(Anti) American caravan: an unreturned love

In Colombia, as in all of Latin America, the intensification of land exploitation through extractive policies has a negative impact on the environment and on human rights, especially those of indigenous peoples, highlighting the shortcomings of a development model that is anything but sustainable. The extractive model The concept of extractivism is widely used in Latin America to refer to a mode of accumulation that began with the colonization of the American subcontinent, which envisages that some regions of the world are specialized in the extraction and export of raw materials, while other regions are dedicated to their consumption. In this sense, the activities considered extractivist are those that include the exploitation of large quantities of natural resources, such as minerals, oil, agricultural and forest products. Latin American countries are highly dependent on the extraction of their natural resources and their exportation abroad, following a model of export-led growth which does not allow for diversification of the economy and makes it dangerously dependent on the value that the raw materials in question have on the international market, an example is the case of Venezuela. Criticism of the extractive model is, however, primarily concerned with its effects on the environment. If the environment and its resources are considered exclusively as economic goods to be sold to the highest bidder and as means to increase development, and if the latter is understood as a mere increase in gross domestic product, it goes without saying that Latin American countries are experiencing a lack of protection and environmental degradation. The environmental conception of the indigenous people of Abya Yala Latin America or Abya Yala, as it is called by indigenous peoples, is an area that exemplifies how the unconditional exploitation of natural resources has consequences not only at the environmental level, but also in relation to the rights of those peoples closely interconnected with nature, the indigenous peoples, whose population is estimated at about 42 million in the South American territory. The contribution of indigenous peoples to the management and protection of the environment is now recognized internationally, just think that the so-called “protectors of the Earth” preserve about 80% of the planet’s biodiversity. The territory constitutes for indigenous peoples a spiritual and material basis inextricably linked to their past and future identity. From the 1990s onwards, a recovery of the indigenous environmental vision began starting with the spread of the Andean concepts of Pacha Mama and Buen vivire and their inclusion in some Latin American constitutions, such as those of Bolivia and Ecuador. The concept of buen vivir, sumak kawsay in the Quechua language, implies a life in harmony between individuals, communities and nature and is present with different terms in all Latin American indigenous cultures. In the indigenous cosmovision, well-being is only possible within the community and with respect for the Pacha Mama, so the essential element of buen vivir is the protection of nature. In this sense, it is an excellent alternative to modern environmental and development challenges. Given the inseparable link that indigenous peoples have with the environment and territory, on the one hand because of their spiritual and cultural characteristics, and on the other because most of them materially depend on natural resources, it can be said that their survival as indigenous peoples depend on the preservation and protection of the environment in which they live. On the other hand, since colonization these peoples have faced illicit appropriation of their ancestral lands, forced relocation of communities, and pollution of the natural resources on which they depend. Fortunately, Latin American indigenous movements are characterized by a historical solidity and strength that has led them to resist, as far as possible, the numerous attempts of extermination and assimilation that have been perpetrated against them since the period of European colonization.In the name of “development,” mining, hydroelectric projects and energy megaprojects, including renewable energy projects, are being implemented on indigenous territories, leading to the forced displacement of indigenous peoples, often without adequate compensation. The election of political leaders, such as Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, who support land grabbing by multinational corporations can only make the situation worse. The mining industry, in particular, has devastating effects on indigenous communities, as these persist even when mining projects end. Mining projects have negative consequences on the cohesion of the indigenous peoples of the territory where they take place, due to forced displacement and community divisions. Moreover, they often prevent traditional agro-pastoral activities from taking place. The convergence between environmental protection and the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights is emblematic in the Amazon region, yet, in those very territories there are multiple mining and oil extraction projects. The impact of extractive policies in Colombia Colombia is also suffering from the consequences of the increasing increase in extractive policies, which fall primarily on the environment. Even though Colombia is part of the so-called “megadiverse” countries, that is the richest countries in biodiversity on the planet, and in fact has 311 ecosystems, what should be the main wealth to be preserved often becomes a bargaining chip to pursue neo-liberal policies. For this reason, the country is characterized by a high incidence of environmental conflicts involving above all the indigenous peoples, who represent about 3.4% of the population. In recent decades, Colombia has seen an increase in state development policies aimed at extractive activities and the development of mega-projects with high environmental and social impact. In departments such as Chocó, La Guajira and Amazonia, this has led to the forced displacement of indigenous communities, environmental pollution of territories and situations of violence and insecurity. At the same time, legislation has also been passed that favors large transnational investments. These include Law No. 685 of 2001, the so-called Código de minas, which favors the participation of private companies in the processes of exploration and exploitation of minerals and hydrocarbons, and a 2019 ruling by the Colombian Constitutional Court, which removes the mandatory nature of popular consultations in cases of mining projects that threaten to profoundly transform the land use

