Kakuma’s queer voice: A.’s story

Gianmarco Cristaudo
02/02/2023
No Comments
Africa (EN)
KAKUMA, KENYA, LMPRIDE

In our previous articles, we discussed the conditions of the LGBTQ+ community in Kenya and the human rights violations taking place inside the Kakuma refugee camp.
We then took the testimony of J, the first case in our in-depth look at human rights violations within Kakuma.
Continuing, then, the investigation that Large Movements APS is conducting together with International Support Human Rights, in this article we will look at the specific situation of A., the fictitious name of a lesbian woman guest in Kakuma with whom we had the opportunity to speak.
Like so many others living in Kakuma, A. fled her home country because of the discrimination she faced from friends and family because of her homosexuality and sought refuge in neighboring Kenya. The chance to escape the mistreatment and discrimination she endured and the hope of building a better life for herself were the driving forces that pushed her far from home, but the reality she came up against was as harsh on her as the one she escaped from.

Arrival in Kakuma

A is a Ugandan citizen. She fled her country when her family found out about her homosexuality. In fact, A. was strongly discriminated against and suffered severe homophobic attacks of various kinds, to the point that her family, before she managed to flee for Kenya, was about to force her into marriage. She arrived in Kakuma in November 2019 and still resides there.

The violence and unheeded complaints

As soon as she arrived, A. was faced with very difficult living conditions for the LGBTQ+ community residing in Kakuma. Indeed, the coexistence between queer people and other refugees led to several attacks and assaults at the expense of LGBTQ+ guests in the camp. Because of this, A. reports, both she and other members of the queer community residing in Kakuma are deeply afraid for their lives. In July 2020, what had been A.’s home in the camp was set on fire by other guests, and she lost almost all of her belongings in the fire, including basic necessities such as clothes and medicine. After all, the rest of the camp residents repeatedly reported that queer people like A. are not welcome, calling them “a curse” or threatening them with beatings, sexual assaults, and arson attacks.
The situation has been repeatedly reported to UNHCR and the authorities, but both have consistently dismissed A. and failed to provide protection and safeguards from the severe violence suffered by A. and other LGBTQ+ residents. When A.’s house was hit by arson in July 2020, although she immediately reported the incident to UNHCR staff present in the camp, she received support only from the other queer residents of the camp, who provided her with the basic necessities she needed that were destroyed in the fire.

Relocations

One of the main problems preventing the provision of timely services and the effective guarantee of basic human rights is the extreme difficulty in obtaining information, particularly on relocations. In fact, UNHCR staff present in the camp and components of the RAS, the Kenyan government department that manages the entire relocation and refugee status granting process, do not provide clear information or at all. A. herself has never applied for resettlement not only because it is very difficult to get information about the necessary procedures (every time she has tried she has not been assisted, by the very people directly responsible for informing her about it) but also because of her status. One cannot access the resettlement program, in fact, if one has not been granted refugee status. Status which, according to Kenyan law, must be granted or denied within 6 months of the processing of the application. Despite the fact that A. has been in Kakuma for almost 3 years, however, he still has no news about the outcome of his asylum claim.
The fact that he has not applied for relocation, therefore, does not mean that A. does not recognize its importance. So much so that A. told us that she believes that outplacement is the only option that can restore hope to LGTBQ+ people housed in Kenya given that in the context in which they currently find themselves, they cannot move freely, are not provided with basic necessities such as sanitary napkins, and live in fear of being attacked again.
What’s more, she and all the other LGBTQ+ people in Kakuma are traumatized by the treatment they received in the camp. Most of all, they feel like their lives are stuck inside Kakuma, where every day is the same as the last, and they are very scared of the idea of growing old in the camp. A. wants to go back to school and finish her studies. He wants to find a job so he can support himself. He wants a better future for the children in the camp so that they can go back to school as they should, because, as he rightly says, education is a human right.

