threatened to undress in public, and they established a political agenda to defend women’s rights both nationally and internationally. Taylor resigned in August 2003 and was forced into exile in Nigeria. A peace agreement was signed and in 2005 presidential elections were held which saw the victory of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf: the first woman to be elected president in an African state. The role of women in peace negotiations: Let’s look together at why these women were so influential. First, the women highlighted the fact that the war had brought only death and destruction. It was not a war for land, money or political power – it was a war that exterminated mothers and children. After that, Gbowee and the other activists emphasized their status as mothers and women and therefore as “guardians of society”. They emphasized their role as mothers and sisters to the men involved in the conflict and stressed the importance of national unity based on family. This rhetoric worked because in Libera the role of women, as mothers, is very strong and there is a sense of respect for them as they are seen as creators and sustainers of the community and nation. The men decided to attend the peace negotiations because their “mothers” had requested it. However, words alone were not enough to bring about a real peace agreement, so the women took action using an act of high symbolic value: they deliberately undressed in public. On July 21, Gbowee and the other activists entered the building where the negotiations were taking place and sat outside the room where the men were arguing. When they were threatened with arrest, Gbowee stated that she would not object but would first undress and shown herself to the assembly naked. She later explained that in Africa it is considered a terrible curse to see a woman, married and elderly, deliberately undress in public: that action would indisputably highlight the deep despair of Liberian women. Moreover, by undressing, she would deprive the men of their “masculinity” and the strength they had used with impunity throughout the conflict, raping and killing without restraint. In doing so, Gbowee was reclaiming her life and body, and in the process ceasing to be a helpless victim and becoming politically powerful and influential. The activists declared that they would only leave the building when Taylor and the other parties involved would actively participate in the negotiations. Negotiations then resumed and an agreement was finally reached. The importance of Leymah Gbowee’s work around the world: After the signing of the peace accords and the end of the war, Gbowee continued her political efforts outside Liberia’s borders. In 2006, she founded the Women Peace and Security Network Africa (WIPSEN-Africa), which works to promote “women’s strategic participation and leadership in peace and security policies in Africa.“ Throughout her speeches and actions, Gbowee emphasizes the power of ordinary women and the symbolic value of the female body. In order to fight patriarchy and promote the power of women as agents of political change, it is crucial to unite as women, mothers, sisters and demand gender equality. We at Large Movements share this sentiment and feel it is important to share with you the story of Leymah Gbowee who has shown the world the influence women can have in peace processes and the true power of pacifism. If you liked the article, share it!

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