In Colombia, the transitional phase that sees the incessant civil war acquiesce towards peace knows an abrupt halt during 2019, just three years after the signing of the bilateral agreement. What are the new obstacles standing in the way of the peace agreement between the government and the revolutionary armed group FARC – EP? To answer this question, we need to take a step back. Colombia entered the new millennium in a situation of great instability. The guerrilla groups that rebelled against the state, which was considered non-existent in large rural areas of the country, had reached the height of their power. Chief among these armed groups were the FARC-EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo). With the presidency of Álvaro Uribe Vélez (not coincidentally nicknamed “the warlord”), the situation was quickly reversed. His controversial counteroffensive strategies, over the course of his two terms in office, brought remarkable results including the beginning of the FARC’s decline. Since his election to the presidency in 2010, Juan Manuel Santos has begun to depart from his predecessor’s political ideas by promoting dialogue with revolutionary forces until a peace agreement is reached. The bilateral treaty addresses numerous issues considered the fundamental causes of more than 50 years of internal conflict. The document lists the various measures that, by mutual agreement, must be taken by both parties to establish peace between the government and the FARC group. However, a few months later, the end of Santos’ term of office calls into question all the efforts made until then. The election of Iván Duque Márquez, a close ally of Uribe, and his manifest intention to modify the agreement, puts former FARC combatants on notice. In addition, the events that have been making the situation in Colombia even more tense since 2019 hint at a concrete threat of a return to war. The FARC: from armed struggle to political struggle and back again First of all, the disarmament of the guerrillas, supervised by a UN commission created ad hoc, is completed by the majority of FARC members, but not by all of them. Some thousands of fighters, in fact, have refused to come to terms with the government. These never came out of the jungle and never abandoned the armed struggle. Their actions have scaled down, in parallel with the number of their members, but their existence endures the peace process. The most recent information on this subject, claims that these groups have sought refuge in Venezuela, while some speculate that they may be affiliated with other guerrilla groups such as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). What is certain is that, due to the current circumstances of Colombian politics, the group of demobilized is growing stronger thanks also to the affiliation of those who, after embracing civilian life, have decided to return to live in the jungle as clandestine fighters. Critical issues in the peace process If implemented, the treaty could meet the demands of revolutionary groups and avoid further casualties. However, its implementation is encountering numerous obstacles, as has happened in the past in the history of the Colombian conflict. First of all, the political participation of the ex-members of the FARC has not been assured in the last elections. The new political party has had little prominence, perhaps due to the bad reputation the group has earned through the decades. More importantly, since embracing civilian life, many repentants have seen death at the hands of hit men. Now a widespread practice in Colombia; systematic assassinations of political opposition have claimed the lives of some 200 FARC members and more than 600 social leaders, indigenous tribesmen, and human rights activists since the signing of the treaty. Land cultivation and property management was the main issue that caused the outbreak and prolongation of the conflict over the decades. The Integral Rural Reform and the reconversion of lands previously used for cocaine cultivation are therefore at the core of the peace treaty. Nonetheless, implementation and financing are slow, and peasants are not benefiting at all from the new conditions. The shortcomings of the Truth Courts The issue of victims of the conflict is not being satisfactorily addressed. The frightening figures remain far-fetched, and there is speculation that the actual numbers are much higher. The Truth Commission, not being imperative with its sanctions, struggles to carry out its duties. And so, the victims remain without justice, the perpetrators unpunished and the corpses unnamed. But not only that; the greatest defect of the Integral System of Justice that has been established since the signing of the agreement is that it does not guarantee any kind of protection to those who want to testify for the truth, and the sad tradition of murders in Colombia makes this system seem like a trap for those who want to contribute to peace and justice. The circumstances listed so far make the period of dialogue and mutual concessions that characterized former President Santos’ two terms in office seem like a rip-off of Colombia’s violent rule. Instead of strengthening the foundations of peace, his successor and current president Duque directly undermines them, directing his political propaganda against the agreement with the FARC and financing it with the Fund for Peace, thus making use of international funds for electoral and personal purposes. The threat of a return to civil war in Colombia is therefore becoming more and more concrete as we move into 2019. Some encouraging signs Nevertheless, the support of the international sphere that the peace agreement with the FARC has received cannot be ignored. In addition to the UN and its Security Council, individual states have also been advocating for peace in Colombia, committing to the bilateral ceasefire and as members of the Truth Commission. In addition, there are the citizens who are showing that they have grown tired of the violence and of the systematic murder of the political opposition, which inevitably leads to the death of democracy. This part of the population, with a strong and fresh