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Gianmarco Cristaudo

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Kakuma’s queer voice: G.’s story

Giuseppe Antonio Mura e Gianmarco Cristaudo 23 March 2023

In our previous articles we talked about the conditions of the LGBTQ+ community in Kenya and the human rights violations taking place inside the Kakuma refugee camp. We then took up the testimony of J, the first case in our in-depth look at human rights violations within Kakuma, and the testimony of A, a lesbian female guest at Kakuma. Continuing, then, the investigation that Large Movements APS is conducting together with International Support Human Rights, in this article we will analyze the specific situation of G., the fictitious name of an LGBTQ+ boy from Kakuma with whom we had the opportunity to speak. As reported in previous cases, G. also stated that he left his home country as a result of the various assaults he suffered because of his sexuality and sought refuge in neighboring Kenya. The hope of being able to live away from the fear and violence he suffered in what he once called “home” was his compass that guided him along his journey, but life in Kakuma turned out to be far more terrible than he could have imagined. The short stay in Kakuma G. is a Ugandan citizen. He fled his country when life in his homeland had become unbearable after several assaults he suffered because of his sexuality. He arrived in Kakuma in April 2020 and left a year later, in April 2021, when living conditions inside the camp had become very risky, having experienced numerous violent attacks, along with the entire LGBTQ+ community in Kakuma: he was almost set on fire in May 2020 and they tried to poison him twice. It is therefore not surprising that G. describes the conditions inside the Kakuma camp as “horrible.” Police and UNHCR staff negligence G. said he reported to the police and UNHCR staff each time he was subjected to an assault. However, all the emails he wrote were ignored to the point that in April 2021 he was forced to flee for his life after surviving yet another assault.He also told us that upon his arrival he was chosen as the spokesperson for LGBTQ+ people in Kakuma. And it is because of this close contact he has with other people inside the camp that he can assure us that every queer person he knows has experienced the same neglect from the authorities and UNHCR staff. Intimidation, threats, and arbitrary detentions are means often used to oppress the LGBTQ+ community in Kakuma and force them into silence, so much so that G. states that many UNHCR reports from Kenya share information and data that are not at all reliable or close to the truth of the camp, because such information is the result of the use of force on LGBTQ+ refugees, confirming that Kakuma is not a safe place for queer people and that they need and deserve international protection and to be relocated as soon as possible. The questionability of the management of relocations The management of relocations is also questionable. Relocations are so important to LGBTQ+ people in Kakuma because, first and foremost, they give them hope. Hope to live and love freely, to be the person they are, and to become productive members of society. Above all, relocation means freedom and security for G. and those in Kakuma who still live in fear, unable to move freely even when attacked. Although G. never applied for it, as according to him a relocation was implicit in his asylum application, since Kenya is a hostile country for queer people, he told us how the relocation situation was handled while he was in the camp: at first, UNHCR told them that there were only a few available resettlement places and that they were not able to relocate everyone. Then, under the pretext of the health emergency from Covid-19, they delayed the relocations but since the outbreak of the pandemic, the relocations have not happened yet. In addition, the relocations have been used as a weapon by the Kenyan government and sometimes UNHCR staff against the most active and vocal members of the LGBTQ+ community who sought to expose the violations taking place in the camp. Essentially, those who tried to report the very serious conduct in Kakuma, such as G., were threatened that they would never be transferred. In June 2021, after the death of 22-year-old activist Chriton Atuhwera in Kakuma camp two months earlier, G. and LGBTQ+ people inside the camp launched a petition to UNHCR demanding protection and to be transferred. UNHCR officials responded with intimidation to those who wanted to join the petition, saying they would be returned if they signed. “It’s not just about keeping quiet, but they have been proactive in silencing the LGBTQ community,” G. said on the matter. If you liked the article, share it!

Somali piracy

Claudia Rosati 18 January 2021

Somali piracy is often described solely and exclusively as criminal, but what if it has also another function, namely that of guardians of the sea? In this article, an attempt will be made to investigate the nature of the phenomenon, even if there are still few sources that show an alternative vision to the internationally diffused one. Therefore, we will try to identify the elements which define piracy not only as a criminal act, but also as an alternative water defence “force”, a service which the Transitional Government is unable to take full responsibility for. Historical background Modern piracy, which has developed mainly in geopolitically strategic areas, has assumed all the characteristics of the historical definition of “marauder of the sea”. Unlike its analogues, Somali piracy has acquired different characteristics which have made it a particularly difficult phenomenon to study and, above all, to eradicate. These differences are due to the presence of many factors, and in particular, the political situation which Somalia lives. This, in fact, has given rise to a series of key phenomena in the development of piracy. Therefore, the complexity of the Somali situation, lies in the existence and overlapping of different dynamics, local, but also regional and international, which necessitate an all-inclusive approach. However, in this article we will examine one of the many aspects of this phenomenon, trying to answer to the question on the nature of the piracy that has developed in Somali context. Using Somali terms, an attempt will be made to understand whether they fall into the category of burcad badeed, stricto sensu ‘marauders of the sea’, or badaadinta badah, ‘saviours of the sea’. Since the joint efforts of the international community succeeded in eradicating this problem in 2012, the seizure of the oil tanker Aris 13 in 2017 has raised again the attention to the problem, which had been dormant for years, to the area, also portending a return of the same piracy. This attack, however, seems to have been only a brief interlude due to the lowering of the guard of the measures undertaken until then and the withdrawal of the NATO forces of the “Ocean Shield” mission, which ended in 2016. But what if this is just a symptom of a return that could be even more dangerous than the previous one? In this framework, it could be useful to understand the nature of the acts of the Somali pirates and to understand if the initial role of defenders of the sea has disappeared during the evolution that piracy has undergone, becoming finalized only and exclusively to actions of depredation, or if this has only been “hidden” in order to more easily legitimize the actions carried out by the international community. Such an attempt, however, will be very difficult due to the scarcity of data and news by the ‘European eye’. Here, therefore, we will only try to provide some food for thought. Fishermen or professionals? When a political vacuum arose in the country in 1991 due to the fall of Siad Barre’s regime, it was immediately apparent that there was also no centralised structure capable of having effective control over the entire Somali territory and, consequently, its waters. It was from this situation that external actors, mainly European and Chinese fishing vessels and criminal organisations, began to take advantage. Intensive fishing and the dumping of toxic waste were the main motivations for local fishermen to improvise disorganised attacks on invading strangers. Despite this, foreign depredation cannot be defined as the only motivation. Indeed, a more complex picture is added to this: the lack of a centralised state able to take charge of society’s needs, a clan organisation of Somali society that acts as a different representative of order and bearer of principles of political organisation different from those of the modern and post-modern state, and a state of poverty and considerable humanitarian crisis. Therefore, until the 2000’s, one speaks more of a phenomenon aimed at survival, in which the boundary between pirate, fisherman and smuggler is very blurred. It can therefore be assumed that at this stage, although the population that derived its livelihood from the sea had reached considerable levels of frustration due to illegal foreign fishing activities, it had not managed to create a structure that could be considered as a ‘guardian of the waters’. In recent years, in fact, we have mainly witnessed the phenomenon that has been defined as ‘piracy of opportunity’, which can be deduced above all from its discontinuity, the low profitability of the attacks and the short range of action. However, it cannot be ruled out that it was during this period that the criminal-style piracy groups we are accustomed to knowing began to form and develop. In fact, according to a former Somali pirate leader, Farah Hirsi Kulan “Boya”, the passage to a professionalized piracy took place already in 1994. From fortuitous pirates of to a full-fledged coastguard? From the first sporadic and disorganised attacks, pirate activities in a few years changed completely and became a very profitable business. Many claim that there has been a shift from a protest phenomenon to one exclusively based on profit, although this may not be exactly the case. In a political context like that of Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government is the only institutional and internationally recognized power which is not able to extend its authority beyond Mogadishu, allowing other types of “political organizations” to take over control of the space. In fact, “for the entire Somali territory, every level of administration is, to a large extent, entrusted to the hands of clans, village chiefs and warlords” and it is among these leaders that we recognize the most influential figures in piracy. Some of the pirate organisations, which are defined as organised crime, also sought to assume a degree of institutionalisation. They wanted to demonstrate that they were able to carry out not only activities of pillage, kidnapping for ransom or, in any case, connected to enrichment, but also a function