With 4.6 million people leaving Venezuela as a result of the political and economic crisis of recent years, an unprecedented migration crisis is underway in Latin America. At a time of hostility, closure and the erection of walls, neighboring Colombia has absorbed some 1.8 million Venezuelan migrants, practicing, so far, a policy of solidarity obviously not without contradictions. The Venezuelan crisis Gone are the years of the Venezuelan economic boom, when the Caribbean country represented, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), one of the preferred destinations for Latin American internal migrants. The situation has reversed; now people flee from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Some 4.6 million people have done so in just a few years, and the UNHCR estimates that it will reach 6.5 million by the end of 2020, almost 20% of Venezuela’s population. The reasons for the exodus, second in the world only to that of Syria, seem obvious when one considers that the Venezuelan economy shrank by two-thirds from 2013 to 2019 and that the country has, in the last few years, entered a period of profound political, as well as economic, instability. Significantly, the Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, a sustainer of Hugo Chávez’s so-called Bolivarian socialism, is not recognized by most of the international community and last year the main opposition leader Juan Guaidó proclaimed himself president in a failed attempt to seize power. The causes of the current Venezuelan situation are complex and multiple: hyperinflation, sanctions dictated by the United States, debt accumulated over the years, lack of democracy in government policies and an economic system which has been based for a long time almost exclusively on oil production; fortune and doom of the country. The geopolitical roots of a crisis are never easy to trace in Latin America, perhaps the greatest terrain of ideological clash between capitalism and socialism, historically torn apart by hoarding, corruption, and external interference. What is certain are the facts: the political-economic crisis has forced Venezuela into a condition of extreme poverty and lack of basic necessities, such as food and medicine, and the population is abandoning the country en masse. Migration to Colombia Almost 80% of Venezuelan migrants are in Latin America and the country that has absorbed the most is neighboring Colombia, on the western border of the Caribbean country, followed by Peru, Chile, Ecuador, Brazil, and Argentina. According to official data from Migración Colombia, as of December 2019 there were more than 1,771,000 Venezuelans present in the country, of which about 220,000 were minors. Unlike other South American countries, Colombia was not used to receiving migrants, on the contrary it was Colombians who emigrated in search of a better life, far from the civil war that tore the country apart for decades. Venezuela, more than any other country, has welcomed Colombian refugees, who were attracted by its past economic prosperity. Although a 2019 UNHCR report shows how, in recent years, Colombian expatriates to Venezuela have increasingly returned home, Colombia’s people historical memory has not forgotten the welcome they received. The idea of returning the favor, linked perhaps to an awareness of the inevitability of the Venezuelan migration phenomenon, has led Colombia to adopt fairly open migration policies. In 2016, for example, Special Permanence Permits (Pep) were established, allowing Venezuelan migrants to enjoy basic rights, such as access to work, health and education. These permits were even more useful due to the inability of Venezuelans to renew their documents, given the halt of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela and the subsequent closure of the embassies. Dating back to the summer of 2019 is another measure of the Colombian government praised by humanitarian organizations, namely the granting of citizenship to 24 thousand children born in Colombia to Venezuelan women, with an ex-post effect also on births that will take place in the next two years. The figures that Colombia is investing to manage the recent migratory phenomenon are high, and difficult to sustain for a country facing the consequences of a die-hard conflict. Nevertheless, mechanisms have been established at the regional level to coordinate and facilitate the legal, social, and economic inclusion of Venezuelan citizens. In fact, the governments of the Latin American countries most affected by the arrival of Venezuelans have jointly launched the Regional Humanitarian Response Plan for Refugees and Migrants 2020 (RMRP), an instrument intended to coordinate and raise funds to manage the flow of migration. A delicate balance The Colombian population initially reacted positively to the reception of Venezuelan migrants, but it seems that cases of xenophobia and stigmatization have increased in recent months. In a society like Colombia, strongly striven by the armed conflict and by a growing social stratification, Venezuelan migrants have added  themselves to the most marginalized segment of the population, the one that populates the suburbs of the big cities. According to Colombian authorities, 90% of Venezuelans in Colombia work in the informal economy. On the other hand, according to the National Administrative Department of Statistics, 47.2% of Colombians themselves work in informality and precariousness. The new emergency situation created by the COVID-19 pandemic has further complicated the situation of Venezuelan migrants. Colombian President Ivàn Duque on March 13, 2020 temporarily closed the borders to stem the spread of the new coronavirus, but the more than two thousand kilometers of border separating the two countries, in part isolated areas affected by armed conflict, are difficult to control. The risk is greater for migrants not legally registered in Colombia, about half of the nearly two million present in the territory, according to an estimate by Migración Colombia. The latter thus lack access to health care, in addition to being constantly at risk of violence, exploitation, child labor, recruitment by armed groups and trafficking. Lastly, a consequence of COVID-19, concerns groups of Venezuelan migrants who have been trying to return home in recent weeks. The quarantine measures adopted by the Colombian government, for the moment scheduled until April 27, have blocked the informal economy and some migrants, now