Ilaria Alpi’s murder and the investigation of toxic waste trafficking in Somalia

Rainer Maria Baratti 18 January 2021

On 20 March 1994 in Mogadishu, Somalia, Ilaria Alpi, together with her cameraman Miran Hrovatin, was murdered. The journalist had carried out several missions for TG3 since 1992 to report on the UN peace mission ‘Restore Hope’ and the Somali context of the civil war that broke out following the fall of Siad Barre’s regime, in 1991. The investigation of the Alpi-Hrovatin case focused on the journalist’s last report, which should have been broadcast on the evening of 20 March. Only fragments and incomplete footage of that report remain, as the full version never reached Italy. Neither the motive, nor the instigator, nor the executors of that murder are still clear. Giancarlo Marocchino is one of the main protagonists of the Alpi-Hrovatin case. He is a Piedmontese transporter who was an influential businessman in Mogadishu, for several years. For the SISMI, according to one of the declassified notes, he was “an able and cunning entrepreneur” to work for everyone and to disentangle himself in Somalia ravaged by civil war. According to SISMI, he was involved in the logistics and he was suspected of trafficking in arms and in toxic and radioactive waste. The latter are suspicions still not confirmed by the courts. In the background of the investigation, it is also necessary to keep in mind the Somali context, and in particular the Italian involvement in Somalia. The final report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the death of Ilaria Alpi and Miran Hrovatin, approved in February 2006, analysed various causes of the murder, taking also into account fundamentalism and criminality in the country. An analysis of Ilaria Alpi’s notebooks bring to three lines of investigation from the themes of the last reportage: arms trafficking, toxic waste trafficking and the effects of Italian cooperation in Somalia. Italian cooperation in Somalia Before the beginning of the civil war in Somalia, Italy was a close ally of the government of Siad Barre, Somali president-dictator until 1991. For instance, Italy sold arms to Somalia which stockpiled them in various warehouses in the country, and they were object of interest of the militias and warlords, following the fall of the regime. It is generally acknowledged that Italy supported, economically and politically, Siad Barre even at a time when the regime appeared completely discredited in the eyes of international public opinion and the majority of the Somali people. Among Alpi’s lines of enquiry was Italy’s cooperation with developing countries, particularly Somalia. The journalist was interested in the phenomenon of aid in general and how it was managed, as well as whether it could have been used for illicit enrichment rather than the purpose for which it was given. In particular, Alpi was interested in the Garoe-Bosaso road and the Shifco fishing project. Italian parliament started development cooperation in Somalia in 1979, with substantial funding. In particular, during the period 1986-1989, the volume of Italian investment in Somalia and the Horn of Africa increased exponentially and it was only interrupted by the outbreak of civil war in 1992. The final report of the parliamentary commission states that in the decade 1981-1990, 80% of the funds were allocated to the implementation of projects defined as ‘physical’. Out of the total, 49% were allocated to the construction of large infrastructures, 21% to productive investments and 15% to investments defined as “socio-communitarian” (projects that can be considered as benefiting the population). This set-up of Italian cooperation has been marked by programming shortcomings and a lack of coordination with multilateral and international initiatives. Moreover, the actual success of these cooperation initiatives was heavily undermined by the prerogative to protect the interests of Italian companies, lobbies and pressure groups in Somali, not taking into account the real needs of the country. The analysis of these policies of international cooperation was conducted during the season of Tangentopoli. In this context, a number of enquiries brought to light a reality in which allocations for cooperation with developing countries were a significant part of the entire Italian bribe system. The investigations uncovered costly and unnecessary projects, multi-billion dollar allocations, bribes and trafficking of all kinds, including arms to Somalia. In this regard, the 1994 Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into Cooperation with Developing Countries went on a mission to Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya from 29 January to 31 January 1996. The report stressed that there had been many management errors and that a lot of money had gone into the wrong hands. Among the most controversial works financed by the Italian government there were Garoe-Bosaso road and the port of Bosaso, as well as the ocean fishing project and its fishing company ‘Shifco’. With regard to the road, the average cost per km was 605 million, which is disproportionate to the average expenditure in Italy, but also compared to other roads built with development cooperation funds in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, at the beginning of 1979, an attempt was made to undertake an ocean fishing project marked by disasters and failures. This led to the creation of the ‘Shifco’ company, which arranged for the transfer of fishing vessels after the anti-Barre war of 1990 to the waters of the Gulf of Aden. There is a suspicion that this initiative, characterised by serious design errors, served firstly to enrich private Italian and Somali groups, even not necessarily through illicit means. Arms trafficking in Somalia Before embarking on her last trip, Ilaria Alpi had identified the area of Bosaso, a port city in the north of Somalia, as an area of ‘journalistic interest’ and she had the intention to investigate there about arms trafficking and the intertwining with ‘bad cooperation’ and the trafficking of toxic waste. Indeed, Alpi pursue some research on the Shifco ships, looking for evidence. The last interview before the murder seems to focus on this aspect. The cameraman Alberto Calvi, with whom Alpi had worked on previous missions to Somalia, reported that the journalist had always looked for evidence in relation to arms and drug trafficking. As a possible lead

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Climate migration in Africa: an overview of the phenomenon

Rainer Maria Baratti 18 January 2021

Climate and environmental migrations are a phenomenon discussed at the various environmental forums. However, each context brings with it differences in causes and consequences. In the meantime, a response on both fronts is becoming gradually urgent, while at the international level there are increasing difficulties in reaching agreement. Environmental and climate migrations Climate migration in Africa is an increasingly central topic in migration debate. As early as 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations’ scientific forum for studying global warming and its effects, noted that the greatest impact could be on human migration. Therefore, it is necessary to remember the subtle difference between environmental migration, due to direct human action (e.g. caused by environmental damage such as oil spills), and climate migration: migration caused by the meteorological impact of climate change. To clarify, it should be recalled that the scientific community has long recognised the anthropogenic origin of climate change. However, it should be specified that it is not easy to distinguish between the two types of migration and they often move in parallel, adding up in their effects on human mobility. At the same time, the meteorological impact of climate change can be divided into two distinct migration factors: climatic processes and non-climatic factors. To the one hand, climate processes include phenomena such as rising sea levels, salinisation of agricultural land, salinisation of water and soil, desertification and increasing water scarcity, as well as climatic events such as floods and irregularities (as well as violence) in rainfall. To the other hand, non-climatic factors are political instability, population growth or community resilience to natural disasters. Finally, all these factors contribute to the degree of vulnerability that people and societies experience. Rainfalls’ effects in Africa and climate migration With regard to climatic migrations in Africa, an increasing irregularity of rainfall is observed in large parts of sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in arid and semi-arid areas. Certainly, this leads to an increasingly unpredictable start and early end of the rainy season, prolonged phases of seasonal drought, and more intense rainfall. In addition, the trend seems to be towards a reduction in the general level of rainfall and an increase in occasional heavy rainfall. This means increasing difficulties for agricultural systems dependent on rainfall for irrigation. Consequently, these dynamics pose a persistent threat to food security as they result in the loss of large crops and staple foods such as maize and millet. In addition, changes in rainfall are accompanied by flooding, river overflows and flooding caused by cyclone activity in coastal areas. In Africa, from the point of view of climate migration, we have different effects depending on the area affected. On the highlands of East Africa, floods destroy settlements and agricultural fields, often forcing farmers to abandon their cultivated areas. In the lowlands, river floods and large-scale flooding mainly affect livestock farmers operating in arid and semi-arid areas, threatening also urban workers. In southern Africa, land near large river basins and coastal areas (particularly in southeastern Africa and Madagascar) are affected by high intensity flooding, triggering temporary or permanent migration. In conclusion, it must be said that the high dependence on agriculture and livestock forces small-scale farmers and pastoral communities to diversify their sources of income. This leads to an increase in circular and seasonal migration flows within the African continent, which represents a fundamental adaptation and resilience strategy. Climate Migration and forms of mobility within Africa In Africa we can see rural-urban and rural-rural circular labour mobility flows that are a common reaction in all regions of the continent. In this case we speak about ‘migration as adaptation’ to climate change. Often, individuals migrate for a certain period of time in order to earn money and employ it to mitigate the difficulties of their households. However, it must be remembered that there are the so-called ‘trapped populations’, i.e. those many households that are affected by the consequences of climate change but do not have enough resources to move. In addition, there is no ‘automaticity’ to displacement because of labour exploitation, unavailability of employment. Hence, harsh living and working conditions for migrants sometimes weaken the positive potential of migration. The most mobile communities in terms of climate migration are pastoral and semi-pastoral communities. Firstly, these are forced to move or temporarily relocate due to drought. Secondly, such displacements can take two different forms: processes of local sedentarisation or migration to urban contexts. Both of these two forms can have negative implications. For instance, communities often settle along rivers to allow livestock to drink and thus increase their vulnerability to flooding. Meanwhile, migration to urban contexts often leads newcomers to live in the slums of mega-cities. Here, in addition to the sanitation problems they may face, they may be subject to increasing violence. Environmental and political risks While environmental changes and their potential consequences are the key agents of climate migration, they are also linked to political, social, economic and cultural factors. In other words, the risk of climate migration is particularly serious in the presence of a generally unstable socio-political framework and prolonged armed conflicts. Let’s take an example of a fragile context with water scarcity caused by drought. In this case we are in a context with limited access to resources. First, we may have an increased likelihood of conflict over access to water between farmers and herders. Secondly, the materialisation of conflict or resource scarcity itself may lead to climate migration. Thirdly, the element of terrorism should not be overlooked. Africa is the continent that suffers most from the violence of terrorism. Often the choice to pick up a gun and serve the cause of a terrorist group is linked to a kind of law of the strongest: ‘I have the weapons, I can grab that resource’. Often the resource we are talking about is water, other times it may be the very management of a portion of territory. So, the choice of affiliation to a terrorist group is always more tied to the capacity

Talibè children in Senegal: life in the balance between abuse and begging

Rainer Maria Baratti 18 January 2021

Dustiness, dirtiness, and barefoot children, most of them Talibè, holding empty tomato cans or plastic bowls in their hands populate the streets of Dakar and in many other cities in Senegal. A 2007 UNICEF study on child begging in Dakar, the capital of Senegal, found that more than 90% of the children are Taliban. However, official statistics are still missing and children between 8 and 15 years of age are involved. Talibé and Marabutto in Senegal The term Talibè in the Wolof language means ‘disciple’ and refers to children attending the Daara, the Koranic schools run by the Marabuttos, who teach the precepts of Islam on the basis of mnemonic learning of the Koran. For centuries, the Daaras in Senegal have ensured that Islamic education has spread to all segments of the West African country’s population. Here, however, physical punishment is often carried out, which for many West African Muslim countries is considered an important part of the educational process. Between the Talib and his Marabout there is a relationship of devotion and strict obedience as the Marabout offers his guidance and protection to his disciples who express their trust through financial support or tithing. In Senegal, the issue of the Taliban is not seen in a homogeneous way, some promoting its spread while others close it down. In addition, parents who decide to send their children to a Daara often do so through de facto fostering, because of their own economic difficulties, and to offer a better future to the child by building a relationship with the Muslim brotherhood to which the Marabout belongs and consequently to prepare the child for a career as a Marabout. It should be noted, however, that the Taliban’s education remains essentially linked to West African values in terms of children’s education. Begging, punishment and life in the Daara Originally, begging by the Taliban consisted of asking for food to supplement the Daara’s supplies when the Marabout’s fields crops could not support the needs. This practice evolved as the Daara developped in an urban environment and required a change for the income. Thus, the practice of almsgiving resulted in children giving money instead of food. The problem of Marabout abuse of Taliban children in Senagal is not subject to state regulation and as a result some schools abuse the relationship between disciple and teacher. Often, what should be an institution of education can take on negative facets. Some Marabouts exploit Taliban for labour or forced begging on the streets, instead of teaching Koran to them. In some cases, this exploitation exposes children to disease, injury, death, physical and sexual abuse inside or outside the Daara. A Human Rights Watch survey of 175 Taliban children in Senegal estimated an average of just under 8 hours a day, every day, of begging for between 373 CFA (0.56 €) and 445 CFA (0.67 $) on holidays. This is a difficult amount to achieve as just under 30% of the Senegalese population lives on less than 593 CFA (0.90 €) a day and 55% live on less than 949 CFA (1.44 €). In addition to money, food quotas such as sugar and rice are often demanded. If this quota is not met, there is a risk of physical abuse, and for example, many children show scars and bruises, due to the application of electric cables or sticks. However, is the older Talib, who becomes the assistant to the Marabout, to be responsible for punishing younger Talibels who do not pay back their daily quota or who return late. In cases where the Marabout does not supervise the children, the older Talib has absolute power over them and he can rob them or abuse them physically or sexually. In general, children risk beatings, sexual abuse, chaining, imprisonment and numerous forms of neglect and danger in at least 8 of the 14 administrative regions of Senegal. In addition, there are risks associated with the trafficking and migration of Taliban children in Africa, including the illicit transportation of Taliban groups across regions and national borders. The Senegalese Taliban often lack basic necessities and accommodation, having to endure longer hours of begging or sleeping on the streets. Indeed, conditions in urban Daara are often characterised by malnutrition, lack of clothing, exposure to disease and poor hygiene. Often hundreds of Taliban children live in extremely dirty and squalid conditions in unfinished buildings with no walls, floors or windows. Here rubbish, sewage and flies clog the ground and the air, and children often sleep crammed into dozens in an open-air room, most of them without mosquito nets and therefore at risk of infection or disease. Moreover, the situation is exacerbated when the children become ill, they are forced to beg to pay for their treatment. The many rights violated From a legal point of view, there are many issues related to human rights and children’s rights. Hence, the situation of Taliban children in Senegal calls into question several international conventions. When we talk about the Taliban, we face with cases of slavery, forced labour and human trafficking. Some NGOs argue that when a Marabout acquires custody of a Talibé to force him to beg, this practice is a “practice akin to slavery” as defined by the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery (1956). Furthermore, the Forced and Compulsory Labour Convention (1930) describes forced labour as “work which is performed by any person under threat of any penalty and for which the person in question has not offered himself voluntarily”. In addition, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has deemed the practice of exploitation of the Taliban in Senegal to fall within the scope of the Convention concerning the Prohibition of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999), equating forced begging with slavery. In turn, Human Rights Watch, considering ILO’s point of view, has argued that the Marabouts, when they transport the Taliban with the primary intention of obtaining work from them, are involved in child trafficking. In this regard, reference is made to

Leymah Gbowee

Myrlande Nardi 27 December 2021

In October 2011 Leymah Gbowee, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Tawakkol Kaman were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize as a result of “their non-violent struggle for women’s security and their right to participate in the peace process“. Today, let’s talk about Leymah Gbowee and her perpetual commitment to women’s rights. Civil War in Liberia:Gbowee began her work as an activist with the group Liberia Mass Action for Peace (LMAP) in April 2003. Her native country, Liberia, had been in a state of civil war for 14 years. It all began in 1989 when Charles Taylor entered Liberia and aided by the rebel forces of the National Patriotic Front for Freedom, threatened the capital, Monrovia, and the government of Samuel Doe. After nine months, Doe was killed and Taylor took power. This did not stop the hostilities and although Taylor won the 1997 presidential election with 75% of the vote, a new civil war broke out that same year. Between 1989 and 2003, more than 270,000 people died, the neonatal mortality rate was 157 deaths per 1000 births, and the infant mortality rate for children under 5 was 235 per 1000. As a result of the conflict and the high infant mortality rate, 80% of the rural population was forced to migrate. Unfortunately, the conflict was characterized by the indiscriminate use of rape by all sides, including international troops who intervened to restore peace. Gbowee and other LMAP activists then began to protest against the violence: their rhetoric was based on concerns about the welfare of children and the future of the country. They used three tactics in particular: they organized public demonstrations to emphasize that the real victims of the conflict were women and children, they threatened to undress in public, and they established a political agenda to defend women’s rights both nationally and internationally. Taylor resigned in August 2003 and was forced into exile in Nigeria. A peace agreement was signed and in 2005 presidential elections were held which saw the victory of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf: the first woman to be elected president in an African state. The role of women in peace negotiations: Let’s look together at why these women were so influential. First, the women highlighted the fact that the war had brought only death and destruction. It was not a war for land, money or political power – it was a war that exterminated mothers and children. After that, Gbowee and the other activists emphasized their status as mothers and women and therefore as “guardians of society”. They emphasized their role as mothers and sisters to the men involved in the conflict and stressed the importance of national unity based on family. This rhetoric worked because in Libera the role of women, as mothers, is very strong and there is a sense of respect for them as they are seen as creators and sustainers of the community and nation. The men decided to attend the peace negotiations because their “mothers” had requested it. However, words alone were not enough to bring about a real peace agreement, so the women took action using an act of high symbolic value: they deliberately undressed in public. On July 21, Gbowee and the other activists entered the building where the negotiations were taking place and sat outside the room where the men were arguing. When they were threatened with arrest, Gbowee stated that she would not object but would first undress and shown herself to the assembly naked. She later explained that in Africa it is considered a terrible curse to see a woman, married and elderly, deliberately undress in public: that action would indisputably highlight the deep despair of Liberian women. Moreover, by undressing, she would deprive the men of their “masculinity” and the strength they had used with impunity throughout the conflict, raping and killing without restraint. In doing so, Gbowee was reclaiming her life and body, and in the process ceasing to be a helpless victim and becoming politically powerful and influential. The activists declared that they would only leave the building when Taylor and the other parties involved would actively participate in the negotiations. Negotiations then resumed and an agreement was finally reached. The importance of Leymah Gbowee’s work around the world: After the signing of the peace accords and the end of the war, Gbowee continued her political efforts outside Liberia’s borders. In 2006, she founded the Women Peace and Security Network Africa (WIPSEN-Africa), which works to promote “women’s strategic participation and leadership in peace and security policies in Africa.“ Throughout her speeches and actions, Gbowee emphasizes the power of ordinary women and the symbolic value of the female body. In order to fight patriarchy and promote the power of women as agents of political change, it is crucial to unite as women, mothers, sisters and demand gender equality. We at Large Movements share this sentiment and feel it is important to share with you the story of Leymah Gbowee who has shown the world the influence women can have in peace processes and the true power of pacifism. If you liked the article, share it!

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